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Abstract 
The end of the Cold War brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and caused 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to think hard about its changed role in the 
world. Coincident with these momentous events was the disintegration of the former 
. Yugoslavia and the attendant civil wars in the Balkans. At a given point in history, 
therefore, NATO and its former Cold War protagonist Russia found themselves 
undergoing fundamental changes while being forced to deal with the immediacy of 
the crisis in the Balkans. 
This thesis examines, from a NATO perspective, how the Alliance and Russia came 
to terms with their changing status after the Cold War, and how their relationship 
developed throughout the 1990s and beyond. In particular, it focuses on the course of 
the relationship during the bloody civil war in Bosnia, and in the NATO campaign 
against Serbia in Kosovo, known as Operation Allied Force. 
The thesis considers the disparate nature of the twenty-six member Alliance and, 
ultimately, its dependence upon US political leadership and military power to act 
effectively. It considers also the relative weakness ofthe post-Soviet Russian 
Federation, and its attempts to maintain its great power status despite its greatly 
reduced circumstances. The conduct of the unequal relationship between a powerful 
NATO and a weakened Russia is traced through the course of their interaction in 
Bosnia from 1991 to 1995, and their subsequent cooperation in peacekeeping there. It 
is examined further in the case of the war over Kosovo, and the deep rift which it 
caused between the Alliance and Moscow, only partially bridged by their 
peacekeeping activities in the province. 
In conclusion the thesis attempts an evaluation of the significance of the Balkans in 
the overall context of NATO-Russia relations, and offers some thoughts for the future 
of the relationship. 
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Introduction 
This work is concerned with the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), arguably the most powerful political and military alliance in 
the world, and the Russian Federation, the much-reduced successor state to NATO's 
erstwhile adversary, the Soviet Union. The period under consideration is from 1991 
to 2002, tracing the course ofthe relationship from the collapse of the Soviet Union to 
the establishment of "a new quality"l in their interaction via the creation of the 
NATO-Russia Council. In particular, the thesis focuses on relations as played out in 
the Former Yugoslavia, the disintegration of which in the early 1990s provided a 
severe testing ground for the development of security relationships in Europe. 
Why Should Russia Matter to NATO? 
The relationship between the security pre-eminence of NATO and the reduced (from 
its Soviet predecessor) power of the Russian Federation is, on the face of it, an 
unequal one. No one any longer argues seriously in terms of a perceived Russian 
threat to the West. For some years now NATO has concentrated its attention on other 
security challenges in the knowledge that its former ideological adversary is not in a 
position to threaten it. Ifproofwere needed the tragic episode ofthe loss of the 
Kursk, and the painfully protracted engagement in Chechnya provide stark examples 
of Russian military decline. Yet Russia's very weakness, and the dangers attendant 
upon it, oblige NATO to give due regard to its relationship with Moscow. 
That this should be so may not be immediately apparent. As the course ofthe NATO 
enlargement debate has demonstrated, realpolitik has played a significant role in any 
calculation ofthe balance of advantage in the NATO-Russian relationship. One may 
reasonably ask why the stronger party should take account ofthe views of the weaker 
when other forces, not least economic, will compel the latter to behave in certain ways 
amenable to the former anyway. There is an appealing simplicity to the argument that 
the pain involved in cultivating Russia is not worth the perceived gain to NATO and 
the West generally, but this may well be an imprudent course. 
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Despite its decline there are strong cards still available to Russia. First, at a time 
when there is already a good deal of debate about the potential for transatlantic 
divergence within NATO, the relationship with Russia remains a significant test of 
Alliance cohesion. As the experience of George W. Bush's administration indicates, 
there is a greater tendency to unilateralism in the US, a subject discussed further in the 
conclusion to this work. An impatient approach from Washington could alienate its 
allies to their mutual detriment. For its part Russia has proven, over time, keen to 
engage with leading European states and institutions such as the EU, but on its own 
privileged terms as a symbol of its self-proclaimed continued great power status. As 
far as Moscow has been concerned such engagement is all the more desirable if it 
holds out the prospect of counterbalancing NATOIUS hegemony in European security 
affairs. To that extent Russia has shown increasing interest in the EU's attempts to 
give effect militarily and politically to a European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP)2, and although Russian inclusion is some way off, its engagement is 
indicative ofa European focus to Moscow's foreign policy, and the potential for 
European security structures and activities independent of NATO IUS. 
Secondly, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council Russia continues to 
hold a veto on UN actions, something which can be used to frustrate the designs of 
other members. This is an important forum when it comes to consensus building on 
how to deal with major international issues, and Moscow caunot realistically be 
expected to automatically support any state or grouping of states deemed inimical to 
its own interests. Thus, from NATO's viewpoint, cultivation of Russia has been seen 
as desirable because its leading member states need to work through the UN, for 
example in enforcing peacekeeping mandates. That would seem to be consistent with 
the logic of NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, which gave much greater emphasis to 
the language of cooperation and partnership than its 1991 predecessor. Even allowing 
for instances such as Operation Allied Force (see chapter three), when NATO was 
prepared to sideline Russian views when occasion demanded, for the most part, 
NATO-led peacekeeping activities in the Balkans have been authorised by UN 
Security Council resolutions. 
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Third, there is a danger of NATO fostering opposition by neglect, that is to say 
allowing resentment to create links between those weak states which, individually, 
feel themselves to be disadvantaged by the overbearing attitudes and approaches of 
the more powerful, whether states or alliances. Contacts between Russia, China and 
India, based upon similar shared dislikes, are a case in pOine. The ability of these 
states to influence events contrary to the wishes of NATO and the West suggests the 
emergence ofa potential rival bloc to that of the Alliance. Further, for Moscow to 
seek to establish ties with Beijing despite many serious differences, reflects a 
perception in Moscow that NATO poses a greater threat to Russia than China does. 
NATO has thus been a catalyst for Sino-Russian rapprochement4• 
Fourth, Russia's disastrous military decline, coupled with its perceived loss of 
standing in the international arena, has produced a degree of resentment and hostility 
in the country. This has fed into foreign policy thinking to produce an increased level 
of dissatisfaction with the West. Prior to the attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) 
in New York in September 2001, there were signs in Russia of a developing siege 
mentalit~. The Military Doctrine adopted in 2000 was a clear indication ofthis 
development. Although not the first declaration of Russia's rejection ofthe 'no first 
use' principle on nuclear weapons, it provided a restatement of it, reinforcing the . 
message that Russia remained detennined to have its views regarded as those of a 
great power. After September 2001 the Putin government adopted a much more 
cooperative approach with NATO and the West, for example in the area of combating 
terrorism. It remains a matter of debate, however, as to how genuine this pro-western 
'conversion' has been, some arguing that it is merely a sophisticated method adopted 
by the Putin leadership for ensuring a Russian balance of advantage6• 
Its post-Cold War ascendancy may have inclined some in NATO to relative inactivity 
in dealing with Russia, even allowing for the risks outlined above. The leading view, 
however, has been to effect a working relationship which gives due recognition to 
Russian views and so acknowledges that the relationship matters. In the period since 
September 2001, there has been a growing willingness among the NATO allies and in 
Moscow to pursue cooperative engagement in a world increasingly concerned with 
international terrorism, one in which there has been something of a recognition that 
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Russian and western views on international security are perhaps not so divergent after 
ale. As NATO's post-9/ll agenda has been increasingly concerned with combating 
terrorism, drugs, human trafficking, arms proliferation and regional instability, there 
are seemingly clear advantages in partnering Russia, with its regional knowledge, 
influence and intelligence capabilities. All in all, therefore, there are many good 
reasons for NATO to engage Russia and to take full account of Russian sensibilities in 
formulating a relationship. 
From Cold War stasis to interventionism - NATO survival and adjustment 
One of the dangers inherent in talking about NATO is the tendency to regard it as a 
bloc or monolith. It is of course an alliance of twenty-six members which operates on 
the basis of consensus. When considering a particular NATO-approved course of 
action it may be possible to speak of a NATO position - and for all practical purposes 
I will do so - but it should be borne in mind that the position will have been arrived at 
via NATO's internal debate and discussion mechanisms and, as often as not, 
represents a compromise or reconciliation of interests. When considering NATO 
debates on proposed courses of action it is instructive always to view the debate 
through the lens of differing national positions, and how these may be reconciled or 
accommodated. In extremis we may speak of twenty-six "NATOs" to illustrate the 
point. 
The NATO School in Oberarnmergau is at pains to point out to its students the 
collaborative nature of the NATO enterprise, where no action can be taken without 
complete consensus, thereby giving all Alliance members an equal say in matters. In 
strictly technical terms this is the case. However, it is not in dispute that some 
Alliance members (most obviously the US) wield more influence, politically and 
militarily, than others. That being so, there is much greater scope for them to achieve 
their desired outcome through Alliance channels when this coincides with national 
interest. This too needs to be borne in mind in examining NATO debates, actions and 
motivations. The point is that when we think about NATO, we should also think 
about which NATO we have in mind. 
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The NATO of the early 1990s was not the same organisation in size, shape or purpose 
as its current embodiment. The period with which this study is concerned opened 
with the end of the Cold War, which had far-reaching ramifications for Russia and the 
Alliance. At the outset the threads of their relationship were closely entangled as the 
new post-Soviet Russian Federation felt its way towards a national identity and 
independent foreign policy. For NATO there was fundamental political and 
organisational readjustment to be made. Among the European allies there were 
particular concerns stemming from the legacy of modern European history. A newly 
reunited Germany, for example, had its own identity to establish and that process was 
replete with implications for its European allies. Germany went on to play a key 
diplomatic role in recognising secessionist Yugoslav states, in the process highlighting 
major differences among Europe's leading nations and their inability to find a 
common approach on such a vital issue. Thus, at the beginning of the period with 
which we are concerned, we must bear in mind not only the readjustments under way 
in Moscow and in NATO's orientation, but within and among the NATO allies 
themselves. That said, by the end of the 1990s, with Russian revanchism extremely 
unlikely, with Germany reunited and reconciled to its place among its allies, with US 
leadership of NATO firmly re-established following the ineffectiveness ofthe 
Europeans in Bosnia, and with the sheer horror of Bosnia still fresh in the collective 
memory, it becomes more appropriate to think in terms of greater NATO cohesion 
vis-a-vis Alliance relations with Russia in the former Yugoslavia. 
This study will attempt to show that, from differing perspectives in the early 1990s, 
NATO's key members gradually effected a greater unity in the Balkans. NATO is 
seen here not as a monolith, or as an institution with a life force and momentum of its 
own. For all its impressive and quite effective (given that it has to accommodate 
twenty-six sovereign nations) standing bureaucracy and procedures, the Alliance is not 
independently self-sustaining and self-developing. Rather, it is regarded here as the 
outreach of its individual member states and a reflection of national or state interests. 
In the case of Alliance actions in Bosnia in the early 1990s, therefore, the role of key 
national capitals is reflected in this study. 
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By the time of the Kosovo crisis in 1999, however, -and in no small part as a result of 
the calamity in Bosnia - national positions, though never completely in solidarity, 
were closer and more amenable to NATO collective action. Consequently, in the case 
ofKosovo, I focus more immediately on the NATO-Russia dynamic at the expense of 
consideration of the views in national capitals. That is not to suggest that the allies 
were unanimous in their decisions and actions, since Alliance unity came under 
significant pressure as Operation Allied Force proceeded with no apparent end in 
sight. Rather, the fact that the early and open divisions among NATO members in 
Bosnia were sufficiently reconciled to enable NATO to take decisive action in Kosovo 
enables us to concentrate more readily on the NATO-Russian relationship, the former 
being regarded as a cohesive or at least aggregated set of interests. 
This approach, acknowledging the significance and influence of national interests 
within NATO, helps to explain the apparent contradiction whereby a predominantly 
military defensive alliance, having lost its original raison d'etre at the end of the Cold 
War, has not folded but has rather expanded its role and membership. On the face of 
it, the collapse of the Soviet Union should have resulted in the consequent demise of 
NATO, having deprived the latter of its purpose. Even a short-term cautionary span 
of post-Cold War life for the Alliance, pending any Soviet revanchism, would long 
since have ceased to be appropriate. As Glenn Snyder has pointed out "alliances have 
no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response"s. 
In such altered circumstances it would have been reasonable to expect NATO to have 
left the field. Indeed, in one sense it has. Today's NATO is a far cry from its Cold 
War predecessor. Some attribute its persistence to a certain institutional dynamic 
based upon the value and adaptability of the alliance's assets. This argument is given 
full expression by Celeste Wallander who sees NATO's survival and continuation in 
terms of the strengths and adaptability of its institutions and assets, which come into 
play because, in Wallander's terms, security alliances can have multiple roles9• The 
argument is a forceful one if one concurs with the premises on which it is based. The 
prognosis that an alliance can survive and persist if it has mUltiple purposes is 
demonstrated by NATO's recent history. NATO's Strategic Concept of 1999, and the 
outcome of the Istanbul Summit of 2004, provide clear evidence of an institution 
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adapting, changing and defining the multiple purposes for its existence. Where I take 
issue with Wallander's approach is in the weight which she gives to institutional 
assets, at the expense of state interests. It seems much more likely that NATO has 
survived and prospered by the will of its constituent member states than by the efforts 
of an adaptable and multi-functional international bureaucracy. Politically, militarily, 
logistically, and in every other way NATO is the sum total of what its member states 
provide to it. It does not exist in a self-generating vacuum. Beyond very limited 
airborne early warning and maritime assets it does not have standing armed forces. 
Those forces involved in NATO-led operations such as SFOR and KFOR are 
nationally provided roulement personnel serving for four or six months at a time. The 
Alliance's 'permanent' senior military officials are seconded from their national 
forces for two or three years before returning to national duties. The picture is more 
varied for senior civilian and political officials, though again they tend to be seconded 
for a period rather than being NATO careerists. It is difficult in such circumstances to 
speak of a kind of NATO-centric corporate loyalty which might serve to sustain an 
institution shorn of its original purpose. It would be more accurate to speak of the 
sum total of national contributions to an agreed end. The agreed end, however, is 
determined, or accepted, by national governments, some more influential than others. 
NATO survived and prospered because its most powerful members wanted it so. The 
point is well illustrated by Kenneth Waltz in his discussion of the continued relevance 
of structural realism in the post-Cold War eraIO. As Waltz observes, Ha deeply 
entrenched international bureaucracy can help to sustain the organisation but states 
determine its fate"ll. Furthermore, some states are more influential than others. The 
US is the Alliance's most powerful member state in all respects. Washington's views 
are crucial in determining NATO direction on many issues, the history of post-Cold 
War enlargement being a good example (this will be discussed further in the first 
chapter). A clear illustration of Washington's centrality to NATO, and vice versa, 
was provided by John Kornblum, US senior deputy to the undersecretary of state for 
European affairs when he wrote H[t]he Alliance provides a vehicle for the application 
of American power and vision to the security order in Europe,,12. 
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What are the implications ofthis backdrop to NATO-Russian relations? Ifwe are to 
understand the thrust of the Alliance's activities we need to observe the statements 
and actions of national capitals, and in particular Washington, as well as those of 
NATO HQ in Brussels. A NATO which is in effect a conduit for national policies is 
effective only for so long as it is capable of discharging those policies. In other words 
if it is to continue to have a useful function it must be able to reconcile differing 
members' points of view to the ultimate satisfaction of its most powerful members. 
Waltz sums it up thus: "NATO lasted as a military alliance as long as the Soviet 
Union appeared to be a direct threat to its members. It survives and expands now not 
because of its institutions but mainly because the United States wants it to.,,}3 Intra-
alliance management has now assumed an important function for NATO. 
This is particularly true in the European context. There is now no serious military 
competitor to the Alliance on the continent. It is pre-eminent in continent-wide 
security matters, notwithstanding the plethora of organisations which go to make up 
Europe's 'security architecture', or sphere of governance. Post-Kosovo, NATO has 
demonstrated not simply its military and political will, but its capabilities and resolve. 
So where is the threat to what was originally a military defensive alliance? It is not 
too fanciful to suggest that in the longer tenn NATO cohesion is more likely to be 
affected by internal rather than external pressures, perhaps in its reaction to the 
European Union's attempts to give military expression to its Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) concept through ESDP, or by the fissures in European 
attitudes exposed by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
However, ESDP is unlikely to emerge as a competitor to NATO for several reasons. 
In the first place, as Operation Allied Force demonstrated, Europe's defence 
capabilities are operationally limited, and lag well behind the United States. Despite 
political pronouncements by European leaders there is no evidence of defence 
budgetary increases to fund the EU's drive to meet its Headline Goal. It is difficult to 
envisage successful large-scale European operations independent of NATO's (read 
US) intelligence assets or air lift capabilities. The real question mark against NATO 
posed by ESDP concerns the possibility not that it will succeed in creating a capable 
force, but that it will fail to do SOI4. The loss of face for European allies, and 
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consequent undennining ofESDP advocates in the US, combined with US donor 
fatigue would bring into question Europe's true reliability as an ally, with questions 
raised in turn about the validity and cohesion of NATO. 
A powerful alliance, then, faced with no serious military threat to its existence, having 
moved beyond its original raison d'etre, and expanded into the old Warsaw Pact, stilI 
looks eastward and struggles to make sense of its relationship with Russia. The nature 
of that engagement is not, however, straightforward. At the end of the 1990s there 
was a school of thought within NATO circles which believed that the Alliance's policy 
on relations with Russia was essentially three-foldI5• There was an 'Official' level, 
revolving around high-level public pronouncements of engagement in all areas. At 
the 'Working' level, there was an effort to give practical expression to engagement in 
some quantifiable way such as arms control measures. Finally, there was a 'Realistic' 
level, characterised by Russia-fatigue based on a lack of long tenn planning or vision 
for the relationship. 
This view, which has persisted beyond the 9/11 watershed, contends that NATO has 
failed to speak to the Russians in the zero-sum language which they understand. 
NATO's dialogue of partnerships and security for all is regarded as foreign to the. 
Russian historical experience and understanding, serving only to reinforce Russian 
suspicion and intransigence. If this thinking is an accurate reflection of the reality of 
NATO-Russian relations it does not sit well with the official NATO approach to the 
subject. It is at odds with the spirit espoused by institutional initiatives from the 1997 
Founding Act, through the Permanent Joint Council, to the NATO-Russia Council. It 
is also contrary to the tone of the 1999 Strategic Concept. However, it does appear to 
chime more readily with the assessment of the early Bush administration's outlook on 
Russia as a foreign policy non-priority. If partnership and cooperation are concepts 
beyond the Russian grasp then the outlook for the future is bleak indeed, 
notwithstanding a mutually expressed desire for NATO and Moscow to move to a 
qualitatively new relationship. 
From Soviet Union to Russian Federation - in search of a foreign policy 
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It should be stressed at this point that the subject under discussion is NATO's 
relationship with Russia, and not vice versa. This shading of emphasis is important 
because the research has been NATO-centric. The thesis has been concerned with 
probing the Alliance's dealings with Moscow and NATO's attempt to accommodate 
change and progress in that relationship. Naturally, this lends itself to occasional 
discussion of Russian actions and reactions, but Russian views are gauged here in the 
light of NATO's actions, and the empirical evidence gleaned from case studies. The 
thesis does not attempt to provide a Russian vision of the relationship except in so far 
as that can be perceived from NATO-centric research. Nevertheless, it may be useful 
at this juncture to provide a synopsis of Moscow's post-Cold War approach to foreign 
policy issues, by way of context to the main area of research. 
The early years of the 1990s were a time of great flux in Europe's security governance 
as the debate about NATO's future overlapped with the new Russian Federation's 
quest to identify its foreign policy priorities. Each of these major debates overlapped 
with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, an event, or series of events, which provided a 
proving ground for NATO and Russia. It is worthwhile therefore considering the 
main outlines of the Russian foreign policy debate at this time before proceeding to 
examine the NATO-Moscow relationship as played out in the Balkans. 
In foreign policy terms, as in much else, it is difficult to exaggerate the enormity of the 
effect upon Moscow of the end of the Cold War. A few figures may serve to 
illustratel6• With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the borders of the Russian 
Federation encompassed 76% of the area and 60% of the population of the now 
defunct communist state. These new borders represented a reversion to the borders of 
almost 350 years ago, prior to the incorporation of Ukraine. With a parallel loss of 
influence over the former allied countries of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as 
the former Soviet Republics, Moscow's new boundaries were now more than 1,000 
kilometres further to the east, severely limiting, in all senses, its centrality to European 
security concerns. Moscow also suffered in conventional military terms through the 
loss of more than half its combat aircraft, tanks and armoured vehicles to the newly 
created states of the former Soviet Union and its allies. Economically, moreover, the 
new Russian Federation fared poorly by comparison to its Soviet predecessorl7. 
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Against this highly unpromising background the Russian Federation had to arrive at a 
new sense of its identity, interests and place in the world. The ensuing debate is not 
easy to characterise definitively, given its fluid and often ad hoc nature, nor is it easy 
to pin definitive labels on the key protagonists because oftheir tendency to adopt 
overlapping positions, or move between differing schools of thought. However, we 
may identify the main lines of division among Moscow's political elite in their 
attempt to come to terms with the new and vastly altered world order. 
John Berryman has listed the main groupings as Reformers, Centrists and 
Nationalistsl8• The former were subdivided into liberal westernisers with a pro-
Western agenda, and international institutionalists who sought to pursue Russian 
national (and reformist) interests through membership of regional and international 
bodies such as the EU. Centrists comprised state realists who, though not anti-
western, favoured the single-minded pursuit of Russian national interests, and 
eurasianists who viewed Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia and prioritised 
relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Finally, the 
Nationalists too had their nuances, whether promoting the alliance ofSlavic states 
(Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn), the resurrection ofthe Soviet Union (Gennadi Zyuganov), 
or Great Russian imperialism (Vladimir Zhirinovsky). 
The enormous shock to the Russian polity caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union 
generated a lively debate on how Russia should define and pursue its foreign policy 
interests. For all their differences, however, the groupings described above had one 
thing in common - the view that Russia, however diminished, remained a great power 
and was therefore entitled to have its views fully taken into accoune 9• There were 
very few significant voices in the debate urging acceptance of Russia's drastically 
reduced circumstances and influence in the foreign policy arena, and no one in Russia 
seriously questioned Foreign Minister Kozyrev's assertion in 1992 that Russia was 
doomed to be a great powe~o. Different groupings remained concerned to elevate 
Russian status whether through relations with the west, institutional membership or 
creation of new relationships closer to home. With very few exceptions the emphasis 
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was upon how to persuade others of Russia's great power credentials and continue to 
benefit from the kudos associated with it. 
Within Russia therefore the great power debate was fairly one-sided in the early 
1990s, but later commentators reflected the fact that, although the notion of great 
power status still persisted, other voices were beginning to be heard21 • Dmitri Trenin, 
for example, argued that Russia must accept that it was a second rank power which 
should look to a future as one of Europe's other post-imperial powers such as Britain 
and France22• Pavel Baev also pressed the case for accepting that Russia could no 
longer be considered a great powe~3, while an American observer went further, 
arguing that Russia had been in long term decline since the end ofthe Cold War and 
had no prospect of recovering great power status24• Indeed, it was more likely to be 
overtaken by China and the European Union in the great power race. This conclusion, 
however, was not necessarily shared by others in view of Russia's size, nuclear and 
conventional military might, abundant natural resources, educated workforce and vast 
scientific, technological and cultural potentiaes. 
Notions of Russian greatness premised upon historical precedent, and concurrent ideas 
of Russia's special spheres of influence in its 'Near Abroad' and elsewhere proved 
durable. Foreign policy was thus a key area in which the new Russian Federation 
needed to determine its identity and role. The calamity of the Soviet collapse, the' 
variety of schools of thought regarding Russia's new place in the geopolitical 
structure, the various domestic agencies involved, and the obvious tension between 
Russia's drastically reduced circumstances and continuing great power ambitions all 
combined to produce understandable confusion in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
In terms of Russia's relationship with NATO the Russian foreign policy debate is 
extremely significant. It overlapped with the West's consideration of the future of 
NATO, creating a highly interesting, if fluid, area of study for those concerned with 
European security issues. Not least, the idea that a diminished Russia could lay claim 
to spheres of special interest obliged others to take Russian views more seriously than 
might otherwise have been the case, at least in the immediate aftermath ofthe Cold 
War. 
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Why the Balkans? 
Accepting that the relationship between NATO and Russia is an important one, we are 
obliged to examine it through an appropriate lens. Given the change and evolution of 
NATO as an organisation, and the development of Russian foreign policy since 1991, 
the case can be made that, to a large extent, the two have come together most 
evidently and significantly in the Balkan context. 
Gregory Schulte has provided a detailed discussion ofthe effect of Bosnia upon the 
'new NATO' at the tactical and strategic levels, highlighting how involvement in 
Bosnia led to a change in NATO's role and political-military posture, and affected in 
turn the Alliance's relationship with, inter alia, Russia26• Further, as Michael 
Andersen has pointed out, the Balkan wars "constitute an important case of post-Cold 
War European security management - perhaps the most serious test of the so-called 
'European security architecture' since the demise ofthe Soviet Union and the 
emergence of Russia27." 
The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, therefore, while markedly different in many 
respects, display a certain similarity in terms of the NATO-Russia dynamic. NATO 
interventionism became a decisive feature of the Balkan wars and obliged Moscow to 
contend with a growing, changing and increasingly militarily active alliance. The end 
of the Cold War, far from signalling the demise of NATO, actually provided it with a 
new rationale for its existence in countering new forms of insecurity in Europe. The 
former Yugoslavia was also the testing ground for the evolution of Moscow's foreign 
policy. Events in Bosnia and Kosovo highlighted a pattern of NATO interventionism, 
Russian foreign policy motivation (a desire for a place at the decision making table), 
Russian reaction to NATO activities (initial opposition, belated concurrence), and a 
subsequent attempt to reconcile differences and carry on in a spirit of professed 
cooperation. Russian interest in the Balkans, based upon strategic, historic and 
cultural interests, re-emerged with a sharper focus as the former Yugoslavia 
disintegrated. It did so as part ofthe wider debate over Russian national interests28• 
Former Yugoslavia therefore provides a clear lens through which to examine the 
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evolution of the NATO-Russia relationship as each party came to terms with its 
changing role in European security. 
Outline of study 
This work will suggest that while much has changed in the institutionalised form of 
NATO-Russian relations, recent Balkan history suggests that little has changed in 
attitudinal terms. NATO as an institution is influenced by its constituent members 
and is not independent of them. It therefore acts in accord with the most influential on 
any given issue, provided that other NATO members can be persuaded of the merits of 
a course of action. NATO thinking remains rooted in realpolitik, with all that this 
entails for the pursuit of hard security advantages. Although the Alliance has moved 
beyond its collective defence ofthe Cold War years to a more collective security 
approach, it has not relinquished its collective defence outlook, with consequent 
implications for its relationship with Russia. The quality of that relationship can be 
discerned by examining the course of NATO-Russian dealings in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
the proving ground of immediate post-Cold War European security arrangements. 
The first chapter will examine the formal mechanisms of NATO-Russian relations as 
they have evolved since the 1990s. There has, of course, been change at the 
institutionalleve1, a natural consequence ofthe fundamental alterations in European 
security matters attendant upon the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Those changes bear consideration in terms of how they influence the course of 
NATO-Russian interaction generally, as well as setting the institutional background to 
the course of the relationship in'the Balkans. The transformation of NATO from a 
static to an expeditionary force, its adoption of strategic concepts to guide it in that 
direction, and eastward enlargement of the Alliance, all served to alter NATO 
radically throughout the course of the 1990s and beyond. These changes necessitated 
a new approach to engaging with former adversaries, not least Russia, and generated 
partnership progranunes across the field of European defence relationships. The 
partnership ethos took a particular form in the case of Russia, and I examine the 
creation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, the Permanent Joint 
Council, and subsequently the NATO-Russia Council. Moscow's view of the 
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enlargement debate is also considered, setting some of the background to Kremlin 
thinking in its dealings with NATO in the former Yugoslavia. 
Chapter two focuses on the NATO-Russia relationship in the Balkans more 
specifically, examining the disintegration ofthe former Yugoslavia and that country's 
descent into war in Bosnia. The course of the war is outlined, providing the backdrop 
to a consideration of the varying perspectives between western European and US 
allies on how to handle events in Bosnia. There was not a straightforward 
EuropeanJUS split on the issue, rather a series of fragmented views among the 
Europeans and the Americans, as the former attempted to address the worsening crisis 
on adjacent territory. From such unpromising beginnings a NATO line eventually 
emerged, as the US assumed a more prominent leadership role in the crisis. Russian 
policy in Bosnia, and the Kremlin's preference for a non-NATO forum to decide upon 
European security matters, is discussed by way of illustrating Moscow's search for a 
coherent post-Soviet foreign policy, a search given immediacy by events in the 
Balkans, and by historical links with the Serbs. Of necessity, NATO and Russian 
policy came to engage with each other in Bosnia, developing their interaction through 
the Contact Group, and leading to the relationship of unequals evidenced by the 
Dayton Agreement which brought the war in Bosnia to an end in late 1995. 
That unequal relationship underwent further imbalance a few years later as NATO 
launched Operation Allied Force in Kosovo to drive Serbian forces from that 
province. Chapter three examines events there beginning with the rise of Albanian 
nationalism which provoked Belgrade's armed response and which led to internatiomil 
diplomatic attempts to reach a settlement at Rambouillet. NATO's momentous 
decision to intervene miIitarily in Kosovo had significant repercussions for the 
Alliance itself, for Russian great power pretensions, and for the course of the 
relationship between the Alliance and Moscow. The inequality between NATO and 
Russia, evident in the aftermath ofDayton, was exacerbated by the actions of the 
Alliance and caused a considerable set back to the relationship, including a suspension 
of institutional contacts, even ifthis ultimately proved only temporary. 
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Chapter four offers an examination of NATO-Russian peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. Having considered the relationship in times of conflict, and the 
increasingly unequal nature of the partnership, it is instructive to examine post-
conflict relationships in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Alliance and Russia, relieved ofthe 
immediacy of crisis management inherent in times of conflict, could afford to take a 
more considered and long-term approach to the problems oftheir partnership in the 
relatively benign scenario of effecting peacekeeping. NATO, as a military and 
political alliance, was afforded an opportunity to relate to Russia on both levels. The 
picture which emerged, however, suggests that while military cooperation generally 
proved successful, the political relationship was more troublesome. At the time of 
writing there is no clear end state for Kosovo. Now that the Russian military presence 
has gone, the more successful element of NATO-Russian cooperation there has ended 
and NATO-Russian political differences remain, colouring the overall picture of the 
quality ofthe relationship. 
In the final chapter I attempt to synthesise the evidence which emerges from the 
empirical studies, arguing that the course of post-Cold War NATO-Russian relations 
has been characterized by ad hoc realpolitik on both sides. For NATO, the 
institutional efforts made in engaging with Russia were never of sufficient importance 
to override its member states' interventionist interests in Bosnia and, most notably, in 
Kosovo. For its part, Russia's political leaders, while sensitive to domestic opinion, 
never lost sight of the fact that their own interests lay in cooperating with NATO, even 
at times of fundamental disagreement. In summing up the course of NATO-Russian 
relations the chapter will address three questions: what effect did the wars in Bosnia 
and Kosovo have upon NATO?; what effect did they have upon Russia?; and finally, 
what was the significance of the Balkans in the overall cont~xt of the NATO-Russian 
relationship? Having addressed those questions one may offer some tentative 
thoughts as to future developments. 
16 
I George Robertson, (then NATO Secretary-General) A new quality in the NATO-Russia relationship, 
Speech in Moscow, 22nd November 2001, at http://www.nato.intldocu/speechl200Ils011122a.htm 
2 See Mark A. Smith, Russia and the EU under Putin Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 04/20 
(Russian Series) July 2004. For a detailed discussion of the ESDP-Russia issue see Mark Webber 
"Third Party inclusion in ESDP:Form and Substance - a Case Study of Russia" Paper presented to the 
International Conference of the European Community Studies Association at Madison, Wisconsin June 
2001. 
3 A good illustration of this phenomenon is the formal treaty on peace and friendship between Russia 
and China. United largely by resentment of overbearing USINATO influence, the two found common 
cause, temporarily at least, despite their own considerable differences. See "Partners of 
Inconvenience", The Economist Jan 20-26th 2001. 
4 For a fuller exploration of Russian efforts to promote multipolarity, including the creation ofa de 
facto alliance with China, see Thomas Ambrosio, Russia's Questfor Multipolarity: A Response to US 
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era European Security VollO No I Spring 2001. Ambrosio 
contends that US Foreign Policy has promoted balancing behaviour on Russia's part. 
S Alton Frye, The new NATO and Relations with Russia Journal of Strategic Studies Vol23 No 32000, 
P 105 cites examples of developments unfavourable to Moscow, the cumulative effect of which wass to 
create and sustain a defensive outlook in the Kremlin. For the purposes of this study, argnably the most 
significant of these examples is NATO's Kosovo intervention, discussed in detail in chapter three. 
6 For a discussion of Put in's thinking regarding Moscow's relationship with the west see Mark A. 
Smith, Russia and the West, Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper F78, July 2002. See also Mark A. 
Smith, The Russia-USA relationship Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 04112 (Russian Series) 
May 2004. 
7 See for example Mark Smith, The Russia-USA relationship, Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 
04/12 (Russian series), May 2004. Also Oksana Antonenko, The NATO-Russia Council: Challenges 
and Opportunities, paper presented at the Conference on Dual Enlargement and the Baltic States: 
Security Policy Implications, Tallinn, 11-13 February 2004. 
8 Glenn H Snyder Alliance Politics (Ithaca, New York) Cornell University Press 1997 pl92 
9 See Celeste A Wallander, Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War 
International Organization Vol 54(4) pp 705-735 Autmnn 2000. 
10 Kenneth N. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War International Security VoI25(1) 2000. For 
an extended discussion of the persistence of NATO see esp pp 18-26. 
11 Ibid p20. 
12 John Kornblum, NATO's Second Half Century - Tasks for an Alliance NATO On Track For the 
Twenty First Century Conference Report (The Hagne, Netherlands Atlantic Commission 1994) p14: 
cited in Waltz op cit p20. 
13 Waltz op cit page 25 
14 See James Kitfield, Will Europe Ruin NATO? Air Force Magazine (US) October 2000 for an expose 
of the argument. 
15 Author's discussions at NATO School SHAPE Oberammergau February 2001 
16 See John Berryrnan, Russian Foreign Policy: an overview in Russia after the Cold War (ed Bowker 
and Ross) Longman 2000, pp 336-337. 
17 Berryman p336 
18 Berryrnan p338 
"For a detailed discussion of the great power issue see Hannes Adorneit, Russia as a 'great power' in 
world affairs: images and reality International Affairs 71,1 (1995). 
20 A. Kozyrev "Rossiya obrechena byt velikoy derzhavoy" Novoe Vremya no 3 Jan 1992. (cited in N. 
Alexandrova-Arbatova ''The Balkans test for Russia" Russia and Europe: the emerging security agenda 
ed. Baranovsky OUP 1997 P 403). 
21 See for example Edward Lucas "In Search of an Identity" The Economist 21" July 200 I p 17. 
22 Cited in Lucas ibid. 
23 Pavel Baev Russia's departure from Empire: Self Assertiveness and a New Retreat Geopolitics in 
Post-Wall Europe O. Tunander, P. Baev and V. Einagel eds., Sage, Oslo 1997. 
24 C Dale Walton The Decline of the Third Rome: Russia's Prospects as a great power The Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies Vo112, No I, March 1999 pp 51-63. 
25 Berryman op cit page 337. 
17 
26 Gregory L Schulte The Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO Survival VoI39(1) 1997 pp 19-42. 
For an exposition of the centrality of the Fonner Yugoslavia in the development of Russian foreign 
policy see also Michae1 Andersen Russia and the Former Yugoslavia in M Webber ed. Rnssia and 
Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? MacMillan, Basingstoke 2000 pp 179-209. 
27 Andersen ibid page 179. 
28 F. Stephen Larrabee, Russia and the Balkans: Old Themes and New Challenges Russia and Europe: 
The Emerging Security Agenda ed Baranovsky Oxford University Press 1997 pp 392-393. 
18 
Chapter One 
NATO-Russian relations after 1991 - an overview 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the history of NATO's post Cold War efforts in engaging its 
fonner adversary, Russia, at a time of fundamental change for the Alliance. In so doing it 
considers NATO's transformation from a collective defence to a collective security 
organisation whose evolving roles were eventually set out in the Alliance's 1999 Strategic 
Concept. I explore the major aspects of NATO's transformation, focusing on the 
enlargement debate and the outreach initiative of Partnership for Peace. The relationship 
with Russia is set in its institutional context, with an exploration of the mechanisms 
constructed to facilitate and formalise NATO's engagement with Moscow. Against this 
background of evolutionary institutional change and development, the course of the . 
relationship has been problematic, as evidenced by periodic disagreements over NATO's 
transformation and role, and its Balkan operations. 
With the Soviet Union long gone, it is perhaps ironic that Russia has continued to 
demand at least as much attention from NATO policy makers as during the Cold War. In 
a sense this is not too difficult to rationalise; post-Soviet Russia has entered into formal 
institutional relations with NATO which can only be meaningful if each side commits to 
making the arrangements work. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 NATO 
enjoyed arguably its finest hour. The bipolar world was drawing to a close and there 
could be no doubt as to which of the protagonists had triumphed 1. Given the West's 
evident superiority in the ideological contest, and the swift collapse of Soviet power 
which followed, it would seem that NATO's remit to provide security for its members had 
been met in full. With no credible threat to counter or ideological opponent to challenge, 
the Alliance would appear to have served its purpose and obtained a favourable security 
position for its member states2• 
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Well over a decade later not only is NATO still in existence, but it has expanded its 
membership and, as was seen in Kosovo in 1999, its remit for action. The sixteen 
member alliance of 1991 grew to nineteen with the accession of the Visegrad states of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, and subsequently to twenty six, 
following the invitation to membership made to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia at Prague in November 20023• To understand how it is 
that, so long after the Cold War a defensive alliance has grown in size and mission we 
must examine NATO's changing role and expansion of membership. These 
developments illustrate NATO's contemporary posture, and have given rise to the formal 
institutions through which the Alliance deals with non-NATO countries; they thus colour 
much of the relationship with Russia, our main field of inquiry. 
Transforming the Alliance 
The NATO of today, while recognisable from its Cold War origins, has become a very 
different alliance. It has undergone fundamental changes in its size and role, so enabling 
it to adapt to its geopolitical environment and, it would argue, giving it continued 
relevance and import. Taken together, these changes amount to NATO's transformation 
from an organisation of collective defence to collective security. 
This distinction is an important one, highlighting the evolution from territorial defence of 
member states towards a less static and more outward looking approach to defending 
members' wider security interests. In practice this change has been characterised by two 
categories of innovation, identified by David Yost first as cooperation with former 
opponents and others, and second as the conduct of crisis management and peace support 
operations4• This is not to suggest that NATO has abandoned its traditional role of 
territorial defence (this has been retained), but the Alliance has evolved, through 
declaration and action, into an organisation prepared to move beyond its members' 
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borders to engage fonner adversaries and to effect peace support operations - roles very 
different from those undertaken during the Cold War. 
Thus in 1992 the Alliance offered to support peacekeeping operations in the Balkans 
undertaken by the United Nations (UN) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE -later the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)). 
This was followed in 1994 by the creation of the Partnership for Peace (PtP) initiative, a 
highly significant departure from NATO's previously closed consultations, which had 
been limited to alliance members only. PtP not only created an institutional forum for 
NATO-Partner dialogue and consultation. It gave rise to a significant programme of 
military exercises designed to promote interoperability and cooperation between the 
Alliance and its partners. The effect of this was to bolster efforts to increase confidence 
and transparency, not least in the increasingly important field of peacekeeping. 
As further indication of its increasing willingness to countenance non-traditional 
operations, the Alliance devoted considerable efforts to creating the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) concept, endorsed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) at the Brussels 
meeting of January 19946• No longer was it necessary to achieve complete consensus 
among alliance members before acting; under the CJTF those members who were so 
inclined could now consider acting in concert without requiring the consent of more 
reluctant allies. 
These moves toward a loosening of Article 57 ties did not indicate that the Alliance's 
original purpose of collective defence had been jettisoned. However, it was clear that by 
countenancing actions outside the boundaries of its member states, by engaging with 
fonner adversaries and by conducting operations alongside them, NATO was moving 
beyond collective defence. It remained committed to this core mission but extended its 
remit to encompass activities (PtP, peacekeeping etc) where the interests of members 
were also served by an active outreach to encompass those who might conceivably have 
posed a threat in the first place. Instead of viewing the world in tenns of hostile anned 
21 
camps, NATO was trying to move to recognise, if not actually accommodate, the wider 
concerns of members and others - yet without dismantling the original alliance or its 
Article 5 commitment. The 1999 Strategic Concept (see below) set out these issues 
authoritatively as the purposes and tasks of a new NATO. 
Some have suggested that this approach demonstrates that NATO has wanted to have it 
both ways - keen to adapt, evolve and progress in terms of collective security, but 
reluctant to abandon the 'collective defence first' approach of Article 58. Certainly, there 
is a tension between maintaining the apparatus of an alliance constructed to defend Cold 
War interests, and using the institutions of that same alliance to promote moves toward a 
more comprehensive approach to security. As a consequence, NATO has been faced with 
a presentational problem in its dealings with non-members, particularly Russia. How 
does the Alliance convince Russia that it is in Russian interests to cooperate with the new 
NATO, when the old NATO has seemingly not gone away? 
Nevertheless, while 'old' NATO has not vanished, and remains unequivocal in its 
commitment to its original Article 5 posture, the Alliance has broken new ground with its 
emphasis on outreach to non-members, and its central contribution to the peacekeeping 
tasks which were generated by the bloody collapse of former Yugoslavia. The Balkans 
proved a testing ground for combining the Alliance's two new tasks. Peace operations in 
Bosnia, and subsequently in Kosovo, were conducted by NATO members alongside 
former adversaries, most notably the Russians, making the former Yugoslavia a central 
case study for the new NATO's relations with Russia. It was also central in view of the 
scale and nature of the missions, enlarged upon in chapter four below. 
The 1999 Strategic Concept 
In April 1999 the Alliance adopted its new Strategic Concept at the Washington Surmnit, 
replacing the immediate post-Cold War Strategic Concept of 19919• The new (1999) 
Strategic Concept spelled out NATO's purpose and tasks, strategic perspectives, approach 
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to security, and guidelines for the Alliance's force structure. It therefore provided the 
clearest and most authoritative indication of NATO's view of its approach to security as it 
had evolved throughout the 1990s. 
Whereas hitherto the Alliance had been concerned with a largely military approach to 
security issues, the new Concept reflected the development of a more consensual and 
political emphasis through cooperation, crisis management and conflict prevention. 
Washington set out the Alliance's" essential and enduring purpose" of safeguarding the 
freedom of its members by military and political means. It affirmed Allies' support for 
the concepts (undefined) of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, their 
determination to defend one another and to "contribute to peace and stability" in the Euro-
Atlantic area lO• 
In pursuit of its essential purpose "as an Alliance ... committed to the Washington Treaty 
and the United Nations Charter"", the strategy outlined three fundamental tasks; security, 
consultation, and deterrence and defence. In promoting security in the Euro-Atlantic area 
Alliance tasks were identified as crisis management and partnership. Because the Euro-
Atlantic area plays host to other international agencies besides NATO, the Strategic 
Concept recognised the UN Security Council as having" the primary responsibility for 
the maintenance ofintemational peace and security" 12, and the significant role played by 
the OSCE and the EU. 
The document also identified a wide variety of possible security threats and challenges. 
These included large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance, ethnic and 
religious rivalries, territorial disputes, human rights abuses, the proliferation of nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons, and "the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside 
the Alliance". The global context was also catered for: Alliance thinking, the Strategic 
Concept suggested, must include provision for defence against terrorism, sabotage, 
organised crime and "the disruption of the flow of vital resources". Other identified 
threats included the "uncontrolled movement oflarge numbers ofpeople,,13. Clearly, 
23 
while no attempt was made to specify individual countries such as Russia or specific 
threat scenarios, NATO thinking was looking beyond its borders to security scenarios 
which would have a direct or indirect impact upon Alliance members. 
Recognising that the European security landscape had altered fundamentally, the new 
Strategic Concept sought to lay the foundations for a more forward thinking Alliance. 
Part Three, entitled "The Approach to Security in the Twenty First Century", set out the 
framework within which NATO would henceforth seek to operate. The major 
characteristics were: "the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of 
Alliance military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full 
range of (NATO) missions; the development of the European Security and Defence 
Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; 
... continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, 
cooperation and dialogue with other nations as part of (NATO's) cooperative approach to 
Euro-Atlantic security .... ,,14 
Against this broad background of a changing security environment, generic but non-
. specific threat scenarios, and retention of essential (Article 5) purposes allied to an 
ambitious outreach programme, the Strategic Concept went on to offer guidelines for 
NATO's future force structure. The Strategic Concept was an attempt to offer 
comprehensive overarching guidance to the Alliance, recognising the need of the Alliance 
to adapt and develop if it is to remain relevant. In short, the Strategic Concept "enables a 
transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment" (my italics) and 
"will govern the Alliance's security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its 
conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements ... ,,15 
It is notable that the Strategic Concept moved away from the outdated language of its 
1991 predecessor by deleting reference to preserving the strategic balance in Europe. 
More appropriately, it referred to NATO's contribution to continental peace and security, 
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thereby avoiding the impression that the Alliance's principal purpose was to guard against 
a threat from Russia. 
The document is significant as a fonnal marker of the extent to which the Alliance had 
already been changing prior to 1999. In tenns of NATO outlook the Strategic Concept 
did not mark a new beginning. Rather, it codified the extant position, and NATO's place 
within the post-Cold War strategic environment. Indeed, by the point of the Strategic 
Concept's adoption, NATO had already moved well beyond the stasis of the Cold War 
period. Enlargement had resulted in the admission of the Visegrad states; the ptp 
programme was active; internal force restructuring studies were well under way; 
internally, work on the European Security and Defence Identity was proceeding; and the 
Alliance was involved heavily in peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. 
All these activities contributed to the overall tenor of the relationship between NATO and 
Russia. In order to illustrate the broad contours of this relationship it is worth focusing 
upon NATO's externally oriented activities of enlargement and ptp as they unfolded in 
the course of the 1990s. 
NATO Enlargement 
The history ofthe decision to enlarge NATO shows that the Alliance went through 
varying degrees of enthusiasm for the project throughout the course of the 1990s. These 
ranged from initial resistance to acceptance, via delay and defennent. Along the way 
different institutional innovations were developed to further the work, and these gave rise 
to strains not just between NATO and non-NATO participants, but within the Alliance 
itselfl6. 
In the immediate post-Cold War environment there was optimism yet uncertainty in 
NATO. European security prospects appeared brighter than hitherto, though the reason 
for NATO's existence was no longer immediately apparent and was therefore a subject of 
some debate 17• Nevertheless, only isolated voices in the West were calling for the 
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enlargement of NATO in the early 1990s, a period in which NATO was struggling to 
redefine its raison d'etre. In Eastern Europe the position was somewhat different, with the 
Visegrad states pressing their claims for NATO membership from as early as 1991. They 
did so on the grounds that they wished to be relieved of the role of cordon sanitaire, 
seeking the perceived benefits of collective security via NATO, and positing that NATO 
membership would facilitate the westernisation of East and Central Europe (ECE) 18, 
It is important to understand the profound effect of Russia on the thinking of the central 
and east Europeans l9, Russia was still regarded with trepidation, as a power capable of 
reimposing its will militarily in the region. Consequently the argument was made that 
only membership of NATO could offer firm guarantees of security to the newly 
independent countries of eastern and central Europe, When Gorbachev had been at the 
helm in Moscow in 1990, there was less urgency to this demand. A dying Soviet Union, 
withdrawing its forces from the region, was not regarded as posing an immediate threat. 
However, during 1991 the Soviet Union's reversion to force, particularly in Lithuania, and 
a firmer foreign policy line towards former Warsaw Pact allies, led ECE leaders to seek 
the reassurance of NATO membership as a safeguard against Russian revanchism. 
In this light, disappointment with the outcome of NATO's 1991 Rome summit was to be 
expected. Instead of tackling the issue of enlargement directly the Summit created the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for cooperation between NATO 
and the ex Warsaw Pact nations. At this stage the Alliance was not prepared to expand 
its membership and further debate was still to be had among the Allies on the benefits of 
any such move20• 
That said, given NATO's uncertain future, it was not long before the enlargement of the 
Alliance began to be discussed in the West as a serious option for reinforcing Europe's 
security architecture. Although there were other institutions which might conceivably be 
better placed to accommodate the security needs of the new Europe21 , NATO began to 
emerge as the institution of choice in key capitals, notably London and Washington. 
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Other options were briefly explored. For example, the EU attracted US opposition by 
having the WEU consider European defence matters, for example at the 1996 inter- . 
governmental conference prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam (the French had favoured a 
WEU revival also around the time of the Maastricht Treaty). The WEU's agreement on 
the need for a European security and defence identity was not to Washington's liking 
initially, but eventually came to be seen as a useful means of undermining the position of 
NATO's more Euro-centred states, who favoured a strengthened CSCE22. 
The CSCE was a much more acceptable institution than NATO to the Russians, who 
sought a pan-European framework for security matters23 . For a time, it had seemed that 
the CSCE might provide that framework (it also enjoyed support among some ECE 
governments and was championed by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher) 
but a combination of factors served to undermine the organisation'S credibility. Two of 
NATO's major players, the US and the UK, were lukewarm about the CSCE's ability to 
act as the appropriate forum, and Germany came to share that view. Russia's profourid 
domestic political and economic problems were a constant preoccupation for the Kremlin, 
and the break up of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia led to the creation 
of a vastly extended and unwieldy CSCE. Of crucial importance, however, was the 
CSCE's evident impotence in the face of the August 1991 coup in Moscow, and 
subsequently in Yugoslavia's descent into war. 
By late 1993 the NATO expansionist argument was gaining currency and was justified in 
a variety of ways24. A combination of reasons, premised on NATO's ability to fill a 
perceived power vacuum in ECE, thus projecting stability eastward, furthering 
democratisation and promoting the market economy, persuaded the Clinton 
administration to commit to enlargement. Other reasons, such as meeting the requests of 
aspirant nations25, and not allowing Russia to have a veto over the Alliance's activities, 
also came into play. While all played their part, there is evidence to suggest that US 
domestic political interests were at least as influential in the administration's 
considerations26. 
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The end of the Cold War saw the re-emergence in the US of the old debate between 
isolationists and internationalists, with the latter correctly identifying NATO enlargement 
as an issue on which it could draw support away from the former. An unsophisticated 
public debate did not necessarily distinguish between the old Soviet Union and the new 
Russian Federation. Consolidation of the Soviet Union's collapse - and, therefore, a 
counter to the perceived threat now posed by the Russian Federation - required NATO'S 
eastward expansion if US foreign policy in Europe was to succeed. Added to this was the 
influence of ECE lobby groups, encouraged by the prospect of NATO admission, and 
representing an important ethnic voting constituencyn. 
The enlargement debate was not, of course, confined to Washington. It was equally 
prominent in Germany, economically the Alliance's strongest European member. The 
legacy of modern history, allied to the immediacy of Germany's geostrategic position, 
added a uniquely German flavour to the debate, and Defence Minister Volker Riihe gave 
strong support for early enlargement. Ruhe represented the view that swift action was 
needed to enlarge NATO and to accept new members. Others, most notably Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel, had favoured a more cautious approach linked to EU enlargement, 
but the RUhe view held sway in the end28• 
With two of NATO's key players in favour of enlargement, the way ahead was emerging 
clearly. By the time of NATO's Brussels summit of January 1994, therefore, President 
Clinton was in a position to state publicly that he looked forward to the day when NATO 
would take in new members who would assume the full responsibilities of Alliance 
membership29. In effect, the decision to enlarge had been taken, and now required the 
work to implement it. 
Before enlargement could take place there remained the question of how to justify it 
formally. To that end the September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement set out seven 
reasons justifying NATO expansion, centred on notions of strengthening international and 
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European security through the promotion of democratic refonn, civilian control, common 
defence, shared democratic values and good neighbourly relations3o• The rationale for 
increased membership having been set out, NATO fonnally invited its first round of new 
members to join at its Madrid summit in July 199731 • The invitations to Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic were issued with a view to these states acceding to full 
membership in 1999, in time for NATO's fiftieth anniversary. In due course, all three 
were admitted. The fact that this occurred in the same month as the launch of Operation 
Allied Force over Kosovo did not go unnoticed in Russia. 
Partnership for Peace 
Opinion has differed on the value of ptp to European security, with some seeing it as no 
more than a further enlargement-delaying tactic, and as such a successor to the NACC32• 
However, the Partnership programme differed from the NACC in the important respect of 
introducing differentiation. NATO concluded bilateral ptp arrangements with individual 
partner nations. The programme of exercises, exchanges and training activities involved 
was to be by agreement between NATO and the individual partner concerned, at a 
mutually acceptable pace. 
Seen from another perspective ptp was also an attempt to accommodate Russian 
concerns, providing a compromise between the enlargement sought by ECE countries, 
and the effective veto on enlargement sought by Moscow. Born out of the NATO 
Defence Ministers meeting at Trevemunde in October 1993, ptp provided for aspirant 
NATO members and others to effect a closer cooperative relationship with the Alliance, 
but fell short of full membership. 
Such an arrangement was always likely to evoke mixed reactions, since it provided a little 
of something for everyone yet failed to fully satisfy anyone. The flexibility of the 
arrangement allowed varying claims to be made about its essential nature. It is not 
difficult to understand the view that ptp represented a somewhat cynical fudge between 
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meeting the aspirations of the ECE countries and their western advocates, and attempting 
to reassure the Russians. Yet this very flexibility was a political gain of sorts. Indeed, 
Y ost provides a very positive assessment of ptp and makes a strong case for considering 
it a highly successful enterprise33• 
The immediate practical effect of establishing partnership arrangements was to postpone 
consideration of full membership for those who wanted it, while failing to reassure those 
opposed to enlargement. ptp was so open to differing interpretations that Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev could attempt to portray it as a Russian success in so 
far as it had the potential to obviate any further expansion ofNAT034• While this was a 
valiant effort to portray his policies as successful, Kozyrev could not hope to convince 
Russian sceptics who regarded acceptance of ptp as accepting a junior status, particularly 
after the NATO bombing of Serb positions in Gorazde in April 199435• Partnership or 
not, NATO was not Moscow's agency of choice for the construction of an effective 
European security regime; at this juncture, the CSCE remained the Kremlin's preferred 
option36. 
Russia's delayed entry into ptp in 1994 was a mark of its displeasure at NATO's decision 
to enlarge37• Nevertheless, there was very little that Moscow could have done about the 
Alliance's determination to expand its activities, whether by enlargement or ptp. Faced 
with the consequences of its own diplomatic weakness on the subject, it was as much as 
the Yeltsin regime could do to manipulate ptp to its own ends. The Russia-NATO 
protocol, attached to the ptp Framework Agreement which Kozyrev signed in June 1994, 
made specific reference to Russia's status as a major power and thus represented 
diplomatic recognition of Russia's uniqueness and centrality to the continent's security 
structures38 • From Russia's viewpoint, membership of ptp also held out the prospect of 
obtaining a voice in NATO decision-making, a prospect which was doomed to 
disappointment. Russia continued to cite ptp and the attached protocol as giving it a 
voice in NATO. By contrast, NATO was categoric in its position that Russia had not 
been afforded any form of influence or veto over Alliance decision-making39• 
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The enlargement-delaying tactic - if that is what it was - ofPfP could not be seen as 
entirely successful. By accepting evolutionary enlargement, PfP added pressure to the 
overall momentum for enlargement, which in tum hastened the process of identifying the 
qualifying criteria and effecting the necessary institutional expansion, in tum outlined in 
the 1995 Study on Enlargement40• 
Partnership, however portrayed in Moscow and the West, was not what the ECE countries 
had in mind in lobbying NATO for membership. Poland and the Czech Republic in 
particular were loud in their criticism of the halfway house that was PfP. Ever mindful 
of the potential threat to their new found status posed by Russia, they continued to keep 
up the pressure for admission to the Alliance, and their case appeared strengthened by 
events in Chechnya in 1994. Russia's military intervention in Chechnya caused many to 
fear for the course of the Yeltsin regime. This added impetus to the movement for 
inclusion of the Visegrad states in an expanded NATO, a movement which had been 
gathering momentum in the United States as the Clinton administration explored ways of 
meeting ECE security demands. 
The Russians made clear their displeasure by, initially, refusing to sign their hi-lateral 
Partnership arrangement with the Alliance, then engaging in a diplomatic and propaganda 
offensive designed to counter the arguments advanced in favour of NATO enlargement. 
Leading political and military figures spoke out against NATO's proposed course of 
action. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Defence Minister Grachev and others sounded dire 
warnings about the inadvisability of NATO enlargement, but to no avail41 • Indeed, for 
Kozyrev, NATO enlargement proved the end of the road. He was replaced in 1996 as 
Foreign Minister by Yevgeny Primakov, with the express purpose of shoring up Russia's 
international and security interests. Grachev's successor at the Defence Ministry, Jgor 
Rodionov, also joined the criticism of NATO, again to no effect. NATO did, however, 
attempt to reassure the Russians by affirming that it had no intention, no plan and no 
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of any of its new member states. This 
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was made public following the December 1996 meeting of the NAC though it had no 
perceptible effect on those elements in Moscow opposed to NATO enlargement. 
Notwithstanding the Alliance's attempted stroking ofrumed feathers via its "three no's" 
formula, a timetable for enlargement was agreed by July 1997. 
The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
Despite Moscow's constant engagement with the West under Yeltsin and Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev, enlargement was seen in the Kremlin as creating a new division in 
Europe which would effectively isolate Russia politically and economically. It was also 
opposed on the grounds that it represented a betrayal of the understanding of the 1990 
2+4 agreement on German unification. The Russian view was that the West had 
undertaken not to expand the NATO alliance beyond East Berlin (East Germany 
excepted). Finally, Kozyrev's policy of engagement with the West was undermined by 
domestic political opponents, for whom NATO expansion provided justification to attack 
the policy. As a consequence of enlargement the West in general, and NATO in 
particular, were not trusted in Russia. 
Nevertheless, Moscow was faced with the reality that there was very little it could do to 
influence the course of events. In such circumstances the prudent approach seemed to be 
to accept the direction of NATO activities and attempt to influence it in Moscow's 
favour42 . The logic of this thinking dictated that a more conciliatory approach to NATO 
was required in the Kremlin, whatever the public pronouncements, and in early 1997 
Yeltsin faced up to that reality by entering into negotiations, conducted by Primakov and 
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, designed to formalise and regulate Russia's 
relationship with the Alliance. 
As a result, in May of that year the two parties signed the Founding Act on Mutual 
Relations, Cooperation and Security4l. As with PiP, so with the Founding Act. Each 
party to it got something of what it desired from the relationship, and each could portray 
it in a positive light for the benefit of a domestic audience, or other observers44. NATO 
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reiterated its position on the non-deployment of military assets in new member states 
(though with the significant caveat that it retained the right to deploy in the event of 
future crisis or aggression). In return, Russia effectively conceded the inevitability of the 
Alliance's determination to enlarge, but could portray the Act, and its creation of a 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), as putting it on an equal one-to-one 
footing with the Alliance. The PJC, furthermore, was to be the main forum for NATO-
Russian consultation, and resolution of disagreements. There was now an agreed method 
of communication and consultation between the parties, which represented progress for 
Moscow since it held out the prospect of influencing Alliance decision making. 
In reality, however, the Founding Act and PJC did not allow for Russian interference or a 
veto in NATO internal deliberations. Although the Founding Act created a forum for 
communication, and stipulated clearly broad areas of interest which could be discussed it 
was never interpreted by NATO as constituting the bilateral relationship to which the 
Kremlin aspired. NATO retained a political cohesion, then presented a united front to its 
Russian interlocutors on any given issue. This format became known as "sixteen 
(subsequently nineteen) plus one". Russia had accepted the inevitability of enlargement 
in return for a more permanent and high profile presence at NATO, but with no more 
tangible diplomatic gains than that. 
The NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 marked a further effort on NATO's part to 
establish some kind of meaningful institutional basis for its relationship with Russia, 
though the parties differed in their interpretation of the Act's application. Light, White 
and Lowenhardt, outlining the fmdings of their fieldwork in Russia and Ukraine on the 
expansion of NATO and the mfs, noted the fundamental divergence of interpretation of 
the Founding Act between NATO and Russia, the former regarding it as giving Russia a 
voice in, but not a veto over, NATO business, the latter as obliging NATO to consult 
Moscow via the PJC. Recognition of this fundamental divergence is echoed in 
discussions with NATO political staffs46• The Act's recognition of the PJC as "the 
principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis" proved 
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meaningless, as far as Moscow was concerned, when the Kosovo crisis emerged. 
NATO's view, of course, was that while the PJC may be the principal venue for 
consultation it was not an exclusive venue. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the ptp 
and the Founding Act were a sop to Russian sensibilities. The real issue had been 
decided in favour of NATO enlargement, NATO exclusivity in its decision-making, and 
institutional arrangements to provide a public show of accommodating Russian wishes. 
That, at least, is how it came to look from Moscow. 
This, however, was not always the case. While some opinion formers in Moscow 
remained at best sceptical, others saw the Founding Act, for example, as an opportunity 
for Russia to establish a meaningful partnership with NATO on the basis of equality. 
Piontkovsky and Tsygichko 47 offered an optimistic assessment of the prospects for the 
relationship as follows: " ... the Founding Act offers great opportunities for Russia to build 
an equal partnership with NATO in all areas ... " - particularly by focusing upon "common 
economic corporate interests" which would raise the relationship to a new and mutually 
beneficial level. Perhaps the keyword here is "equal", conveying as it does the sense ofa 
one-to-one relationship with all that this entails in terms of the relative status of the 
interlocutors. Contrast this with the NATO interpretation, and we may - with hindsight -
begin to appreciate the extent of Russian disappointment. That the Founding Act and the 
PJC did not live up to Russian expectations makes Russian disappointment more 
understandable but no less deeply felt48• Nevertheless, in the two year period between the 
Founding Act and the Kosovo campaign it was still possible for commentators to speak of 
equal partnership and Russian influence upon NAT049• 
Towards a "new quality" a/relationship 
The scope of this study, which concludes with the attempts to institutionalise a "new 
quality" to NATO-Russian relations in the forum of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) of 
2002, constrains fuller consideration of the second round of NATO enlargement, 
concluded in May 2004. The significant events of the empirical studies of the 
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relationship in Bosnia and Kosovo took place against the background of the initial 
enlargement debate, and subsequent accession to NATO membership of the Visegrad 
states. Nevertheless, NATO's continued commitment to enlargement after 199950 
remained a major irritant in relations with Moscow right up to the Prague Summit of 
2002, at which Alliance membership was offered to seven more new members51 • 
Relations were already strained after the fust round of enlargement in 1999, and over 
Balkan issues. In this regard, Kosovo marked a turning point (see chapter three). 
NATO's assumption of intervention rights in Kosovo, contrary to the strongly expressed 
wishes of Moscow, was the proof positive that the Alliance, and by extension the US, 
considered itself the only authoritative voice in security matters52 The PlC had not been 
convened to discuss the crisis prior to the launch of Operation Allied Force. Not even the 
UN was in a position to thwart unilateral action by NATO. Further, the complete 
disregard for Moscow's views in an area that it regarded as a zone of special influence 
(given its affinities with Orthodox Serbia), removed the last fiction that the Krernlin's 
opinion was of any account when it came to deciding NATO's course of action. So much 
for Partnership for Peace, PlC, and the Founding Act, in Russian eyes at leastS3• 
It is not difficult to see why, after Kosovo, Moscow had no confidence in the existing 
Alliance, notwithstanding talk of Russia one day joining it. Yeltsin's successor President 
Putin caused something of a stir when, shortly before the 2000 Presidential elections, he 
spoke of the possibility of Russia becoming a member of NATO 54. The idea was not 
new55 but, unsure how to react, NATO reverted to making the right noises of welcome 
while ruling out the near term prospect of Russian entry into the Alliance. Putin 
subsequently affected a shift in his original position and 'normality' was restored56, though 
press discussion of the possibility of Russia joining the Alliance continued to resurface 
occasionallY7. 
Following the events of September 2001, popularly referred to as '9111', Putin travelled 
some diplomatic distance in assisting the US to respond to the outrages58• Leaving aside 
the rationale for this new diplomatic course, discussed in chapter four, Putin's overtures 
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to the US and the West in general did much to foster a more benign environment for the 
conduct of NATO-Russian relations, so badly damaged by Operation Allied Force. In an 
atmosphere of improving cooperation and rapprochement, both sides set to work to create 
a new institutional framework for the conduct of their relations, a framework which could 
go beyond the discredited PJC and give the relationship at least a new appearance, ifnot 
necessarily any greater substance. The result was the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), 
ratified and inaugurated at the Rome Summit of May 2002. 
The need to distance the new forum from its predecessor ensured that there would be 
transparent differences in its establishment and functioning. The tri-partite chairmanship 
of the PJC became a single chair, a position filled by the NATO Secretary General. This 
ostensibly put Russia on an equal footing with all the other Alliance members, 
transforming the previous 'nineteen plus one' arrangement into 'at twenty'. As noted 
above, under the former system the Allies agreed their unified position in advance of any 
meetings with the Russians. Now, in theory at least, all subjects for consideration were 
amenable to open debate among the twenty participants on an equal basis, and decisions 
subject to consensus. This arrangement enabled Moscow to claim a diplomatic advance 
in its dealings with the Alliance. Post-PJC equality had been recognised, issues affecting 
the Alliance and Russia were open to debate at the NRC, and decisions and action could 
only proceed on the basis of consensus. However, there remained a mechanism (known 
as retrieval) whereby anyone of the NRC participants could effect the withdrawal of an 
item from the agenda, and the NAC reserved the right to discuss any issue in its own 
forum, untroubled by the prospect of a Russian veto. 
Perhaps the real significance of the NRC lies not so much in the substance of its debates 
as in the symbolism of its creation in the first place. It represented a move away from the 
bitterness generated in Moscow by the Alliance's actions in Kosovo. It afforded a 
hitherto lacking equality - procedurally, at least - to the Russians. It also marked a 
considerable improvement in relations in the post-9/11 atmosphere, a form of recognition 
of Russian support of the West as the US began to turn its attention more towards the 
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Middle East at the expense of South East Europe. As the NRC was coming into being 
and improving matters between the Alliance and Moscow, international attention was 
shifting away from the Balkans. NATO was preparing for its historic Prague Summit of 
November 2002, the US was becoming preoccupied with Iraq, and Moscow was in the 
process of reducing its troop levels in the Balkans. NATO-Russian relations beyond the 
creation of the NRC would therefore have a considerably reduced Balkan focus, being 
more concerned with issues such as counter-terrorism, crisis management, WMD and 
non-proliferation matters. Fourteen months after the creation of the NRC the last Russian 
troops left the Balkans. 
Conclusion 
The 1990s proved a volatile decade for NATO and for the new Russian Federation. 
Indeed, the ramifications of the fundamental changes wrought to both are still working 
themselves out as each attempts to adjust to establishing its role in the dramatically 
reordered post-9/11 world. NATO sought and found a new rationale for its existence 
after the Cold War. No longer a defensive Article 5 alliance, it enlarged its mission and 
membership, establishing itself as the leading international organisation in European 
security affairs. The Alliance moved beyond, but did not abandon, its collective defence 
posture. The 1999 Strategic Concept recognised and formalised NATO's transformation, 
and provided guidance on the near term direction of the Alliance. The decision to pursue 
outreach initiatives to accommodate former adversaries also entailed offers of partnership 
with Russia in various institutional fora. However, NATO saw fit to act unilaterally 
where it chose, and operations in Bosnia and Kosovo bore witness to Alliance 
unilateralism. The true worth - or perhaps lack of worth - of partnership arrangements 
became a cause of grave concern for Moscow, whose consistent opposition to 
enlargement proved fruitless. 
The survival, adaptation and persistence of NATO obliged Moscow to react and to deal 
with the reality of western power. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, reactivity was 
37 
characteristic of the relationship in the Balkans where NATO actions often drew Russian 
criticism, then subsequent reconciliation. Russian preferences for a pan-European 
security framework constructed around the OSCE were to no avail in countering NATO's 
pre-eminence throughout the 1990s and beyond. Attempts to institutionalise NATO-
Russian engagement, whether through PiP, the Founding Act, or the PlC, were never 
entirely satisfactory. Overshadowing all this was the process of enlargement to which 
Moscow was never reconciled, yet never able to counter. Consequently, Russian attitudes 
to NATO fluctuated between suspicion, cautious cooperation, and outright hostility, the 
latter most openly after the launch of Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in March 1999. 
Subsequent efforts to put relations on a new footing in the NATO-Russia Council did at 
least go some way to mending fences after the war in Kosovo, though whether one may 
speak of a new quality in the relationship is more open to debate, and is discussed in later 
chapters. 
The formal institutionalising of NATO-Russian relations since 1991 provides the wider 
background against which to view the post~Cold War relationship in action. This is best 
illustrated by reference to activities in the Balkans. If the 1999 Strategic Concept 
formalised the Alliance's new mission and posture, it is worth noting that the changes had 
already been evident for several years in Bosnia where SFOR was putting the Concept's 
words into effect on the ground. Operation Allied Force was also in the process of 
demonstrating in practical terms what the Strategic Concept meant for NATO forces. 
Each of these operations had considerable significance for Moscow in shaping its 
relationship with a politically and militarily powerful NATO which continued to expand 
eastward. The strains which characterised the institutional relations between NATO and 
Russia were perhaps less evident on the ground in the Balkans, where IFORlSFOR and 
KFOR operations demonstrated the parties' ability to cooperate effectively at the tactical 
level, but could not disguise the unevenness of relations at the higher political level (see 
chapter four). The former Yugoslavia thus became the testing ground for the practical 
evolution of the new NATO, the evolving foreign policy of the Russian Federation, and 
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the ability of the Alliance and Moscow to work together in arguably the most difficult and 
dangerous circumstances in Europe since 1945. 
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Chapter Two 
NATO, Russia and Civil War in Bosnia 1991-1995 
Introduction 
Among the most profound consequences of the end of the Cold War was the 
disintegration in the early 1990s of the former Yugoslavia. In a number of its constituent 
republics including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, nationalism 
based upon ethnicity began to emerge as the dominant political ideology, in opposition to 
the formerly tightly controlled and centralised Belgrade regime. The position of Serbia, 
the pre-eminent Yugoslav republic, was somewhat ambivalent as the demise of 
Yugoslavia inevitably detracted from its leading position, but paved the way for the Serb 
nationalism which replaced it. A relatively bloodless secession in Slovenia in 1991-92 
first of all, followed by a much bloodier campaign for Croatian independence, indicated 
the end of Yugoslavia as was. When Bosnia-Herzegovina in turn attempted to secede, the 
response from Belgrade resulted in a downward spiral into vicious and bloody ethnic 
strife which eventually led to widespread international involvement in the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Ineffectual UN efforts l to maintain peace were 
eventually superseded by NATO intervention and by late 1995 the Dayton Accord 
provided a NATO-monitored peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
NATO's intervention in the former Yugoslavia was significant for being the first major 
out-of-area operation in which the Alliance participated. Bosnia showed the Alliance in a 
new light, as deployable peacekeeper beyond its own borders. As such it proved a key 
factor in shaping the posture of the new, post-Cold War NATO. The history of the 
Alliance's efforts to keep the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrated the difficult, and at 
times strained, relationship between the Allies and Russia throughout the early 1990s. It 
demonstrated that from a promising beginning, with a general coincidence of western and 
Russian views - an apparent partnership of equals - the relationship deteriorated, by the 
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signing of the Dayton Accord at the end of 1995, to a more obviously senior-junior 
partnership2. 
In arriving at an understanding of the Alliance's relationship with Russia in Bosnia, a 
number of separate yet related strands need to be drawn together. I will begin by tracing 
the outline of Yugoslavia's collapse in the early 1990s, examining the country's descent 
into conflict. The long and bloody route to eventual NATO involvement was a tortuous 
one, and the war in Bosnia requires significant exposition in setting the backdrop to the 
Alliance's actions. In turn, I attempt to identify NATO policy in Bosnia (in so far as one 
can speak of such a thing, implying as it does a systematic, consistent and coherent 
Alliance approach) by considering some of the differing perspectives within NATO. 
Yugoslavia's disintegration exposed significant differences of outlook within the North 
Atlantic Alliance, and its members' failure to come to tenns with Europe's worst security 
crisis since the Second World War. It also demonstrated vividly the fact that NATO is 
not a monolith but a disparate organisation requiring consensus to function successfully. 
This leads into a consideration of Alliance policy overall, as NATO's leading nations all 
shared an interest in and desire to work through international cooperative bodies, so 
. obliging them to acknowledge, inter alia, the Russian position. In particular, I focus on 
the NATO position on Bosnia as evidenced by its public pronouncements, in attempting 
to identify the Alliance's expectations of Russia in Bosnia. 
This chapter goes on to focus on the Russian position on the war in Bosnia. In 
considering Moscow's outlook, I examine debates surrounding the fonnulation of the 
new Russian Federation's foreign policy. The successor state to the Soviet Union groped 
its way towards a more or less coherent line in the Balkans which would enable it to 
portray itself as a leading diplomatic and military player, yet retain a working partnership 
with the West. Russian foreign policy underwent a painful evolution in the Bosnian 
context, as cooperation with the West gave way to a more assertive yet less influential 
line. Finally, I discuss the effect of the war in Bosnia upon NATO itself, and on its 
impact upon the Alliance's relationship with Russia. 
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The collapse of Yugoslavia 
To begin with, it is worth describing the disintegration of Yugoslavia, so placing in 
context the Alliance's dealings with Moscow in the Balkans3• By the summer of 1991 
Yugoslavia's constituent republics were taking steps to secede, though there is a case for 
acknowledging that secession was not driven solely from the periphery, but also from the 
Belgrade centre as part of a wider Greater Serbia project4• In June of that year Slovenia 
and Croatia declared their independence. The Yugoslav National Army's (JNA's) 
attempts to maintain control over Slovenian border stations were unsuccessful and the 
Yugoslav Federal Presidency ordered the army to withdraw within three months, marking 
de facto recognition of Slovenian independence. JNA attention then focused upon 
Croatia where armed conflict was increasingly bitter. As the war dragged on through the 
summer, pressure increased for the international community to take some action to 
prevent complete disintegration and all out civil war in Yugoslavia. One week later the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 7135 imposing an arms embargo on all the 
former Yugoslav entities. This was followed by an EU decision to send monitors to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
International Recognition of Secessionist States 
By the end of 1991 Vukovar had fallen to the JNA after an SO-day siege but more 
significantly in the long term, on 23,d December 1991 Germany recognised Slovenia and 
Croatia as independent states, the recognition to be effective from 15th January 19926• 
Germany's actions precipitated widespread recognition of the new republics by the EU 
and IS other states, including the US, in January 1992. Two months later the UN passed 
Resolution 7437 establishing a peacekeeping force in Croatia, and deployed its 14,000 
strong United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to separate the Croatian and 
Krajina Serb forces. The force included a Russian contingentS though Russian 
cooperation with the west in the Balkans was not universally well received at home9• 
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However, it was in Bosnia that the situation deteriorated most severely. The Bosnian 
Serbs declared their independence from Sarajevo and established the Republika Srpska, 
which reacted violently to the February 1992 Bosnian referendum vote in favour of 
independence from Belgrade10. Heavy fighting now broke out as the Serbs moved to 
partition Bosnia and the siege of Sarajevo began. Serbia and Montenegro now 
proclaimed a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, declaring it the successor state to 
Yugoslavia. Within a month it was the object of UN economic sanctions imposed under 
Security Council Resolution 75i 1. 
Increasing International Involvement 
As Serb-led ethnic cleansing got under way in May 1992, Bosnia became the scene of 
some of the bloodiest atrocities in Europe since the end of the Second World War. The 
UN's best efforts were not proving effective in putting an end to the bloodshed, but the 
organisation persisted, in cooperation with the EU. At this stage NATO had not yet 
become actively involved in operations in Bosnia, although, significantly, the June 1992 
Ministerial Summit in OSl012 had taken the decision to offer troops and equipment for 
peacekeeping operations beyond the borders of its member states, so highlighting a 
willingness to move 'out of area'. 
Between August and December 1992 the UN and EU stepped up their attempts to end the 
increasingly bitter struggle. The Security Council passed a series of resolutions to 
facilitate the delivery of relief supplies, effect access to detention camps, establish a. 
commission of experts to examine evidence of war crimes, establish a no-fly zone over 
Bosnia, initiate naval interdiction of ships attempting to evade sanctions, and send 760 
observers to Macedonial3• UNPROFOR's humanitarian mission was extended to all of 
Bosnia. The Vance-Owen negotiations, a UNIEU collaborative venture, got under way in 
Geneva in September 1992, but broke down in January 1993. NATO was beginning to 
take a more prominent role in the situation, agreeing in October 1992 to send 100 
45 
personnel to the UN headquarters in Bosnial4, and a month later providing naval forces to 
patrol in the Adriatic to enforce UN sanctions. This operation, which eventually came to 
be known as Sharp Guard, was conducted alongside WEU naval forces. 
NATO Becomes More Involved 
As the war in Yugoslavia dragged on through 1993 the pattern of UN diplomatic activity, 
alongside increasing NATO involvement, was repeated. Against the backdrop of the on-
off-on Vance-Owen negotiations, now supported by the Clinton administration in 
Washington, the UN continued to issue Security Council resolutions in response to the 
escalation of the war in the Balkans. An international war crimes tribunal was set uplS, 
the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia extended16 and, in March 1993, the enforcement of 
the no-fly zone over Bosnia was authorised17• As war broke out in April 1993 between 
Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces, NATO began air operations to enforce the UN's no-fly 
zone. Among the more noteworthy UN Security Council resolutions issued were the 
stiffening of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and the creation of safe areas 
among the Muslim enclaves of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Srebrenica, Bihac and Gorazde18• 
NATO meanwhile authorised planning for a peacekeeping force of some 60,000 troops in 
Bosnia in support of UN efforts, and in June 1993 offered air power support to protect 
UNPROFOR19• In the same month US willingness to countenance greater involvement in 
the Balkans was stepped up as Washington announced its readiness to send a small force 
to Macedonia, an action immediately sanctioned by the UN under resolution 84220• The 
Security Council also authorised the provision of air assets to provide armed protection 
for its declared safe areas21 , and two months later, in August 1993, it announced that 
NATO was ready to carry out air strikes at the request of the (UN) Secretary General, to 
support UNPROFOR. 
It wasn't long before NATO air support was invoked when, in February 1994, the UN 
Secretary General called upon the Alliance to be prepared to launch attacks against 
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Bosnian-Serb artillery positions around Sarajevo. NATO's willingness to employ air 
power was not at all to Russia's liking22• The call for NATO to be ready to launch air 
attacks came in the wake of a mortar attack upon Sarajevo market place and led to the EU 
calling for the demilitarisation of the city and its administration by the UN. The Serbs 
complied with the NATO ultimatum to withdraw from their positions within ten days, but 
shortly afterwards four Serb aircraft were shot down by NATO US aircraft for entering 
the no-fly zone. 
This action was NATO's first combat mission, indicating the Alliance's willingness to 
use force and highlighting its capabilities23• More was to follow when, in April 1994, US 
aircraft bombed Bosnian Serb positions around Gorazde, a declared safe area. This led to 
a short tenn increase of diplomatic and military tensions, with the Russians complaining 
that they were not consulted24 and the Bosnian Serbs detaining UN and NGO staffs. 
However, fighting in the Gorazde area subsided, and a UN-brokered cease-fire came into 
being. 
The use of NATO air power had given the clearest indication to date that the UN could 
call upon effective military means in support of its diplomatic initiatives2s• However, the 
Bosnian Serb response to attacks by NATO was unpredictable, and ran the risk of 
inflaming an already very dangerous situation. At Gorazde in April 1994, for example, 
the Serbs had taken hostages in response to NATO bombing of their positions, and 
threatened to shoot down NATO aircraft. A similar situation developed at the Serb-
controlled Udbina airfield in Croatia, where 300 UN troops were taken hostage in 
retaliation for NATO strikes against Serb positions which were being used to launch 
attacks on another of the safe areas, Bihac26• Air strikes were clearly a risky strategy, 
though the fact that they were now an option for serious consideration for the UN served 
to underline the credibility of the military capability which NATO could lend. 
Diplomatic Progress 
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Although 1994 had seen a grave deterioration in the Balkan wars and the gradually 
increasing involvement of NATO, it had not been an entirely gloomy year diplomatically. 
In March a US brokered deal, the Washington Agreement, had put an end to hostilities 
between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, establishing the Croat-Muslim Federation in 
Bosnia27. A few weeks later a ceasefire agreement was' reached between the Croatian 
government and the Krajina Serbs. Signed in the Russian Embassy at Zagreb, it was 
implemented in April 1994, in the same month as the ceasefire at Gorazde28• 
These hopeful signs were repeated at the beginning of 1995 when in January a four-
month cease fire between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs came into 
effect. The agreement had been brokered by former US President Jirnmy Carter, but 
expired amid low level fighting in May. Meanwhile, the Croatian army launched attacks 
to take control of the Zagreb-Belgrade main link road across UN lines in the UN's Sector 
West. Krajina Serbs responded by shelling Zagreb and other cities but the Croatian attack 
pressed on, siezing virtually all strategic points within the UN Sector West, and enabling 
Croatian President Tudjman to declare victory. 
Safe Areas? 
By May 1995 NATO and the Bosnian Serbs found themselves once again in direct 
confrontation, with the Alliance launching air strikes against Serb positions near Pale in 
response to Serb removal of heavy weapons from a UN depot. The Serb response was 
bloody and included shelling of UN safe areas, taking UN personnel hostage and killing 
68 people in Tuzla. Sarajevo remained under siege by the Serbs despite exploratory 
missions by the Bosnian government to lift the siege. Serb armour also advanced upon 
the safe area ofSrebrenica and, in one of the bloodiest actions of the war, overran the 
Muslim enclave there killing an estimated 7,000 Muslims in July 1995. The UN defences 
around the city had proven entirely inadequate, and the conflict went into downward 
spiral as Bosnian Muslims siezed UN weapons to defend themselves against anticipated 
Serb attack. Zepa became the scene of heavy fighting between Bosnian Muslims and 
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Serbs. Krajina Serb leader Martic, Bosnian Serb army commander General Mladic, and 
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic were all indicted for war crimes by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague29, and the US Senate voted 
to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. 
Through patient negotiation and agreement between NATO and the UN, more refined 
procedures for implementing close air support were devised. However, they remained of 
. somewhat limited value since dual authorisation, by its very nature, did not facilitate 
immediate response to contraventions of the 20 kilometre exclusion zone around 
Sarajevo. Further, UN forces were inadequate for effective monitoring of the exclusion 
zone at ground level, undermining the deterrent effect of airstrikes and jeopardising the 
continued security of the safe areas. The events of July 1995 when the Bosnian Serbs 
overran Srebrenica made it clear that UNPROFOR was not in a position to guarantee the 
security of the remaining safe areasJo• Notwithstanding the clumsy dual authorisation 
system, therefore, greater reliance upon NATO air power now became more evident. This 
was exemplified by the launch of Operation Deliberate Force, a sustained month-long 
bombing campaign of Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo in response to their 
shelling of the cilf I. Carried out in accordance with Security Council Resolution 836, 
Deliberate Force was rnilitarily successful in compelling the Serbs to withdraw their 
heavy weaponry from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, reopening road and air access 
to the city, and paving the way for a formal peace process. The NATO air campaign 
continued throughout September in tandem with diplomatic manouevres, in which the 
Contact Group representatives met the Foreign Ministers ofBosnia, Croatia and the 
former Yugoslavia and agreed upon the basic principles for peace negotiations, eventually 
resulting in the Dayton Accord in November 1995, discussed in chapter four. 
In essence the parties acknowledged that Bosnia would consist of a Bosnia-Herzegovina 
entity, or Federation, ofMuslirns and Croats, and a Serb entity. Each would have its own . 
constitution and be self governing within its own borders, with joint national institutions 
to be created at the state level. Fifty one percent of the territory would be apportioned to 
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the Federation, the remainder to the nascent Republika Srpska. The Bosnian government 
and the Bosnian Serbs signed a cease fIre agreement on 12th October 1995, and UN 
peacekeepers reopened the roads to Sarajevo for humanitarian convoys, ending the three 
year siege of the city. Meanwhile, Greece and the former Yugoslav republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) reached an agreement to normalise their own relationship as the 
Balkans began to settle into an uneasy peace, the details of which remained to be fInalised 
at the Dayton talks in Ohio. 
NATO perspectives on Bosnia 
As noted in the Introduction chapter, it is essential to bear in mind the diverse nature and 
interests of NATO's membership. One is not dealing here with a unitary and monolithic 
structure, but a diverse and consensual one. While ultimately acting in accordance with 
consensus, the Alliance had fIrst of all to achieve that consensus, an activity which, in the 
absence of the unifYing Cold War threat from the east, was always going to be somewhat 
problematic for a disparate organization in search of a new role. In the early 1990s 
Bosnia provided NATO with a rigorous test of its post-Cold War cohesion and relevance. 
It struggled to pass that test, a struggle which can best be understood by reference to the 
differing outlooks of the major NATO capitals in their handling of the war. 
As a Pennanent Member of the UN Security Council and a long time advocate of the 
military potential of the WEU, it is not surprising that France regarded these as its 
institutions of choice for dealing with the security problems of the Balkans. France's 
1967 withdrawal from NATO's military structure, and the latter's susceptibility to US 
influence, meant that Paris sought to promote the involvement of international bodies 
other than NATO, most notably the UN and the WEU32• 
Experience on the ground, however, gradually persuaded the French of the value of 
adapting NATO procedures and practices33• As the European nation with the most 
sizeable contribution of troops to the Balkans, France had military credibility and a 
50 
recognised stake in the debate on the way ahead. Paris became a leading advocate of air 
strikes as the war continued, notwithstanding the British view that air strikes would 
jeopardize the safety of troops committed to the theatre of operations. 
NATO also came to be recognized by the French as the only practical expression of 
effective military force, despite Paris' initial preference for the WEU. The latter body 
excluded the Americans by definition, yet its lack of a capable military structure 
compelled France to acknowledge that the WEU could not provide an independent 
European security capability. Rather, the compromise position was to seek to develop the 
WEU as a European pillar of NATO, consistent with the French aim of establishing a 
distinctly European (and therefore French-, rather than US-influenced) approach to 
Bosnia. 
At the strategic level Paris continued to espouse a UN line as a member of the Security 
Council. At the practical level its membership of the Contact Group gave it the 
opportunity to bring its influence to bear directly on the major international participants. 
Not least, the experience of the French military in Bosnia inclined the country's decision 
makers ever closer to NATO, and therefore to the US, in pursuit of a more interventionist 
stance. France, a member of NATO though not of its military structure, came to the view 
that only through the Alliance could there be effective international intervention in 
Bosnia. 
Although all the major governments of Europe were susceptible to the opinions of their 
electorate, the German government proved particularly so. Reunification being still very 
fresh in public consciousness, the wars in Yugoslavia came to be viewed in Germany as 
struggles for the proper self-determination of independent nations held back by the former 
communist regime in Belgrade. In the public mind there was a parallel to be drawn . 
between the recent German experience of post-Cold War unification and the case for 
independence put by Slovenia and Croatia. 
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Bonn thus began to take a more robust stand in seeking recognition for Slovenia and 
Croatia34• One week after the European Council agreement of 16th December 1991 to 
invite applications from the former Yugoslav republics for recognition of their 
independence, Germany effectively broke ranks with its EC allies and announced that it 
would establish diplomatic ties with Slovenia and Croatia on 15th January 1992. In so 
doing, it exposed the myth of a common European foreign policy, and precipitated 
widespread recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, signalling international diplomatic 
acknowledgement of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. 
Diplomatic success for Bonn came at a price. By pre-empting the agreed EC position on 
recognition, and so destroying any credibility attaching to a common foreign and security 
policy, Germany had angered its EC aIJies. The strength of their reaction also needs to be 
understood in light of fears of a unified Germany's potential for revanchism. The war in 
Bosnia posed serious questions for the foreign policy of the new Germany. To what 
extent should it seek to exert its autonomy in the foreign policy arena? How should the 
Kohl government deal with the pressure of domestic public opinion and its support for 
self-determination in the Former Yugoslavia? Above aIJ, how should Germany reconcile 
the apparently conflicting courses ofEC common foreign policy and German public 
opinion? In the event, Bonn chose to acknowledge the views of the German electorate by 
forcing the pace of recognition, weathering the storm of EC disapproval, and seeking 
subsequent harmony with its European and US allies through international diplomatic 
cooperation, including contributing militarily and politicalJy to the NATO effort. 
The United Kingdom was prominent in the international efforts to address Bosnia's 
problems in the diplomatic and military spheres. Its troop contribution was second only 
to that of France, a fact which enabled the British to claim a certain moral authority in 
debates on how the international community should respond to the crisis. However, the 
UK record on Bosnia attracted criticism for its caution and aIJegedly pro-Serbian stance35• 
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London justified its caution by reference to its troop commitments to UNPROFOR, and 
the perceived adverse impact upon its forces should there be greater interventionism from 
the international communitl6• Given the US preference for air strikes rather than putting 
its own forces on the ground, the UK was in no hurry to commit greater numbers of 
troops to intervene in what it saw as an intractable ethnic wa.27• In practice, British 
caution was a brake on concerted international action, and considerably angered its allies, 
as well as Alija Jzetbegovic's govemment in SarajevoJ8. 
The UK placed great faith in the advice of its commanders in the field, particularly 
General Rose, Commander ofUNPROFOR forces in BosniaJ9, who was eventually 
instrumental in persuading the UK to countenance limited air strikes as a way of 
reinforcing diplomatic pressure. This had the wider effect of helping to reconcile the UK 
and US positions, and restoring some equilibrium to their damaged relationship, though 
Britain remained highly sceptical about becoming embroiled in Bosnia as long as the US 
continued to refuse to commit its own troops to the Balkans. It would take more than air 
strikes to reconcile the British and US positions, albeit the British government gradually 
came to accept that, like it or not, lift and strike would probably happen if the US was set 
on it4o. 
In Washington the post-Cold War order meant that the US need not necessarily adopt its 
traditional leadership role in European security matters. Consequently, at the beginning 
of the war in Bosnia the US was quite content to regard the issue as a European one, and 
to leave matters to the EC. In part this course was prompted by a desire not to be seen as 
the world's trouble-shooter, or perhaps more accurately as the newest form of 
imperialism. Washington's reticence was also largely determined by its desire not to 
become embroiled in a potentially endless military and diplomatic commitment. US 
foreign policy makers also recognized the centrality of engaging with Russia in the 
immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's implosion41 • Enlightened self-interest in 
Washington dictated a Russian engagement if the US were to safeguard its own global 
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hegemony, control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and promote market capitalism 
and Western liberal democracy in the successor states of the Soviet Union. 
American reticence in Yugoslavia also flowed from its analysis of the situation in Bosnia 
as part intractable ethnic strife, part querulous secessionism, and part Serbian 
aggression42• It thus combined elements of the outlook of all its major European allies, 
but over time the Clinton administration came to focus upon Serbian aggression as the 
main cause of the war. Lift and strike was not popular with the British or, initially, the 
French, and the effective killing off of the ECIUN Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) 
created further dissension, signalling clearly that the US wished to avoid troop 
commitments. Nevertheless there is evidence that the US opted for clandestine methods 
to effect "lift" even if it fell short of a public commitment to its preferred policy 
direction 43. 
US reluctance to provide military weight and diplomatic leadership left the field open to 
the Europeans, whose analyses differed and who could not produce a policy consistent 
with the aspirations of CFSP. When the Americans [mally decided to assume a more 
direct leadership role via the negotiations of Richard Holbrooke, the relatively swift 
conclusions reached at Dayton simply underlined the fact that previous US reticence had 
served to prolong Bosnia's agony. The transatlantic relationship had therefore suffered, 
as had the opportunity to continue to engage Russia in cooperative ventures on conflict 
resolution. 
The four major NATO players, therefore, approached Bosnia from differing, if 
occasionally overlapping, perspectives. Their Bosnian policies were at variance and, 
from time to time, in direct confrontation. The initial onus of leadership lay with the 
Europeans who, despite the claims advanced for CFSP, proved unable to subjugate 
national interests to common European ones. All, however, did operate largely through 
international agencies, even when they accorded priority to different agencies at different 
times (for example, the early French preference for WEU involvement). As the single 
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most powerful diplomatic and military nation the US eventually overcame its reluctance 
to provide Western leadership, and adopted an interventionist stance through the efforts 
of the Holbrooke negotiating team and the Dayton process. Again, however, the US was 
keen to play an internationalist role rather than a unilateral one. Reflecting on the 
inability ofthe Europeans to cooperate effectively in Bosnia, and the reluctance and 
tardiness of US involvement, Holbrooke observed in his memoir on Dayton that "the 
Yugoslav crisis should have been handled by NATO,,44. The medium for providing an 
effective internationalist approach to security in Bosnia was, as Holbrooke commented in 
retrospect, the North Atlantic Alliance. 
Bearing in mind the caveat that NATO capitals were not always in harmony, we may yet 
speak of a NATO position on Bosnia, at least by the end of the war in 1995. The course 
of events indicated that, from a downward spiral of vicious fighting, progress was made 
eventually, but only when NATO's European members acceded to American diplomatic 
and political leadership, and employed NATO to effect their agreed will. Yet there were 
signs that NATO involvement in Bosnia predated the ability of national capitals to agree 
on unified courses of action, albeit the Alliance only became truly effective in the latter 
stages of the war. 
As violence in Bosnia dragged on there was a noticeable hardening of language in NATO 
declarations on the former Yugoslavia. The Alliance's Rome ministerial summit in . 
November 1991 reflected the fact that member nations were "deeply concerned" by the 
Yugoslav crisis, and expressed NATO support for the efforts of the EC, CSCE and UN in 
their attempts to resolve the crisis. There was condemnation of the use of force generally, 
and a reminder to all warring parties of their accountability under international law45. 
The Alliance's November 1991 Strategic Concept46 anticipated circumstances in which 
the threat to NATO members might arise from instability and armed conflicts in 
neighbouring countries, predisposing the Alliance to take a direct interest in situations 
such as that in Yugoslavia. In June 1992 NATO declared itself willing to support CSCE-
led peacekeeping operations, given the instability abroad in various parts of the Euro-
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Atlantic region47 • Six months later the same principle was applied to UN-led 
operations48• By now the language was considerably harder and more direct, NATO 
being "profoundly disturbed" by the "serious threat to international peace, security and 
stability" posed by the situation in Yugoslavia49• There was forthright condemnation of 
Serb atrocities and a clear allocation of blame to Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. 
Even prior to this NATO was already using Bosnia as an indication of its intent in 
relations with Russia, and as a harbinger of its ability to act as a peacemaker, while 
simultaneously flagging up the possibility of NATO enlargement to come. Secretary-
General Manfred Woerner gave an interview to the Russian press, setting the tone for 
relations with Russia in Bosnia in the wider context of the Alliance's plans for its own 
development and expansion50. By describing NATO as a political, as much as a military, 
organisation Woerner may have been attempting to assuage Russian fears regarding 
NATO's potential eastward enlargement. He nevertheless made it clear that NATO 
troops could be made available for UN or CSCE peacekeeping missions if requested, a 
matter of potential concern to Moscow in its near-abroad. However, Woerner pointed out 
that for NATO, Russia was regarded as a partner and not an enemy, subject to continued 
reform and cooperation. NATO's Defence Planning Committee had recoguised "the risks 
to European security and stability posed by the growth of regional conflicts involving 
ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes,,51. It also concluded that "the most acute crisis is 
the war in the former Yugoslavia". This, taken together with Woerner's message, tended 
to the conclusion that NATO wanted from Moscow a cooperative approach to the crisis in 
Bosnia and that Russia was not in a position to oppose the Alliance in the Balkans, or in 
the wider NATO-Russian context. 
In June 1993, in a detailed statement addressing the theme of regional conflicts generally, 
NATO continued its condemnation of the Serbs as the chief perpetrators of atrocities in 
the Balkans52. The Alliance declared its willinguess to use airpower in support of 
UNPROFOR safe areas, welcomed the peace proposals based upon the Vance-Owen 
principles, and pointed out the interdependence in the security of all European states. In a 
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further hardening of resolve two months later, NATO announced its decision to prepare 
for airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positionss3, and in December 1993 NATO's Foreign 
Ministerial summit issued a final commuique expressing support for, inter alia, ongoing 
EU-based peace initiatives in Bosnia, and President Yeltsin's programme for political and 
economic reforms4• 
The North Atlantic Council's clearly expressed determination to protect the UN-declared 
safe areasss was to no avail in preventing the Bosnian Serbs from attacking them, and by 
May 1995 the Alliance was again condemning the Serbs and urging international 
cooperation via the Contact Group, Russia includeds6• NATO's consistent condemnation 
of the Serbs and calls for international action combined to reinforce Russia's diplomatic 
potential, as the only major player with strong historical links to the Serbs. Given these 
links Moscow's best chance of exercising influence lay in its ability as a favoured 
interlocutor to prevail upon the Serbs to stop the war. 
NATO's relationship with Russia in Bosnia was, of course, played out against the broader 
background of NATO-Russian relations generally. That background was coloured by two 
prominent considerations, one each on either side of the relationship: periodic Western 
fears of Russian revanchism, and Russian fears of NATO enlargementS7• An enlarging 
NATO, promoting its partnership programmes, wanted Russia alongside. Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev's signing up to Partnership for Peace in June 1994 was welcomed by 
the Alliance, which recognised Russia's "unique and important 
contributions ... commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, 
international and nuclear power,,58. A year later Kozyrev, commenting on the signing of 
the individual NATO-Russian partnership programme, took the opportunity to stress 
Moscow's opposition to NATO enlargement, and the need for a greater political rather 
than military emphasis in NATOs9• Just as Russia wanted partnership to include reforms 
in NATO, so the Alliance regarded reform in Russia as essential to cooperation60• Each, 
however, recognised a need for cooperation in establishing an effective security 
partnership. 
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NATO expectations of Russia in Bosnia were therefore a good test case of the respective 
parties' ability to engage in practical cooperation61 , and an indication of their ability to 
cooperate beyond the immediate conflict into the future62• Bosnia was also a tough 
testing ground for the formulation of foreign policy in post-Soviet Moscow. 
The search for a Russian foreign policy 
Despite their policy differences, the Western desire to operate through international. 
bodies entailed the necessity of paying attention to Russia and its views. Moscow had 
long standing historical and kinship links in the Balkans and, like the major NATO 
countries, was in the process of adapting to the new world order. If the former 
Yugoslavia was proving difficult for the West it was no less, and arguably considerably 
more, of a problem for Russia, which had long established historical ties in the Balkans. 
Russia enjoyed religious and cultural links with the Balkan Slavs, links which were 
strengthened during the late nineteenth century as the Ottoman Empire unravelled and 
pan-Slavism gained greater prominence in Russian thinking63 • Although the influence of 
pan-Slavism has from time to time been exaggerated, usually for domestic reasons in 
Russia, it helps to explain the occasional Russian pre-disposition to adopt a pro-Serbian 
stance in Bosnia. However, Russian strategic interests and diplomatic self-interest in the 
Balkans formed a long standing phenomenon and continued to be the chief influence in 
Moscow's involvement in Bosnia. 
At a time when the Russian Federation was only beginning to emerge from the collapse 
of the Soviet Union as the latter's de facto successor state, it found itself having to deal 
with seemingly insoluble Balkan problems, which in turn cast a harsh light upon 
Moscow's search for a foreign policy of its own in the region. For the Russians there 
were uncomfortable parallels between the dissolution of Yugoslavia and that of the Soviet 
Union as each former Communist federation was dissolving along ethno-nationallines, 
though not everyone accepted the parallel64• The formulation and conduct of Russian 
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foreign policy generally was being detennined to a large extent by domestic political 
debate over the future direction which the new Russian Federation should take65 • 
In broad terms the debate revolved around whether Russia should seek closer ties with the 
West (the Atlanticist school) or whether greater emphasis should be given to Russian 
uniqueness, based upon its Slavic roots and kinships (the Slavophile and Eurasianist 
schools). These were already historically well-established positions in Russia66, but the 
newness of the post-Soviet, Yeltsin-led Russian Federation and the volatility of the 
Balkans now gave them an immediacy and import which required early and pragmatic 
translation into foreign policy. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's pro-Western views 
did not, for example, sit easily with those ofYevgeny Ambartsumov, Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Commission on International and Foreign Economic Relations67. In turn, 
Russian policy came to be played out in the former Yugoslavia sometimes alongside, 
sometimes in opposition to, the Western position as Moscow sought to balance its desire 
for an independent policy with the realpolitik imperative of cooperating with the West 
andNAT068. 
Russia's conditional cooperation with the West did not, however, prevent NATO from 
bombing Serb positions. Moscow's objections to NATO bombing may be viewed not 
just in the military and political context of the Bosnian conflict, but in the wider context 
of Russian opposition to giving NATO any support for peacekeeping or military activities 
closer to Russia's own borders. Against that background, any diplomatic or military 
action in Bosnia which ran contrary to Moscow's wishes could be read as a diminution of 
Russian status and influence. Unsurprisingly, therefore, NATO attacks upon Bosnian 
Serbs drew critical comment in Russia69• 
Consequently Russian policy in Bosnia was obliged to steer a course designed to maintain 
the country's international prestige and status as a great power, while as far as possible 
countering NATO's predominance. As one observer put it "to avoid marginalisation and 
to prevent NATO dominance have consistently been Russian priorities,,7o. In pursuing 
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these priorities Moscow veered from cooperation with the West, via independent 
diplomatic initiatives to, ultimately, a declining influence as disparate Western views 
gradually merged under US leadership to produce the NATO line which facilitated the 
Dayton Accord. 
Russia, The United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) 
From the outset Moscow did not view NATO as the primary agency for dealing with the 
emerging crisis in the Balkans. The United Nations, and more specifically in the 
European context, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later 
the OSCE) were the institutions of Russian choice in addressing post Cold War security 
issues, not least because Russia had an interest in keeping NATO at arm's length when it 
came to peacekeeping in the near abroad71 • 
Russian preference for the UN is readily understood in the context of that organisation's 
status and authority as an internationally recognised body concerned with conflict 
resolution. As a Permanent Member of the UN's Security Council Russia was guaranteed 
a prominent and influential voice in all debates, and possessed the powerful diplomatic 
veto on proposals not to its liking. In the cooperative spirit of the immediate aftermath of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin used his address to the 
UN Security Council Summit to describe Russia and the West as allies 72. 
Consequently Moscow supported the deployment ofUNPROFOR in Croatia, the 
implementation of sanctions against Belgrade, and the extension of the UNPROFOR 
mandate to Bosnia in the early years of the Yugoslav wars. These years, under the 
stewardship of Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister, were the high water mark of Russian 
cooperation with the West in the Balkans as Moscow sought to make its foreign policy 
operate through its favoured international institutions. 
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Russian participation in the peacekeeping efforts ofUNPROFOR marked something of a 
departure, being the first occasion on which Russian troops had made a large scale 
contribution to UN peacekeeping, in contrast to their Soviet predecessors. A large 
contribution of troops was also offered in support of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
(VOPpf3 and Moscow also supported the commitment to cooperative solutions 
enshrined in the Washington Declaration, as well as the work of the five-nation Contact 
Group. All such efforts were part of the Russian need to be involved in international 
decision-making as part of Moscow's continued claim to great power status. This course, 
however, did not escape domestic criticism among those who viewed it as an 
unsatisfactory upholding of Russia's independent interests74. 
Turning to the OSCE, there were several reasons why this body was attractive to Moscow 
as the institutional focal point for European security issues 75. The organization had a 
widespread membership extending well beyond the NATO core, it espoused a 
comprehensive approach to security as opposed to traditional 'hard' security concerns, 
and it operated on the basis of consensual decision making76• As a result it offered to 
Russia a forum in which it could have, potentially, a significant voice in European 
security, and it also provided an effective counter to NATO preerninence. Of concern to 
us here, Russia's view of the OSCE, therefore, was closely linked to its wider relationship 
with NAT077. The perceived threat of NATO enlargement and the possibility that the 
Alliance could adopt a peacekeeping role within the borders of the former Soviet Union, 
led Moscow to give a greater priority to OSCE prerogatives. 
Based upon the domestic struggle to determine the course and conduct of Russian foreign 
policy, and the pace of external events shaping Europe's security landscape, Russian 
attitudes to the OSCE evolved continually throughout the 1990s. Consistently to the fore, 
however, was the desire to maximise Russian security interests by operating through a 
forum that was not NATO-centric and could accommodate wider concerns than those of 
the Western alliance. This position was also consistent with the longer term trend in 
Russia's Balkan policy approach, away from an all-embracing cooperation with the west 
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towards a more assertive and distinctly Russian line, though still maintaining contact with 
the West via a recognised international forum. Russian attachment to the CSCE/OSCE 
persisted when relations with the West deteriorated. This was exemplified by Kozyrev's 
own writings, in which he cited the work of the Contact Group as an example of what 
could be achieved through a collective security system based upon the OSCE78. 
Only as events unfolded in former Yugoslavia, and NATO involvement there increased, 
did Russia gradually come to terms with the necessity of engaging seriously with the 
Alliance while simultaneously attempting to establish its own distinctive role. Russian 
historical interests, great power aspirations and permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council combined to give it a certain standing in the Balkans region. The logic of 
Russia's self-perception as a great power ultimately compelled Moscow to seek as far as 
possible - an important caveat - an independent line in the former Yugoslavia. As we 
have seen, there was sufficient convergence of views among the foreign policy elite on 
the basic principle of Russia's claim to great power status to enable policy makers to 
employ that unifying theme. However, a cool appraisal of the reality of Russia's 
diplomatic and military capabilities tended to militate against simple wilfulness, 
generating a creative tension between the desire to pursue an independent line and the 
necessity of maintaining good diplomatic relations with the West. In this respect, the 
Serbian connection is important. 
Russia and The Serbs 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of Russian involvement in Bosnia was its 
relationship with the Serbs, that is the Belgrade government, and the Bosnian Serbs. 
Some have identified a parallel between the post-Soviet Russian Federation and post-
Yugoslav Serbia in terms of their centrality to the Former Soviet Union and Former 
Yugoslavia respectivell9• Upon the collapse of the old systems Russians and Serbs 
came to be blamed for all the failings of the previous regimes, setting them in opposition 
to their former fellow citizens of different ethnicities. This in turn helped to foster 
62 
Russian and Serb grievance and resentment, at the popular if not necessarily the official 
level. Consequently, it was possible to speak of a certain level of Russian and Serb 
solidarity in the post-Cold War order. 
Furthermore, a pro-Serbian line held attractions for Moscow as one avenue of approach to 
the war in Bosnia which would clearly serve to distinguish between the Russian and 
NATO positions, while still maintaining an overall orientation toward conditional 
cooperation. The difficulty with this approach, however, was its potential to isolate 
Russia when events became NATO-driven and detrimental to the Bosnian Serbs. For 
example, NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb positions illustrated Moscow's vulnerability 
to being marginalized by those with whom it sought critical cooperation, and being 
resented by those whose interests it purported to espouse80• Nevertheless, there were still 
some in the Duma who promoted the notion of Pan Slavism and the duty incumbent upon 
Moscow to aid its ethnic brethren, the Serbs81 • Russian governmental support for the 
Serbs would also have the advantage of playing well among elements of the Kremlin's 
more vocal right wing domestic critics. Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, Moscow 
did periodically adopt a sympathetic approach to Serbian and FRY interests, most notably 
on the issue of international sanctions. 
In the early part of 1992 Russia was unwilling to countenance sanctions against the FRY, 
preferring to pursue the diplomatic path and arguing that punitive measures were likely to 
be counterproductive in the effort win Serb cooperation. Eventually, however, Moscow 
changed its course and voted in favour of sanctions in accordance with UNSCRs 757 and 
787, effectively an acknowledgement of its own diplomatic isolation and Serbian 
intransigence. Even then it continued to regard sanctions as a blunt instrument, arguing 
that the rescinding of sanctions should be effected as reward for continued moderation of 
Serb conduct. Further, Moscow maintained that sanctions should be applied even-
handedly against all parties where appropriate, for example in response to Croatian 
aggression in Bosnia and Krajina. 
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The Russians were also concerned to prevent any lifting of the arms embargo against the 
Bosnian Muslims on the grounds that any increase in the availability of weaponry was 
bound to lead to an escalation of the violence. On this, Russia was not alone; its 
abstention on the UN Security Council vote on this issue in June 1993, together with that 
of Britain and France, defeated a US-proposed removal of the ban. While the Kremlin' s 
position on this appears unobjectionable, Moscow was not solely concerned with 
preventing an escalation ofthe war, acknowledging that lifting the embargo would have 
altered the balance of force to the detriment of the Bosnian Serbs82• 
If an occasionally pro-Serbian stance distinguished the Russian position from that of most 
of the other concerned countries (with the possible exception of the UK, which in practice 
led to accusations of a Serbian bias83), so too did Moscow's views on NATO military 
intervention and, in particular, the use of air strikes84• As NATO prepared to employ 
force against the Serbs in 1994 to implement UN resolutions establishing and defending 
safe areas, Moscow was faced with a diplomatic dilemma. Opposed to NATO air strikes 
against the Serbs, it had already voted in favour of the relevant Security Council 
resolutions under which air strikes were now being authorised (though Moscow did 
dispute the legitimacy of the mandates in this respect). Matters came to a head when in 
February 1994 NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to stop shelling Sarajevo 
and to withdraw their heavy artillery from the surrounding area. Moscow's diplomatic 
hand was forced and was played cleverly, given the very restricted room for manoeuvre85• 
Initially the Russians argued that air strikes werenot a sound military option since they 
risked provoking a continued campaign of violence from the Bosnian Serbs. They also 
risked the lives of Russian UN peacekeepers in Sarajevo, as well as unquantifiable 
civilian casualties. Further, Moscow queried the validity of the UN Secretary General's 
action in requesting armed NATO intervention, arguing that any decision to employ force 
should be a matter for referral to the UN Security Council, in which Russia held a veto86• 
The military and procedural approaches were unsuccessful, forcing the Krernlin to devise 
a direct diplomatic approach to the Serbs. Yeitsin offered a further contingent of Russian 
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UN peacekeepers for operations in Sarajevo, and wrote to the Serbian and Bosnian Serb 
political leadership (president Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic respectively) 
requesting the withdrawal of Serbian weapons from around Sarajevo. ill the event this 
was successful, allowing the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw without appearing to 
acknowledge NATO's ultimatum, and giving Moscow a notable diplomatic coup at the 
expense of the Alliance. 
On the face of it, cultivating the Serbs and engaging in a critical fashion with NATO 
would appear to have been a vindication of the Slavophile tradition in Russian foreign 
policy thinking. It is tempting to read into the sympathy for Belgrade and the Bosnian 
Serbs echoes of the Slavic kinship tradition, but in fact Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
recognised at the time that a simple pro·Serb (and by extension anti-NATO) position 
would be self defeating for Russia, with its own large Muslim population87• 
Notwithstanding the occasional upsurge in populist pan·Slavist sentiment, the influence 
of its proponents was limited in Bosnia. It is true that from time to time Moscow evinced 
pro·Serbian sympathies at the official level, though one may attribute this as much to 
Russian desires to establish independent diplomatic credentials as to any genuinely held 
belief in pan·Slavism. It is also true that Russian volunteers fought alongside their 
Serbian brethren88, and that press and parliament occasionally gave vent to pro-Serbian 
views. However, among the Russian public at large Serbian sympathies were not 
especially strong. 
illdeed, there was something of a myth about the strength of Russian·Serbian kinship, the 
Russians being ultimately more concerned to preserve their place at the diplomatic top 
table, if necessary by dropping any pro·Serbian position which threatened them with 
isolation and loss of status. Russian abstention in the Security Council vote on the arms 
embargo in June 1993 was symbolically significant. Russia also supported, albeit 
reluctantly, the February 1994 ultimatum to the Serbs to face air strikes if they did not 
withdraw from around Sarajevo. There was no protest from Moscow when US aircraft 
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shot down four Serb jets for entering the no-fly zone in March 1994, and in November of 
that year the Kremlin supported NATO attacks on Serb aircraft operating out of Udbina 
airfield. Indeed, Yeltsin and his senior colleagues were quite open in their lack of 
sympathy to the Serbs, issuing stem public warnings to them to adhere to the will of the 
international community, whether by subscribing to the VOPP or adhering to agreed 
courses of action, as at Gorazde89• 
Consequently, the desire for great power diplomatic autonomy, as evidenced by shows of 
support for the Serb position, was always tempered by willingness to concede where the 
consequences of not doing so would be exposure of Russian weakness and isolation, with 
subsequent loss of international prestige. Moscow had to tread very carefully if it was not 
to lay itself open to charges of empty rhetoric and posturing. Its displays of independence 
did not disguise the fact that its interests did not diverge significantly from those of the 
West90• 
Conclusion - Impact of Bosnia upon NATO and its relations with Russia 
The crowded years of 1991 to 1995 witnessed the collapse of the fonner Yugoslavia and 
posed the most immediate threat to security in Europe since the end of the Second World 
War. The collapse of Yugoslavia confronted the West and Russia with the question of 
what was to be done to check the violence of the Balkans. In. answering that question 
NATO chose to reinvent itself as an expeditionary organisation prepared to operate . 
politically and militarily outside the borders of its member states, and to accept the 
consequences in tenns of its relationship with Russia. The latter, opposed in principle to 
any extension of NATO influence and committed to defining its own role in the new 
world order, perfonned the tricky balancing act of adopting an autonomous line where 
possible, while mindful of the need to court Western opinion in order to avoid diplomatic 
isolation and irrelevance. 
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Having moved beyond its own borders to act in support of the UN, having exercised force 
and refined its rules of engagement to enable it to demonstrate clearly the continued 
military muscle behind UN diplomacy, NATO became ever more deeply involved in 
Bosnia. We may understand the apparent inconsistency of Russian foreign policy 
behaviour in Bosnia by recognising that Moscow was pulled in two directions 
simultaneously, tom between the need to continue to assert its autonomy and the 
imperative of its own wealmess when faced with growing Western intervention. As a 
result, Russian diplomacy vacillated - by turns cooperative with the west, sympathetic 
towards FRY and the Bosnian Serbs, and opposed to NATO military operations. These 
characteristics were not confined to any strict chronological sequence. Rather, they 
emerged in a more ad hoc fashion in reaction to unfolding events as perceived by Russia, 
and Moscow's need to engage with the problems of Bosnia and the actions of NATO. 
Ifthere was a logic to Russian foreign policy it was aimed at boosting Russia's standing, 
checking the power of NATO, yet avoiding a diplomatic break with the West. The 
Bosnian Serb withdrawal from around Sarajevo in February 1994 marked the high point 
of Russian diplomatic influence91 but, despite some subsequent achievements (persuading 
the Serbs to lift the blockade of Tuzla airport in March 1994, and to accept a ceasefire in 
the Krajina) Moscow was unable to maintain any form of momentum to build upon this 
success. Instead, contrary to its fundamental priorities, Russia was to find itself 
increasingly marginalised in Bosnia by the emerging prominence of NATO, culminating 
in the Dayton settlement at the end of 1995. Ironically Moscow's finest diplomatic hour 
in Bosnia succeeded only in giving impetus to greater US-led NATO intervention. 
As NATO's star waxed with the launch of Operation Deliberate Force against Bosnian 
Serb positions in August 1995, Russia's influence waned. US diplomacy, led by 
President Clinton's special envoy Richard Holbrooke, was forcing the pace in Bosnia 
backed by the application of NATO's military force. It was Holbrooke and his team 
which drove the diplomatic agenda in Bosnia in the late summer and autumn of 1995 and 
which culminated in the signing of the Dayton Accord in November of that year, bringing 
67 
the war in Bosnia to a close. It was largely at the instigation of the West, especially the 
USA, and backed by NATO's military and political will, that a peace settlement was 
reached at Dayton, though it suited NATO and Russia to inflate the part played by 
Moscow. 
Overall the Bosnian experience illustrated the differences among NATO allies, and 
especially the inability of the Europeans to harmonise their foreign and security policies. 
In turn, this state of affairs served to highlight the continued need for US leadership of the 
Alliance, in effect a recognition that nothing had changed in this regard since the end of 
the Cold War. If NATO was required to act, US diplomatic leadership and military 
capability were the catalysts for successful action. Bosnia did, however, generate 
significant change and innovation for NATO, largely by justifying its continued 
existence, and by providing the rationale for NATO to move from its traditional defensive 
posture to a more interventionist role. In so doing, NATO had to engage with Moscow's 
views, which moved from Gorbachevian new thinking and Western cooperation to, by 
1995, a more openly self-assertive, ifless influential, approach. 
Bosnia tested NATO's cohesion and its ability to continue to cooperate with Russia. 
While NATO may claim ultimately to have passed the cohesion test, it is more difficult to 
justify that claim with regard to cooperation with Russia. Nevertheless, one may speak of 
the survival, if not the flourishing, of a working relationship. While never reconciled fully 
to NATO intervention in the Balkans, Moscow came to engage more fully with its 
erstwhile enemy alliance, and did so successfully enough to lead, in due course, to a more 
formal institutionalising of the relationship through the PJC. Even as the resolution of 
the fighting in Bosnia demonstrated a declining Russian influence, ceded to a US-led 
NATO, Russia was kept on board in concluding Dayton and implementing its provisions 
in Bosnia. 
The NATO allies came to face up to the lack of European unity in foreign policy, the 
diplomatic and military primacy of Washington, and the futility of courting the Yeltsin 
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regime in Moscow. The latter's very weakness, however, obliged NATO to bolster 
Moscow's position to sustain the portrayal of an international community united in 
dealing with the horror of Bosnia. Peace there was sustained only by the presence of 
large numbers of NATO-led troops. In terms of reimposing a tolerable level of security 
NATO intervention had eventually proven effective. A NATO interventionist template 
had thus been created in the Balkans - a clear indication of the senior-junior nature of the 
Alliance's relationship with Russia. 
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Chapter Three 
NATO makes the rules: The Bombing of Kosovo 1999 
Introduction 
The conflict in Bosnia demonstrated that the NATO-Russian relationship, while not one 
of equals was nevertheless significant for both parties. Yet if Bosnia placed what proved 
to be a bearable strain on NATO's dealings with Russia, events in the province of 
Kosovo were to test matters even more severely. 
With its largely Albanian population the province of Kosovo sat uncomfortably within 
the federal republic of Serbia, and had for many years sought recognition of its own 
internal autonomy, and its differences from the rest of Yugoslavia. In 1974 Tito 
acknowledged Kosovo's distinct status as an autonomous province, though not a distinct 
federal republic, of the Yugoslav federation. The breakup of Yugoslavia gave impetus to 
the Kosovar Albanians' desire to achieve independence. At a time when other federal 
republics were pursuing their own independence from Belgrade, there was clearly an 
opportunity to press the Kosovar Albanians' case, but the province lacked the status of a 
federal republic such as Croatia or Slovenia, and so wider recognition of its claims to 
independence'. It was a constituent province of the federal republic of Serbia, which was 
embroiled in its own struggle to establish a Greater Serbia, and which cleaved to Kosovo 
as a place of historical significance for all Serbs2• Whatever the views of the majority of 
Kosovo's population, Belgrade was not going to accommodate any form of Kosovan 
secessionism. 
While world attention was focused on Bosnia there was no movement to resolve the 
stalemate in Kosovo. Disappointingly for the Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, 
the Dayton Accords failed to address the Kosovo question, and stalemate persisted. The 
ensuing armed and political struggles in the province succeeded in internationalising the 
problem, and once again brought NATO and Russian focus back to the Balkans. This 
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time, however, the pace of events and the desire not to repeat the failures ofBosnia 
generated a fast moving and often tense diplomatic atmosphere, with potentially grave 
consequences for the relationship. 
This chapter will consider the background to the war in Kosovo, examining the views of 
the Kosovar Albanians and their resort to armed insurrection. It will consider the Serb 
response, the events leading to international attempts to broker a peace deal at 
Rambouillet and, subsequently, to the NATO decision to launch Operation Allied Force 
(the bombing of Kosovo) in March 1999. It will cover the significance of that 
intervention in terms of its implications for international law, its impact upon NATO 
itself, and the reaction from Moscow. The course and outcome of the operation will be 
considered, and the chapter will analyse specifically the effect of Operation Allied Force 
upon NATO's relationship with Moscow. 
By examining the background to, and unfolding of, the conflict in Kosovo, the course of 
NATO-Russian relations may be observed in its post-Bosnian phase. The conflict in 
Kosovo, and NATO and Russian responses to it, served to illustrate the growing gap 
between Russia's great power assertions and its ability to exert real influence on the 
course of events in the former Yugoslavia. By contrast, Operation Allied Force also 
demonstrated the willingness and ability of a US-led NATO to flex its military muscle, 
whether or not sanctioned by the UN. The conflict over Kosovo, by illustrating the 
Alliance's preparedness and ability to wage war, and Russia's inability to prevent it, 
further exacerbated the inequality of the NATO-Russian relationship. This inequality 
would colour the outlook of Moscow as it sought to promote its own role in peacemaking 
and peacekeeping, and as NATO for its own reasons sought to portray partnership and 
cooperation with Russia in the Balkans as perhaps more significant than in fact it was. 
The rifts which had characterised NATO-Russian dealings over Bosnia were thus 
widened and deepened by Kosovo. 
The Yugoslav Context 
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Kosovo seeks independence 
Yugoslavia's collapse led to the pursuit of independence by its constituent republics in 
the federation. In tenns of a desire for independence from Belgrade the position of 
Kosovo was no different to that ofCroatia or Slovenia. In legal tenns, however, the 
position differed significantly in that the latter were fully fledged and internationally 
recognised republics of the fonner federation, entitled to pursue their autonomy upon the 
disintegration of that federation. Kosovo enjoyed no such international recognition, its 
status as an internal province being subordinate to that of a republic and, as such, 
ineligible for international acknowledgement as an independent state3• What made this 
position worse was Kosovo's position within the fonner Yugoslav republic of Serbia at a 
time when the Milosevic leadership in Belgrade was seeking to promote the cause of a 
Greater Serbia throughout parts of the fonner Yugoslavia. 
The tension between the Kosovar Albanian desire for self-determination, and the 
international community's upholding of the principle of territorial integrity, was 
compounded by the issue of ethnicity. The Albanian roots ofKosovo's population had 
long marked the province as different to the rest of Yugoslavia, and had won for it a 
special provincial autonomous status under Tito in 1974. That autonomy perished with 
the collapse of Yugoslavia, notwithstanding the efforts of Ibrahim Rugova and his 
Kosovo Democratic Alliance (KDA) party to preserve, and even enhance it, via their 
September 1990 proclamation of the sovereign republic ofKosov04• Within weeks of the 
proclamation, the Serbian assembly in Belgrade had passed a new constitution for the 
Serbian republic, in the process fonnally abolishing Kosovo's provincial autonomy. 
In response the Kosovar Albanians adopted a strategy of peaceful resistance to Serbia. 
Under the leadership of Rugova, parallel governmental structures were establisheds. 
Kosovo's Albanian popUlation took responsibility for the provision of its own education 
and administration of daily life, and withdrew cooperation from the Serbian authorities. 
For a few years this strange fonn of governance, paralleling the structures across the 
border in Albania, coexisted with the official Serbian regime, and offered the hope that 
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Kosovo's problems might be internationalised without resort to violence. However, the 
heavy responsibility of bringing peace to Bosnia precluded the issue of Kosovo from 
consideration at Dayton and, for some Kosovar Albanians, suggested international 
indifference to their cause. This in turn propelled a move away from peaceful resistance 
towards armed insurrection. 
To begin with, armed attacks were light and sporadic. Rugova still held sway over many 
Kosovar Albanians, and the Kosovo Liberation Army's (KLA) resources were extremely 
limited. In due course, however, the collapse of Albania in 1997 led to a situation of 
lawlessness which included the ransacking of state run arsenals. Much of the weaponry 
which was looted from Albania subsequently turned up in Kosovo, reinforcing the hand 
of the KLA in its preparations for an armed campaign against the Serbs. This, allied to 
support from the local population, and the failure of Dayton to reward Kosovar Albanian 
peaceful resistance, paved the way for a more sustained campaign of violence waged by 
the KLA, and the subsequent brutal reaction by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. 
Belgrade responds 
The historic significance of Kosovo for the Serbs cannot be overstated6• In addition, the 
expUlsion of Serbs from Croatia in 1995 was still fresh in the Serb nationalist 
consciousness, together with a determination never to suffer the experience again. 
Compounding this was Serb antipathy to Kosovo's Albanians, perceived as having driven 
out many Kosovan Serbs during the years ofKosovo's provincial autonomy in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Demography, however, was decisively on the side of the Kosovar Albanians, 
giving Belgrade a headache as to how to retain the province within the Republic of 
Serbia, yet keep the Kosovar Albanians' secessionist ambitions under control. In the 
longer term, there was no getting around the issue of population numbers. Kosovar Serbs 
were not only heavily outnumbered by Kosovar Albanians, there was even a Serbian 
school of thought which argued for relinquishing Kosovo to preserve a long term Serb 
majority in the Republic of Serbia itselt. 
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The KLA uprising of 1998-99 brought this dilemma firmly to the forefront of Belgrade's 
thinking, and resulted in a forceful anti-insurgency campaign against the rebels. In 1998 
the Milosevic regime concentrated its efforts on crushing the KLA, a strategy which 
entailed displacement of much of the Kosovar Albanian population, without whose 
succour a successful guerrilla campaign would be much more difficult. Yet throughout 
1998-99, up until NATO intervention was all but inevitable, Milosevic appears not to 
have given full rein to mass expulsions of Kosovar Albanians, presumably in an effort to 
avoid western intervention8• In October 1998, for example, he agreed to a ceasefire 
which limited the numbers of Serbian forces deployable within Kosovo, and agreed to 
receive two thousand OSCE monitors, considerable concessions for a sovereign state9• 
Further, the considerable upsurge in mass expulsion ofKosovar Albanians after the 
launch of NATO's air attacks in March 1999 (see below) would appear to indicate that 
previous expulsions had been more targeted and less widespread. Within a few months, 
however, the Racak massacre of January 1999 brought the October ceasefue to an end 
and led to the RarnbouiIIet conference of February 1999. 
Rambouillet and the Road to War 
RambouiIIet was the brainchild of the Contact Group and afforded a brief breathing space 
for all concerned to attempt to avoid further bloodshed. Unsurprisingly, given the 
membership of the Contact Group, NATO fully supported its efforts to bring about an 
end to hostilities lO• In February 1999 the initial negotiations, as far as the Serbian side 
was concerned, were conducted under the threat of NATO intervention, a situation which 
Belgrade was determined to avoid even if it meant partial restoration of Kosovar 
autonomy within Serbia, albeit with safeguards for the Kosovar Serb population 11. The 
proposed Interim Agreement was, in any case, rejected by the KLA since it did not hold 
out the prospect of secession in due course. 
Under US pressure, however, the KLA accepted the Interim Agreement at the second 
time of asking when the negotiations reconvened in mid-March. On this occasion, 
however, a military annex to the Agreement, granting NATO unimpeded access to 
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facilities and territory in Serbia, rendered the arrangements unacceptable to the Serbs and 
made NATO intervention all but inevitable. 
Milosevic was now faced with the prospect of war against NATO as well as the conduct 
of his current campaign against the KLA. The imminence of the former accelerated the 
prosecution of the latter. Within weeks a violent campaign of expulsion of Kosovar 
Albanians had driven many hundreds of thousands across the borders into Albania and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Ironically, the 'success' ofMilosevic's 
plan to redress the demographic balance reinforced NATO's will to act against Serbia, 
and cemented much of Western public opinion behind NATO. The scene was set for a 
historic military intervention by the Alliance. 
Operation Allied Force 
NATO's decision to launch Operation Allied Force in March 1999 had profound 
significance for post Cold War European security well beyond the resolution of the 
immediate conflict in Kosovo. Any consideration of the impact of that decision must 
necessarily address the immediate conflict; however, we also need to consider to some 
degree its wider implications in order to comprehend its full significance for the Alliance 
itself, and for its relationship with Russia. As we saw in the previous chapter, NATO-
Russia relations had demonstrated a form of critical cooperation over Bosnia 
(exemplified as we shall see in the following chapter over the Dayton Accords). The war 
in Kosovo and NATO's military intervention presented a case of sharp and unambiguous 
disagreement between Moscow and the Alliance. 
In a very real sense Operation Allied Force marked the nadir of NATO-Russian relations, 
and thus merits examination in detail. Because the intervention occurred within a 
particular international context and set important international precedents it is necessary 
to consider NATO's action in Kosovo in broad terms before examining the specific 
impact upon relations with Russia. Hence, this section will consider briefly the impact of 
Operation Allied Force on the prosecution of the Serb campaign against the Kosovar 
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Albanians. It will then trace the course of the NATO air campaign launched against Serb 
forces, and in particular the claims advanced on behalf of air power, central to an 
understanding of why the Alliance acted as it did. This will be followed by a brief 
consideration of the impact of intervention upon contemporary understanding of 
international law in this field. In turn, I will consider the effect of Operation Allied Force 
upon the Alliance itself, before examining in more detail the impact upon its relationship 
with Russia in the context of, effectively, the new rules of the international game. 
NATO Intervention 
In the approach to, and immediately after, intervention in Kosovo the West made it plain 
that chief among the reasons for intervention was the prevention of a humanitarian 
catastrophe l2• Others have argued that NATO's very intervention provoked a 
humanitarian catastrophe, claiming that the bombing campaign accelerated the expulsions 
carried out by Milosevic' s troops in Kosovo 13. Certainly, it is clear that the campaign of 
forced expulsion of Kosovar Albanians was stepped up in the run up to the initial NATO 
bombardment l4• 
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that initially limited expulsions were expanded in 
the light of the anticipated intervention, and that the drive to effect ethnic rebalancing 
(from a Serbian perspective) received impetus from an imminent NATO attack. 
However, that is not to say that the step up was not already planned as part ofMilosevic's 
anti-KLA strategy. On this basis it is possible to argue the case either way, i.e. that 
NATO intervention was justified to suppress a campaign of brutal ethnic expulsions 
already under way or, conversely, that NATO intervention was the catalyst which turned 
a limited anti-terrorist expulsion progranune into a forced mass exodus. The more 
immediate problem for Belgrade was no longer how to justifY its actions - since the West 
had already made up its mind to intervene - but how to protect its forces from attack as 
NATO launched Operation Allied Force, relying upon its air power to effect the will of 
the Alliance. 
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Operation Allied Force and Air Power 
NATO undertook a military campaign based exclusively on the use of air power to 
achieve its objectives in Kosovo. This was perceived as the least risk strategy by 
Western leaders. This was an important consideration in maintaining domestic political 
support among the Alliance's leading member/contributor nations, and in turn helped to 
reinforce NATO solidarity in prosecuting the campaign. One of the major effects of 
achieving and maintaining this solidarity was, of course, to deny Milosevic the prospect 
of facing a divided and undermined enemy. 
If the initial attraction of air power lay in its potential to achieve political-military goals 
at minimum risk, the course of the air war did not necessarily run as smoothly as had 
been hoped for. In practice, it was characterised by initial optimism, limited effect upon 
the enemy, gradual escalation and, finally, a strategic campaign against Serbia proper, as 
opposed to a tactical one against Belgrade's fielded forces in Kosovo. Only when the 
bombs were falling on Serbia did Milosevic finally relent and seek terms, though his 
decision may have been influenced just as much by his diplomatic abandonment by 
Russia as by the effects of the bombing campaign. 
In the event, the hoped-for short air war lasted seventy-eight days and tested NATO 
cohesion to the full, with debate among Allies between proponents of ground warfare 
intervention (UK), those favouring limited use of air strikes (France), and those with a 
largely neutral stance on the use of force in order to keep incheck their domestic 
constituencies's. To arrive at a better understanding of the evolution of NATO thinking 
during Operation Allied Force, it is worth giving some consideration to the debate on the 
success or otherwise of air power, given its central role in the Kosovo campaign and its 
subsequent impact upon relations with Moscow. 
Use of air power was the option of choice for western politicians based upon their 
inclination to view it as offering least risk to their own forces, and most political 
acceptance among their electorates '6. Against this background, any assessment of the 
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success or otherwise of air power needs to address the political aims of the campaign, and 
the military ones. In so doing, one must start from an appreciation of what air power is, 
since any judgement of its achievements can only be arrived at in the context of its 
capabilities. 
Something of an academic industry has grown up around air power, and while this is not 
the place to explore the study of the subject, a working hypothesis is necessary. All 
research into air power represents a variation on the theme that it is concerned with the 
application of military force from the 'platform' of the air (and, increasingly, from 
space). Technological advances offer the possibility of so-called surgical strikes i.e 
generating limited collateral damage, through the use of precision-guided munitions. 
Consequently, air power is an attractive option to those, mindful of the need to maintain 
political support and cohesion, seeking to minimise non-combatant casualties. Air power 
is thus an effective military instrument in conjunction with land and sea power, as 
circumstances dictate. It can also provide an effective military instrument in support of 
political ends if applied correctly under appropriate circumstances. Its inappropriate 
military use, however, based solely on its attractiveness to policy makers, makes it a 
blunt instrument for obtaining political ends 17. 
Air power's proponents claim that it can win a military conflict outright, and indeed cite 
Kosovo as a case in pointls. While it may be possible to speak ofa successful military 
campaign (with the significant qualification that the Serb forces, though hampered, 
remained largely intact), it is not possible to regard the air war as having safeguarded the 
Kosovar Albanians, thousands of whom were killed or driven out during the course of 
Operation Allied Force. Since this was the chief political reason advanced for going to 
war, failure to meet that objective undennines the claims advanced on behalf of air 
power's ability to meet political needs. However, by its very nature, air power alone was 
not a suitable means of protecting hundreds of thousands of people on the ground. 
NATO's reluctance to complement air power with a force of ground troops effectively 
limited Operation Allied Force to tightly proscribed high altitude bombing of, initially, 
politically insignificant targets, in the name of risk aversion and domestic political 
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expedience. Claims that air power alone won the day are greatly exaggerated19, though 
the cautious conduct of the air campaign contributed significantly to the cohesion of the 
Allies in facing down Belgrade. 
Given the recent horrors of Bosnia and the pressure on western governments to respond 
to Serbian actions it is not difficult to appreciate the attractions of an air campaign. Such 
a course courted the danger of a breach in relations with Moscow but this was seen as an 
acceptable risk given the broader context. To have taken account of Russian views 
would have obliged NATO governments to engage in a necessarily protracted diplomatic 
process, by definition inimical to decisive action. Air power appeared to offer a swift and 
effective solution, albeit at the expense of political relations with Moscow. It therefore 
became a factor in deciding NATO to opt for the military rather than the political route, a 
decision which in itself is indicative of the relative value placed upon the relationship by 
NATO, when viewed in the context of the Balkans. In short, NATO placed strategic 
considerations over Kosovo ahead of diplomatic considerations relating to Russia. 
Operation Allied Force, Intervention and International Law 
At the height of NATO's campaign against Yugoslavia, British Prime Minister Tony 
BIair made a robust case for the justification of interventionism in international affairs2o• 
Yet beyond the outcome of the irnmediate campaign, the war in Kosovo proved deeply 
controversial with regard to the legal ambiguity surrounding Operation Allied Force, and 
its implications for the future conduct of international relations. Indeed, it is fair to say 
that it set new parameters within which to play the international game; it is also fair to 
say that NATO's intervention in Kosovo gave rise to a veritable publishing industry on 
the ramifications ofthe intervention for international la~l. 
It should be noted at the outset that we are concerned here not with questions of morality 
and international law per se, but with the ramifications of Allied Force in these areas, 
given their centrality to the NATO-Russian relationship. This section will consider the 
significance of Allied Force in pushing accepted boundaries, and the consequences in 
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terms of international law, contending that these were highly significant in altering the 
posture of NATO and, consequently, the character of the Alliance's relationship with 
Russia22• 
The debate surrounding the moral and legal soundness of Operation Allied Force can be 
understood in the context of the widely accepted (in the west) Augustinian principles of 
war - the 'just war' construct, the roots of which are traceable to St Augustin of Hipp023. 
In examining whether NATO acted in accordance with the accepted precepts of a just 
war, it is necessary to consider whether the Alliance was justified in going to war (jus ad 
bellum, understood as just cause) in the first place, and how it conducted the subsequent 
campaign (jus in bello, understood as just conduct) 24. The latter revolved around the 
prosecution of the air campaign: we are concerned here, therefore, with the former, and in 
particular with addressing the question oflegality. For the Alliance to show just cause it 
would have to address three fundamental questions: was the decision to go to war 
supportable as preventing a greater evil?; were all other options short of war exhausted?; 
and was the decision to go to war a lawful one? 
NATO's stated intent in going to war was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe25, an aim 
which it judged worthy of intervention in a sovereign state in order to prevent the greater 
evil of the killing of thousands of Kosovar Albanians by the Serbs. On the face of it, the 
aim of humanitarian intervention would appear justifiable, indeed laudable, especially 
given the horrific recent experience of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Croatia. Against a 
background of ongoing killings and expulsions of Kosovar Albanians by the Milosevic 
regime, the west's bruising political experience of very recent Balkan conflicts, and the 
reaction of public opinion among NATO members, there was a growing sense that, this 
time, something must be done26. 
If, as the Bosnian experience would appear to have demonstrated, Belgrade was not 
prepared to accommodate the opinion of the international community short of the threat 
of force; if, as the failure of Rambouillet showed, the Balkans was set to witness further 
bloodshed as Milosevic intensified his campaign against the Kosovar Albanians; if, as 
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western contemporary debate would appear to indicate, NATO domestic opinion was in 
favour of using force to intervene to prevent another bout of ethnic cleansing; if all the 
above, there was a strong case to be made for intervention on humanitarian grounds to 
stop the killing and forced expulsions ofKosovo's majority ethnic grouping. Unlike the 
situation in the early 1990s, there was also a greater willingness among the Clinton and 
Blair governments to contemplate intervention27, though the former was openly opposed 
to the use of ground forces. 
In such circumstances NATO was faced with the difficult decision of how to put a stop to 
the campaign of killings and expulsions of Kosovar Albanians. In the emerging situation 
in Kosovo some NATO governments, most notably the Americans and the British, were 
so persuaded by the moral case for intervention that they were prepared to accept the 
consequences for the Alliance's relationship with Moscow. The morality of the ends 
seemed clear enough, since it seemed that only by the lesser evil of force could the 
greater evil of ethnic cleansing, if not genocide, be stopped. Further, following the 
breakdown of the second round of the Rambouillet talks, it can be argued in the bright 
light of recent Balkan history that all other options short of force had been exhausted. In 
resorting to military intervention, therefore, it can be argued that two of the three 
requirements of just cause had been met. The question of legality is more ambiguous. 
This chapter is not directly concerned with the question of whether international law 
informs international practice, or vice versa. One may observe upon their inter-
relationship, and the fact that law is not an immutable code of conduct but can evolve 
from precedent, practice and emergent custom28• Here I am concerned only to highlight 
the question of legality of intervention in Kosovo in so far as it illustrates a significant 
development in the character of NATO, and the impact of that development upon the 
Alliance's relationship with Russia. 
Any moral and political imperative to act militarily in Kosovo was at odds with the legal 
norm, enshrined in the UN Charter of recognising the inviolability of state sovereignti9• 
NATO allies were not entirely at ease with, or in agreement on, the legal basis for 
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military intervention3o• The debate on the legality of military intervention turned, and 
still turns, on the incompatibility of international law' s recognition of the inviolability of 
sovereign states (save in well-defined exceptional circumstances) as enshrined in the UN 
Charter, and the ad hoc and emergent body of international humanitarian law, which 
imposes obligations on states with regard to the treatment ofminorities31 • 
Ideally, the legally recognised authority for any military action in Kosovo ought to come 
from the UN Security Council, and indeed NATO justified its intervention by reference 
to UNSCR 119932. Nevertheless, this was a less than convincing legal basis for military 
action, as Russia had specifically stated that the resolution did not mandate the use of 
force, whatever interpretation was placed upon it subsequently by NAT033• 
Notwithstanding misgivings and shades of emphasis among member states, NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana based the threat of military intervention on a 
combination of factors including Belgrade's failure to comply with Resolution 1199, the 
need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and the dangers posed to regional peace if the 
situation in Kosovo went unchecked34• Given the continual emphasis upon compliance 
with UNSCRs it is clear that NATO was sensitive to the need to be perceived as acting 
with the legitimacy conferred by UN resolutions. 
Solana subsequently reiterated the NATO position, now backed by UNSCR 1244 in 
regard to the deployment ofKFOR, in an article published in the NATO Revie~5. By 
now the NATO action, still justified "in pursuit of a single objective: to reverse the 
Belgrade regime's horrific policy of ethnic cleansing", was being couched in terms of the 
need to act in defence of values, principally those of relieving humanitarian suffering. By 
implication, defence of values had assumed a greater significance than defence of 
territorial integrity, a position underlined by the reference to Kosovo's widening the 
NATO zone of stability. Solana's reference to values echoed Tony Blair's speech in 
Chicago on this theme36• The Alliance's willingness to act militarily in the absence of 
specific UN authority, combined with justification of its actions as being in defence of 
values beyond its traditional role of territorial defence, signalled a significant 
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development of its post-Cold War role. Indeed, it has been argued that it had now 
become in part a humanitarian agencl7• 
The debate on the legality of the Kosovo intervention, however, remains a matter of 
interpretation of the competing priority to be afforded in the international law versus 
human rights debate. Kosovo provided a stark reminder that the former had not evolved 
sufficiently to be able to accommodate what the West saw as the requirements of the 
latter, and so to be able to codify practices and procedures acceptable equally to NATO 
and Russia. From a legal perspective, the task is not to be able to justify NATO 
intervention as some kind of exception to the rule; rather, it is to establish a position in 
which the UN Charter and its promotion of the primacy of state sovereignty are 
compatible with the humanitarian obligations of states. 
Nevertheless, any decision to override the accepted international norm of state 
sovereignty was indeed a heavy one to take, replete with significance for the conduct of 
future international relations, not least with the Russians who regarded Serbia as an area 
of Russian strategic significance. As it turned out, Russian reaction to Operation Allied 
Force was predictably fierce at the levels of officialdom and public opinion. 
Russia and Operation Allied Force 
NATO's bombing of Kosovo provoked widespread outrage in Russia across a range of 
political opinions. Even those pro-Western elements of Moscow's foreign policy elite 
found themselves divided, with some being critical of Operation Allied Force and 
warning of its dangerous precedent for the future conduct of international affairs38• 
Those less inclined to take a sympathetic view of Western policy had no difficulty in 
stating their case in even more forceful terms. The range of reactions, from sympathy for 
the West to Russian military intervention on behalf of the Serbs, is considered below. 
I begin with a brief outline consideration of the effect of NATO's operation upon the 
wider Russian foreign policy community of commentators, and on Russian public 
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opinion, all of which interacted to feed the debate on how Moscow should proceed in its 
dealings with NATO during and after Operation Allied Force. I then examine the bases 
on which Russian policy had been constructed under Foreign and later Prime Minister 
Primakov, and the consequent deep shock to the official foreign policy community, 
before proceeding to an examination of the Russian government's constraints in reacting 
to Allied Force. The course charted by Yeltsin's Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin is 
considered, together with an assessment of the peace agreement which put an end to the 
war. Finally, I examine the immediate post war aftermath, and Moscow's concerns for 
the future conduct of European security affairs born out of the experience of Operation 
Allied Force. 
Allied Force and the Wider Russian Foreign Policy Community 
Writing one year after Operation Allied Force, Boris Yeltsin made clear the depth of 
resentment felt in Russia during the NATO bombing campaign, to the extent that he 
considered that there was a real danger of a new Cold War breaking oue9• The Russian 
President provided a succinct summary of the official Kremlin view of NATO's action in 
Kosovo, citing the collapse of the rules of international conduct epitomised by the UN 
(the issue oflegality), conflating the US and NATO, emphasising the centrality of 
diplomacy (and Russia's vital role therein), disparaging NATO's adopted role of world 
policeman, criticising President Clinton's lack of understanding of the Russian-Serb 
relationship, and Prime Minister Blair's parroting of the Clinton line. Even allowing for 
the element of self-justification, Yeltsin accurately summarised the main fears of many 
Russians that an existing world order, whose rules were widely understood and in which 
Russia had a significant influence, was being dismantled. In its place was the prospect of 
a new, arbitrary, Western-dominated system which threatened Moscow with exclusion. 
Whatever their shades of political difference, this was a position around which most 
Russians could unite. 
One particularly lucid account of the various schools offoreign policy thought in Russia 
identified five main positions, or world outlooks, ranging from pro-Western liberals to 
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ultra nationalist Russian expansionists4o• Between these poles of opinion lay a variety of 
views, each of which was deeply affected by NATO's attack upon Yugoslavia, and there 
was no shortage of comment across the political spectrum in the approach to, and 
inunediate aftermath of, Allied Force. The widespread nature of the public debate, allied 
to the outrage caused by NATO's actions, indicates clearly that Operation Allied Force 
was not simply a foreign policy issue for the Kremlin, but a domestic one as we1l41 • 
Yeltsin's administration needed to pay careful attention to non-governmental opinion in 
its approach to resolving the Kosovo crisis, and that opinion was, with the exception of 
some pro-Western liberals, wholly opposed to the actions of NATO and the West. 
Among those of differing foreign policy outlook there emerged a degree of consensus in 
reaction to Allied Force. In the first place, the NATO action was seen as a highly 
dangerous precedent for the conduct of security affairs (the legality issue again). The 
lack of mandate from the UN, where Russia wielded influence, brought home the dangers 
for Russia inherent in bypassing the Security Council. By implication, Russia's status as 
an influential actor in European security, much less its great power ambition, was 
diminished. Finally, the timing of the launch of Operation Allied Force, so soon after the 
admission of new members to the Atlantic alliance, was a matter of great concern. Fears 
that NATO enlargement of its membership was the precursor to NATO geopolitical 
expansionism appeared to be given credence. In turn, this could be interpreted as a t1rreat 
to Russia's own security, if not checked in some way. Little wonder that the Kremlin 
was under pressure to express strong opposition to NATO's actions in Kosovo. 
Official Reaction 
Boris Yeltsin's government appeared to be caught on the hop by the launch of Operation 
Allied Force, if the reaction of Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov is anything to go by. 
En route to Washington for meetings on the 24th March 1999, he ordered his aircraft to 
return to Moscow in protest against the commencement of hostilities, signalling grave 
Russian displeasure at the turn of events. The diplomatic drama involved was reflected 
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in official communiques, and set the tone for much of Moscow's message for the 
duration of Allied Force42• 
Russia's dilemma was the now familiar one of wishing to act as a great power, drawing a 
distinctly Russian line, and exercising diplomatic and political influence in the Balkans-
all from a position of military weakness, domestic political pressure and economic 
dependence upon the west. If Russia's future diplomatic status was to carry any weight, 
Moscow could not afford to be sidelined, therefore any engagement in Kosovo had to be 
tempered by considerations ofrealpolitik towards the NATO allies. As in Bosnia only a 
few years earlier, so now in Kosovo - Russia was forced to tread very carefully in 
reconciling its diplomatic ambition with its constrained resources. 
In European security terms, Russian foreign policy had (as noted in Chapter two) been 
based upon promotion of the OSCE as the prime mover in the continent's security 
decision making. This approach was complemented by Moscow's view of the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a partnership of equals in which matters were 
debated and joint decisions taken. Sitting above these arrangements was the UN Security 
Council in which Russia held a permanent seat. UN primacy in security matters was an 
article of faith for Moscow, given its sway in the Security Council. In launching 
Operation Allied Force NATO bypassed the UN, OSCE and the PJC, shattering any 
illusion that Russia possessed a guaranteed strong voice in European security decision 
making. As a demonstration of where that decision making power, if not authority, lay, 
the bombing ofKosovo was clear and unambiguous. The shock to the Russian system 
was enormous. Its foreign policy conduct, including contaimnent of what it perceived as 
NATO ambition as part of preserving and promoting its own great power credentials, had 
been exposed as a complete failure. The Alliance, by contrast, was demonstrably the 
prime mover in European security issues. Indeed, to add insult to injury, in the midst of 
Operation Allied Force NATO unveiled its new Strategic Concept - and this too became 
a focus of Russian criticism. 
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The strategy of wide-ranging engagement of key European security institutions in the mid 
1990s had been pursued by the then Foreign Minister, subsequently Prime Minister, 
Yevgeny Primakov. In particular Primakov had pursued a relationship with NATO with 
a view to exercising Russian influence in the Alliance through the 1997 Founding Act 
and the PlC. The declaration of Operation Allied Force, therefore, rode roughshod over 
Russian foreign policy strategy and forced Moscow into a rapid rethink of its approach to 
the Kosovo crisis. Primakov himself became an early casualty of the war, his 
responsibilities for the Balkans passing to Yeltsin's Special Envoy Viktor Chemomyrdin, 
prior to his (primakov's) dismissal in April 1999. 
Within days of the launch of Allied Force Russia stopped all contact with NATO under 
the terms of the Founding Act, withheld its cooperation in the PlC, the next scheduled 
meeting of which, in April 1999, was cancelled, and recalled its military representative to 
NATO. In addition, Moscow refused to attend NATO's Washington Summit, and 
refused to participate in the PtP programme 43. As signals of diplomatic displeasure, these 
actions could hardly have been clearer. Perhaps predictably, the rhetoric from the 
Ministry of Defence was bullish, though in practice the measures taken were fairly 
restrained. Calls for greater military readiness, and threats to withdraw the Russian 
military battalion from SFOR, contrasted with the comparatively mild measure of 
despatching a reconnaissance vessel to the Adriatic. 
Indeed, the Russian leadership, battered by a storm of outrage from all domestic quarters, 
retained a clear sense of its limitations. Yeltsin recognised the importance to Moscow of 
not risking isolation from the West44• His initial statement of 24th March had also 
declared Russia's willingness for close cooperation with the Contact Group, recognising 
diplomacy as the way ahead. This theme became more prominent in later official 
statements45• Consequently, the Russians did not withdraw from SFOR or from 
negotiations on CFE treaty matters. 
Moscow's attempts to mediate in the Kosovo crisis were constrained by the tension 
between the desire to play the Great Power game, distancing itself from NATO, and the 
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necessity of avoiding diplomatic isolation. Keen to uphold the inviolability of Serbian 
sovereignty, Russia could not afford its position to be confused with support for 
Milosevic's tactics in Kosovo. Independent Russian initiatives came to nothing, forcing a 
closer diplomatic liaison with the West to bring about an end to the conflict46• In effect, 
Russian diplomacy underwent a rapprochement with the West at the official level, 
notwithstanding the variety and strength of feeling of domestic opinion on Kosovo. 
When it came to handling the Kosovo issue, the constraints of strong domestic criticism, 
economic dependence on the West and the IMF, and military stagnation did not augur 
well for Chernomyrdin's chances of success. These constraints were compounded by an 
inherent diplomatic paralysis on Kosovo within the Russian foreign ministry, and indeed, 
one well placed insider has gone so far as to describe Russia's policy on Kosovo in the 
1990s as "a sustained fiasco" 47. In such circumstances it is hardly surprising that the 
Chernomyrdin's efforts were only blessed with success in so far as he approximated 
NATO positions in negotiations. 
Having been unsuccessful with independent initiatives, Moscow began to make some 
progress in its mediation via the G8 grouping which, in May, agreed at Foreign Minister 
level on a set of principles for resolution of the conflict48• In brief, the Foreign Ministers 
called for an immediate end to violence; the withdrawal of Yugoslavian army, police and 
paramilitary forces from Kosovo; the creation of a UN-sponsored interim government; 
and the deployment of international security forces to maintain peace in the province. 
On the face of it, there was little to disagree about in these broad principles. 
Nevertheless, they masked NATO-Russian differences of emphasis or opinion on what, 
precisely, was required to meet the principles. For example, the boundaries beyond 
which Yugoslav forces should withdraw, the composition of any international military 
presence, and the roles of the OSCB and BU in any provisional administration were all 
sources of disagreement between NATO and the Russians. Nevertheless, the basis of a 
sufficiently robust rapprochement had been established, enabling Chernomyrdin to 
engage in more meaningful mediation with Belgrade, though his initial visits there met 
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with little success. Indeed, given his enagagement with Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari 
and US deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, representing the EU and US 
respectively, the role of Ye Its in's Special Envoy began to be viewed critically at home as 
being little more than a mess~nger of the West49• 
This led to a period of disillusion in Russia since, for all Chemomyrdin's efforts, there 
did not appear to be any end in sight to NATO's bombing campaign. Despite the outrage 
and rhetoric, little of substance had emerged from Moscow to demonstrate its displeasure 
with the Alliance, or to provide practical assistance to Yugoslavia. While this situation 
persisted, and in the absence of any breakthrough, Russian diplomatic engagement ran 
the risk of being tainted with the NATO brush, and regarded as complicit in the West's 
attack upon Yugoslavia. Aware of this growing disillusion, and anxious to put some 
distance between the Russian and NATO positions, in late May Chemomyrdin had 
threatened to withdraw from negotiations should NATO continue its bombing campaign. 
However, he did not need to carry out the threat as, a few days later, the diplomatic 
breakthrough came. 
An End to the War 
By 3 June the efforts of Chemomyrdin and Ahtisaari bore fruit in the form of a peace 
plan accepted by the Yugoslav parliament5o• The outline of the plan represented 
something of a compromise from a Russian point of view, with Moscow accepting a 
NATO-led security presence in Kosovo, including US and British forces, albeit under a 
UN mandate provided by Security Council Resolution 124451. The new force would be 
known as KFOR (Kosovo Force), analogous to the SFOR (Stabilisation Force) operation 
in Bosnia. The Russians also acquiesced in the NATO demand that the air campaign 
would cease only when withdrawal of Yugoslav forces was demonstrably taking place. 
Belgrade began withdrawing its forces on 10th June, the same day that the UN passed 
Resolution 1244, and the bombing was halted. However, Chemomyrdin did score some 
plus points by promoting successfully the authority of the UN in any post-conflict 
arrangements, together with agreement that Kosovo must remain an integral part of 
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Serbia, and that the KLA must be disarmed and disbanded. Yugoslav sovereignty was 
not negotiable as the price of Serbian withdrawal. 
In prevailing upon Milosevic to accept the peace plan, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari were, 
in effect, peddling a western line52 • There was little substantial difference between the 
plan and the G8 proposals of early May, or indeed the subsequent UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244. There had been no meeting of minds between Milosevic and NATO; 
rather, Chemomyrdin had managed to impress upon Belgrade that Russia was no longer 
prepared to ride to Yugoslavia's rescue. Russia's involvement in the diplomatic peace 
process was thus characterised by an essentially hard headed pragmatism on the part of 
the Yeltsin administration. Notwithstanding the rhetoric denouncing the actions of 
NATO and the calls for a fIrmer diplomatic or military response from some quarters, 
Chemomyrdin's, and by extension Yeltsin's, practical contribution to pacifying Kosovo 
was to align Moscow with the West, and to prevail upon Milosevic to recognise the 
hopelessness of his position. Without his Russian mentor, and the opportunity to exploit 
the differences between NATO and Moscow, Milosevic was no longer in a position to 
continue to defy NATO. The outcome was a peace settlement which favoured NATO, 
yet managed to preserve a viable if unequal relationship between Russia and the Alliance. 
As with Dayton, the Kosovan settlement and the subsequent UNSCR 1244 once again 
demonstrated a senior-junior partnership in terms of the NATO-Russian relationship. It 
represented a compromise for Moscow in the interests of preserving its relationship with 
the West. To the dissatisfaction of one influential commentator in particular5) Yeltsin 
had to concede that the peacekeeping force in Kosovo would have a substantial NATO 
participation, including US and British forces, and would be pennitted to arrest suspected 
Serbian war criminals. This, and more vexed issues such as the unfulfilled Russian desire 
for its own military sector in north east Kosovo, and Russian insistence on having an 
independent chain of command in peacekeeping operations, are discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. For our purposes here, the settlement of hostilities in Kosovo once 
again highlighted the unequal nature of the NATO-Russian partnership. 
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Impact of Kosovo on NATO and Russia 
Kosovo demonstrated that the Alliance, albeit with its own internal dissent, was prepared 
to bypass the accepted international processes of obtaining UN or regional (OSCE) 
authority to legitimise military action in pursuit of its aims. Whether driven by the neo-
imperialist motives ascribed by some critics54, fear of repeating Western ineffectiveness 
over Bosnia, pursuit of the Milosevic regime, a search for a new collective security role 
for the Alliance, or straightforward humanitarian concerns, NATO was ultimately willing 
to use force to halt Belgrade's campaign against the Kosovar Albanians. The seventy 
eight day air campaign did not inflict a great deal of damage upon Serbian forces, but the 
switch to bombing Serb infrastructure targets did eventually create the circumstances in 
which Milosevic was persuaded to seek peace. 
NATO's score card for Operation Allied Force is, therefore, a mixed one. The Alliance's 
critics point out iliat the campaign, lacking in UN or OSCE approval, was illegitimate, 
ineffective against enemy force, precipitated even more violence against the Kosovar 
Albanians (so creating the humanitarian disaster it had purported to avoid), and almost 
brought about the collapse of Alliance unity. Further, it highlighted the poverty of 
Europe's military contribution to the Alliance, and in turn, NATO's dependence upon US 
military capabilities. American aversion to the use of ground troops, the so-called 'body 
bag syndrome', limited NATO to the strategy of air power in isolation, so prolonging the 
bombing campaign by emboldening Milosevic's resistance. 
In its defence NATO can point to the fact that, domestic politics notwithstanding, 
Alliance unity held up. The Serbs were forced to comply with NATO's demand for a 
military withdrawal from Kosoyo, whose Albanian population largely began to return to 
their homes now that the pogroms by Serb forces had been stopped. A large NATO 
peacekeeping force was now put in place in the province working alongside a much 
smaller Russian force, the latter having been denied its own zone. A subsequent UNSCR 
was successfully obtained to authorise the peacekeeping operation and regularise the 
basis upon which NATO and Russia would henceforth cooperate in Kosovo. 
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For Moscow the picture was rather different. Significant, if unwelcome, lessons were 
drawn from the Kosovo experience, chiefly along the lines that power overrides principle. 
NATO's willingness to bypass the UN Security Council, the OSCE and the NATO-
Russian Permanent Joint Council, betokened an aggressive organisation threatening the 
creation of a new unipolar world order. This new order would be run on rules determined 
by USINATO interests, and not in accordance with internationally recognised precepts. 
NATO had abandoned its original defensive raison d'etre and embraced an aggressive 
posture in which diplomacy could swiftly give way to force. In these circumstances the 
NATO-Russian partnership was seen as being of no value whatsoever. One very 
significant consequence of this view was that Moscow could safely be ignored by the 
west because of Russia's economic and military (and consequently, diplomatic) 
weaknessss. A particularly elegant yet trenchant critique was peuned by the Deputy 
Chairman of the Duma's Committee on Defences6; describing Russia's role in Kosovo as 
"humiliating", he drew direct lessons from it in criticism of the Dayton Accords in 
Bosnia, and in justification of Moscow's recently commenced second campaign in 
Chechnya. Writing in March 2000, the author concluded that "the seeds of 
misunderstanding and total hostility sown in Kosovo are growing into huge problems in 
US-Russian relations" - and, by extension, in NATO-Russian relations. 
If Russian views could be dismissed so lightly by the West, itwas incumbent on the 
Russian leadership to take some form of action to rectify the situation, or at least to signal 
its displeasure. In January 2000 Russia published its new National Security Concept, an 
updating ofthe 1997 version, which in tone and content reflected a significant hardening 
of official attitudes since KosovoS7• It would be simplistic to regard the Kosovo 
experience as the sole catalyst for the revised National Security Concept. Other changes 
had occurred rendering an update necessary - NATO enlargement; the collapse of the 
Russian economy in August 1998; Russia's renewed intervention in Chechnya; and the 
accession ofVladimir Putin to the Presidency were all significant developments since the 
publication of the 1997 documentS8. Nevertheless, Kosovo generated a greater degree of 
emphasis upon the perceived external threats to Russia's security. 
97 
The new National Security Concept was soon followed by the publication in April 2000 
of a new Military Doctrine, and two months later a new Foreign Policy Doctrines9• These 
were major policy developments, all within a short space oftime, and although not 
everyone subscribed to the view that the publications were Russia's natural reaction to 
events in Kosov060 there can be little doubt that NATO's actions had a strong influence 
on these documents. It is noteworthy, for example, that the National Security Concept 
2000 and the Military Doctrine 2000 each reflect a lowering of the Russian nuclear 
threshold compared to their earlier iterations, as a consequence of greater emphasis upon 
perceived external threats. Such grave considerations reflected the view that, if Bosnia 
had already demonstrated an unequal relationship with NATO, Kosovo had been even 
more traumatic for Moscow. 
Conclusion - NATO-Rnssian relations after Kosovo 
The conflict in Kosovo demonstrated that the diplomatic, political and security agendas 
in the Balkans were being set by NATO. This activity extended to reinterpreting - some 
would say rewriting - the rules of the international game, to the detriment of Russia's 
position, and consequently deepened the divisions in NATO-Russian relations. This 
chapter began with a reference to the bearable strain which the conflict in Bosnia had 
placed upon the relationship. In concluding, one may observe that after the conflict in 
Kosovo the relationship survived but was subject to even greater strain than before. 
It may be that the increased pressure on NATO-Russian relations was in part the result of 
the cumulative effect of disagreements over Bosnia, and then Kosovo. It is just as likely, 
however, that the deterioration in relations can be directly attributed to the qualitatively 
different actions of NATO in Kosovo. For the first time the Alliance went to war, not in 
defence of a member state or in prosecution of a UN resolution, but for what it perceived 
as humanitarian reasons. It was assisted in doing so by its new members from the former 
Warsaw Pact. From Moscow's point of view, an enlarged NATO willing to bypass the 
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UN and undertake an arbitrary attack on a sovereign state, was a set of circumstances 
replete with troubling implications for Russian security. 
The consequences for NATO-Russian relations were therefore profound. Virtually all 
shades of Russian foreign policy opinion were united in rejecting NATO's rationale for 
its actions. Such a consensus among Russia's foreign policy elite was beyond even the 
Kremlin's best efforts to bring about. NATO bombing of Kosovo, however, was a 
salutary reminder to all in Russia of the country's diplomatic weakness and, for the 
Yeltsin government, of the need to approximate the NATO line if it wished to avoid 
isolation and helplessness. 
Given Russia's inability to influence the course of events in Kosovo, it lost all faith in the 
formal mechanisms for engaging with NATO. The PJC without Russian involvement 
could hardly be considered a functioning forum, though it lingered in decline for a couple 
of years before being replaced by the NATO-Russia Council, discussed in the next 
chapter, itself given emphasis by events beyond the Balkans. 
Ifthere was to be progress in the NATO-Russian relationship, especially in the Balkans, 
there was now a great deal offence mending to be done - and done from a position of 
greater strength and recognition, as far as Russia was concerned. As in Bosnia, so in 
Kosovo; peacekeeping would now be a significant factor for both parties in seeking to 
rebalance their future relationship. 
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Chapter Four 
Peacekeeping ... and Moving On 
Introduction 
Tills chapter will examine the NATO-Russian relationship as played out in the post-
conflict Balkans by considering the history of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. The operations themselves were politically conceived, that is to say, based upon 
political direction from, inter alia, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council and the 
Kremlin. They were then carried out militarily, being put into effect by NATO, allied 
and Russian armed forces. As such, the formation and functioning of the Implementation 
Force (IFOR), succeeded in turn by the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), in Bosnia, and of 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) illustrated the workings of the NATO-Russian relationship at the 
political (strategic) and military (tactical) levels. The course of peacekeeping would 
reveal that these two levels were not always in harmony. In general terms we may point 
to the fact that while military cooperation in the Balkans, though never trouble-free, 
achieved a laudable level of success, the same could not be said of the political 
relationship, which proved much more troubled. Balkan peacekeeping, therefore, 
provides a concrete example of the progress of the post-conflict NATO-Russian 
relationship against the background of a real opportunity for demonstrable cooperation in 
shaping European security. 
Peacekeeping, whether seen from a political or military perspective, did not take place 
exclusively of the wider NATO-Russian relationship, with its focus shifting from time to 
time to NATO enlargement, Alliance reform, or Russian great power aspirations. Also, 
as peacekeeping came to replace crisis resolution in Bosnia and Kosovo, as each settled 
into a peacekeeping norm, and as events elsewhere, not least in the Middle East, came to 
absorb more of the world's attention, the emphasis on the Balkan dimension to NATO-
Russian relations gradually receded. NATO HQ Brussels and Moscow would each come 
to give greater attention to the US-declared post-September 11 th 'war on terror', with 
104 
President Putin taking the path of greater rapprochement with the West. However, the 
IFORlSFOR and KFOR experiences informed the wider relationship, and contributed 
significantly to each party's efforts to stabilise post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Consequently, an examination of NATO-Russian cooperation in the sphere of Balkan 
peacekeeping is needed to gauge the progress of their attempts to give practical 
expression to proclaimed partnership aspirations. 
For NATO and Russia, peacekeeping in Bosnia provided a demonstration of the validity 
of the Dayton settlement. Successful implementation of the provisions of Dayton would 
enable NATO and Russia each to portray itself as a credible force for good in post-Cold 
War European security. For an Alliance reinventing itself, and a fading great power 
clinging to its former status, there was a mutually reinforcing interest in cooperating to 
effect the provisions of the settlement, whatever their differences of outlook. 
Post-Conflict Bosnia 
The Road to Day ton - Resume 
After several bloody years in Bosnia, with western European states seemingly unable to 
bring the violence to an end, the United States began to take a more prominent role in 
seeking a settlement in late 1995. That summer had witnessed a pattern of Serb 
aggression attracting limited NATO retaliation, as for example when the latter bombed 
Bosnian Serb ammunition compounds in May, in response to Serb shelling of the UN 
safe area of Sarajevo described in chapter two. In turn, the Serbs took UN peacekeepers 
hostage, obliging NATO to desist and exposing Western peace efforts to ridicule. The 
message seemed to be that the Bosnian Serbs were free to frustrate the will of the United 
Nations on the ground, even when it was backed by selective NATO airpower strikes. 
A two-pronged approach was needed to counter this stalemate and to reinforce the ability, 
of the UN to effect its mandate. In the first place, the British put forward an initiative to 
deploy a NATO Rapid Reaction Force, putting well-armed troops into Bosnia to protect 
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the lightly anned UN peacekeepers1• This drew initial Russian criticism, but Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev subsequently took a more conciliatory line, indicating that Russia 
might even send troops to support the UN peacekeepers2. The second prong to counter 
Serb aggression was to step up the NATO bombing campaign, an approach which took a 
little longer to establish but was given impetus in July and August 1995 by the Sews' 
overrunning of Srebrenica and Zepa, and the shelling of Sarajevo market place. NATO's 
commencement and maintenance of an intensive bombing campaign against Serb targets 
outraged Moscow, which accused the Alliance of partisanship in Yugoslavia, but from a 
marginalized position now that the US and NATO were making the diplomatic running3• 
Nevertheless, there was now concerted pressure on the Serbs to call a halt to the military 
campaign. With US special envoy Richard Holbrooke leading the diplomatic search for a 
settlement in Bosnia, Russia had effectively been sidelined in the months leading up to 
the Dayton peace process 4• Its influence as a trusted interlocutor with the Serbs had been 
diminished to the point where only the West's desire not to humiliate the Kremlin gave 
Moscow a role to play at Daytons. For all Yeltsin's denunciations of NATO intervention 
in Yugoslavia, there was little or nothing Moscow could contribute to ending the 
stalemate other than to cooperate with NATO and American efforts, a situation which 
emaged nationalist Russian commentators, some of whom called for Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev to be sacked6• 
This imbalance set the tone for Dayton in terms of the relative influence of the 
participating parties. It was Holbrooke and the US which led the way in negotiating the 
terms of the settlement and thus paved the way for subsequent peacekeeping operations 
in Bosnia. Nevertheless, it suited the West to play up the Russian contribution to 
achieving a peace settlement. This would give the settlement the appearance of a truly 
pan-European approval, in turn obliging the Serbs to recognise that there was no mileage 
in attempting to split Russia from the West in order to prolong the negotiations or dispute 
the terms of the agreement. Naturally, it was also in Moscow's interests to promote the 
Russian contribution to achieving a settlement in Bosnia, presenting Dayton as 
attributable to the work of the Contact Group, rather than US-backed NATO pressure7• 
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From the outset, therefore, Russian participation in the Dayton process, and subsequent 
post-Dayton peacekeeping, was susceptible to an ambivalence of interpretation, whether 
at the strategic or tactical level. At the strategic level Moscow's input at Dayton could be 
viewed as a significant contribution to the international will to establish and maintain 
peace in Bosnia (the official Western and Russian line), or as the price Moscow was 
prepared to pay to maintain its relationship with NATO and the West, thereby ensuring 
its continued participation in European security decision making (the more critical 
internal Russian view). At the tactical level, Russian participation in subsequent 
peacekeeping could be viewed as a practical demonstration of its continued capability in 
an area of strategic interest, or as a token gesture of military willingness to translate 
political will into a security presence on the ground, regardless of how effective that 
presence might prove. Whichever interpretation is placed upon the Russian contribution 
at Dayton, the agreement reached there would determine the framework for subsequent 
peacekeeping activities in Bosnia, laying the ground rules for NATO and Russian 
participation, and the backdrop to the next stage of their relationship in the Balkans. 
In his detailed account of the November 1995 negotiations US Special Envoy Richard 
Holbrooke records the fact that the Contact Group (US, UK, France, Germany and 
Russia) and the EU were all represented at the process8• Nevertheless, it is clear from 
Holbrooke's memoir that the process was driven by Washington, that the EU 
representative Carl Bildt did not speak for all members of the EU, and that major 
European players such as the UK. and France reserved the right to adopt national as 
opposed to European positions9• It is equally clear that, notwithstanding Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov's presence, Moscow contributed little to the negotiations; indeed, 
Holbrooke describes having seen only one Russian-produced paper in the course of three 
weeks of intense negotiations, and that an ultimately futile amendment to the military 
annex. Ivanov's subsequent diffident performance at the final initialling ceremony, at 
which he reserved the Russian position on the detail of the military annex, adds to the 
impression that Dayton was not universally well received by all the signatories to it. 
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Even allowing for a certain partisanship in Holbrooke's account, therefore, it is difficult 
to make the case for a significant Russian contribution to the final settlement at Dayton. 
The final formal signing of the agreement took place in Paris on 14th December 1995 
with Prime Minister Chemomyrdin deputising for President Yeltsin, the latter subject to 
one of his regular health scares. Nevertheless, in a December 1995 communique from 
NATO HQ, reference was made to the acceptance of NATO's role in Bosnia by all 
parties to the Dayton agreement lO • The launch of Operation Joint Endeavour to keep the 
peace in Bosnia attracted support from a nurnber of nations, but Russia was singled out 
for particular mention, with Moscow's participation being described as "especially 
significant". It was evidently in the interests of NATO and the Krernlin to give public 
prominence to Russia's role in resolving the Bosnian war, and in maintaining the peace. 
The Day ton Accord 
The settlement signed at Dayton had the effect of formalising the end of hostilities in 
Bosnia though a ceasefire had already come into being in the previous month. Tellingly, 
there were no Russian representatives at the signing of the ceasefire, an indication of 
Moscow's loss of influence on the procedure. However, NATO and Russia, for entirely 
different reasons, were minded to play up Russia's contributionll . Yeltsin needed to 
maintain the increasingly implausible line that Russian influence had been a major factor 
in achieving peace in the Balkans, so cleaving to the great power autonomy of action that 
Moscow believed was its due. NATO sought to support him in his domestic travails and 
to portray the Dayton settlement as enjoying widespread international support. 
The US also had reason to accommodate the Russians since they saw Russian 
involvement in IFOR as helping to "lubricate the NATO-Russia track,,12. Consequently, 
at their meeting at Hyde Park on the River Hudson in October 1995 President Clinton 
was able to prevail upon President YeJtsin to commit two battalions of Russian troops to 
IFOR. In return, though reluctantly, Clinton agreed to ask Bosnian President Izetbegovic 
and his Croatian counterpart Tudjman to attend a pre-Dayton summit in Moscow, a 
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meeting which Kozyrev had already trailed in the Contact Group purely for the purpose 
of enhancing Moscow's statusll . In the event the showcase Moscow summit did not take 
place because of Ye Its in's illness. 
Dayton recognised Bosnia as a sovereign state divided into two entities, the Muslim-
Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. Partly as a gesture in the direction of 
Russian concerns about NATO, oversight of the Accord's clauses on political and 
humanitarian measures was delegated to the OSCE. However, speaking at the ceremony 
to initial the Accord on 21 sI November 1995, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov 
made clear that Russia would "reserve its position in regard to the military and arms 
control annexes .. 14• At the subsequent Press Conference Ivanov reiterated Russian 
concerns about the military proposals and pressed for the lifting of sanctions in the 
Balkans, despite the interjection ofEU Peace Envoy Carl Bildt who sought to change the 
subject, then play up the significance of the Russian contribution 15. 
IFOR and Russian Participation 
While the Dayton negotiations were being conducted in November 1995, the details of 
Russian participation in subsequent peacekeeping operations were also being decided. 
There were, on the face of it, potentially mutually exclusive NATO and Russian 
considerations to be balanced, and the outcome of the discussions would therefore be 
indicative of the two parties' ability to cooperate successfully in post-war Bosnia. 
Moscow sought an independence of command for its troops, whom the KremIin was not 
prepared to place under NATO authority. To do so would have had the effect of publicly 
acknowledging Moscow's junior partner status in all subsequent arrangements, and 
Russia's reduced international standing. It would also, de facto, sanction an increased 
NATO involvement in an area of strategic influence for Russia in 'Eastern' Europe. That 
in tum, would have had the effect of undermining Russian opposition to the ongoing 
debate on NATO's eastward enlargement. 
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For its part, NATO wanted Russian participation in any peacekeeping operation as a 
warrant of full international support for Dayton, and as a signal to the Serbs that there 
was no possibility of dividing the Contact Group. A united international front would 
reinforce the message that there would be no Russian patronage for anyone party to the 
conflict. At the same time, Russian involvement raised the question of the functioning of 
the operational chain of command. NATO had no wish to compromise the effectiveness 
of its peacekeeping operations, which it regarded as best effected through a recognised 
and unified chain of command. 
The outcome represented a compromise. On 8th November 1995 NATO's Supreme 
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan, in his national role 
as a senior US general, signed an agreement in Brussels with Russian Colonel General 
Leontii Shevtsov. This appointed Shevtsov, the SHAPE-based senior officer 
commanding Russian forces in Bosnia, as deputy to the US's General Joulwan, the man 
with overall responsibility for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, so allowing Moscow to 
portray its participation under an American general as an equal partner to NATO. Given 
Joulwan's NATO responsibility for, inter alia, command ofIFOR, the face-saving 
compromise was not difficult to see through. Unsurprisingly, it attracted criticism from 
some commentators in Russia, who were unimpressed by the disingenuous, not to say 
tortuous, arrangements for preserving Russian independence of command16• 
Nevertheless, a framework for peace in Bosnia was created at Dayton, and the form of 
Russian participation was worked out following the signing of the Brussels agreement 
between Joulwan and Shevtsov17• Russia was now in a position to take its place 
alongside NATO forces in Bosnia and begin making a practical contribution to day to day 
peacekeeping operations. Despite domestic criticism of Russia's subordinate role in the 
negotiations, and the hollowness of its independence of command, Yeltsin was able to get 
Federation Council approval to deploy the first Russian troops in January 1996. Russian 
troops on the ground were to be the outward tactical representation of Moscow's self 
proclaimed continued international status, and continued Russian engagement in effecting 
the Dayton provisions would need to take Russian interests into account18• 
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It may be observed from the outset that the cooperation of Russian and NATO 
peacekeeping troops came to be highly regarded on each side, aided to some degree by 
previous cooperation on exercises under the Partnership for Peace regime l9• The Russian 
mission got off to an inauspicious start, however, when the senior Russian commander in 
theatre, Major-General Staskov, was sacked for making personal contact with Bosnian 
Serb General Ratko Miadic, who had been indicted for war crimes. NATO's immediate 
displeasure saw Staskov swiftly replaced and the peacekeeping operation began to settle 
into an effective and productive cooperation at the tactical level. This offered 
opportunities to broaden and deepen the NATO-Russian relationship in a practical and 
internationally demonstrable manner, opportunities recognised by some Russian 
commentators20. By May 1996 Javier Solana, NATO's Secretary General, was in a 
position to address the Russian Council on Foreign and Security Policy in Moscow, and 
to pay handsome tribute to the professionalism and cooperation of Russian forces in 
Bosnia21 . 
However, military to military cooperation, though desirable and largely effective, was not 
the whole story in Bosnia in the early post-Dayton months. One influential Russian 
commentator acknowledged the significance ofIFOR-level cooperation between NATO 
and Russia, and regarded it as a benchmark of the prospects for development of the wider 
NATO-Russian relationship22. His concerns for the future, however, centred on the 
unacceptability to Russia of NATO enlargement, which in his view would ultimately 
render futile the successful cooperative efforts under way in IFOR. 
Notwithstanding the encouraging tactical level cooperation, in early 1996 there was 
indeed cause for concern over divergence of NATO and Russian views at the political 
level in Bosnia23 . Significant issues of difference included a diplomatic spat over 
removing the UN diplomatic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs; wrangling over the 
arrest of a number of Serbian officers and their subsequent despatch to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia (ICT¥); and disagreement on how to treat 
the indicted Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Related to the 
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latter was Moscow's view that the ICTY was biased against the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs. 
NATO's perceived anti-Serb bias was a cause for concern in Russia and found expression 
in the national press, serving to fuel criticism overall of the subordinate role of Moscow 
in its peacekeeping dealings with NAT024. Russia also found itself at loggerheads with 
the West over whether and when to train and equip the security forces of the newly 
created Croat-Muslim federation, though Russian objections proved futile. Thus, in 
terms of the NATO-Russian relationship a pattem of generally encouraging military-
tactical cooperation, contrasting with political-strategic differences, had begun to emerge 
in post-war Bosnia. Consequently there was only limited cause for optimism in the 
overall context of the development of wider NATO-Russian relations into the future. 
The official line in NATO and in Russia remained, however, one of optimism. Great 
hopes for the future of the relationship were vested in IFOR and, subsequently, in SFOR. 
The IFOR mandate was extended in a modified fonn to create SFOR at the end of 1996, 
but the principles of continued Russian-NATO cooperation remained the same. Official 
comment from each side remarked favourably upon the progress of the relationship in 
Bosnia, and its significance as a practical demonstration of NATO's and Russia's ability 
to cooperate25. 
It is noticeable, however, that the optimism expressed in articles and speeches by Russian 
commentators was carefully couched in tenns of maintaining the status quo in the 
relationship, or downplaying NATO in favour of other security bodies such as the 
OSCE26. While NATO commentators were ready to emphasise the fact that cooperation 
in Bosnia demonstrated that Russia had nothing to fear from the Alliance, the Russians 
were keen to stress that NATO expansion could destabilise the relationship, undoing the 
good work of IFORlSFOR and setting back the cause of European security. While 
acknowledging the importance of military cooperation in Bosnia, the Russians also 
played up the significance of the OSCE as a counterbalance to NATd7• Indeed, not 
everyone in Moscow regarded Bosnian peacekeeping as a model for cooperation in 
European security matters, arguing that NATO-led peacekeeping in the particular 
situation of the Balkans could not provide a template for pan-European securitr8. 
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For all the rhetoric about partnership and cooperation, given greater emphasis by the May 
1997 signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, 
progress in Bosnia remained subordinate to a more fragmented political relationship. 
Bosnia continued to trouble the Russian leadership, which did not feel comfortable at the 
political level with the direction of the peacekeeping operation29• Nevertheless, viewed 
in purely military-to-military cooperation terms, IFOR and SFOR were good examples of 
a successful NATO-Russian cooperative venture30• Convoluted command and control 
arrangements permitted each side to portray the mission as being in accord with its own 
wishes. NATO got the operational control it wanted. Russia got a politically significant, 
if numerically less so, military presence to bolster its international status ifnot its actual 
influence. Troops integrated effectively on the ground in performing the wide variety of 
peace implementation tasks generated by Dayton. The Russian presence made the 
Dayton settlement more acceptable to the Serb and Bosnian Serb communities, and while 
ethnic tensions were never far from resurfacing Bosnia settled into an absence of full 
conflict, and attempted to resume normality. 
Post-Conflict Kosovo 
Operation Allied Force and Aftermath 
While Bosnia's uneasy peace held, and notwithstanding their differences of emphasis, 
NATO and Russia continued to provide troops to police the settlement and gradually 
turned their attentions to their wider relationship, most notably the signing of the 
Founding Act in May 1997. Although formalising the relationship and widening the 
opportunities for partnership between the Alliance and Moscow, the issues of NATO 
enlargement and Kosovo worried the Kremlin. The YeItsin government was not in a 
strong position to influence matters, not least because of growing support for enlargement 
in Washington, and active lobbying by the states of Eastern Europe. NATO's admission 
of the Visegrad Three of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic in 1999 came to 
appear particularly ominous for Russia, coinciding as it did with the launch ofOpenition 
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Alied Force, and appearing to vindicate those Russian commentators who feared 
enlargement as simply an anti-Russian manoeuvre. 
Those fears were compounded by the Visegrad countries' decision to provide assistance 
to NATO at the outbreak of the conflict. The fundamental shock to Moscow of NATO's 
conduct over Kosovo far exceeded any previous policy disagreements with the West 
during the Bosnian War. Kosovo was indeed a seismic event in post-Cold War NATO-
Russian relations, and its reverberations were not confined to the duration of the Kosovan 
conflict itself. Such was the depth of resentment in Russia that its participation in post-
conflict peacekeeping in Kosovo was of a qualitatively different order to that in Bosnia. 
Peacekeeping in Kosovo 
As the situation deteriorated in Kosovo during 1998, NATO and Russian peacekeepers 
continued to work together successfully in Bosnia, with Moscow agreeing to extend the 
presence of Russian troops there31 • This contrasted sharply with the deep divisions 
between the Alliance and Russia over the looming crisis in Kosovo. Notwithstanding the 
gains from joint peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, it was becoming clear that such were 
their differences over Kosovo that any subsequent cooperation between NATO and 
Russia would likely prove very difficult to arrange. This view was clearly articulated in 
the very earliest days of Operation Allied Force, and set the tone for post-conflict 
cooperation in peacekeeping in KOSOV032. 
As has been observed, Kosovo and Operation Allied Force had a profound impact upon 
NATO-Russian relations. It is difficult to exaggerate the depth of resentment felt in 
Russia at the level of public opinion and among some commentators, albeit Yeltsin's 
government alternated between outraged denunciation of NATO and cooperation with the 
Alliance (see chapter three). Although the Bosnian conflict had been salutary for 
Moscow in reminding it of its decline in influence over European security matters, there 
was at least the opportunity to participate in decision-making via the Contact Group and 
other forums. Dayton too had given Russia a place at the decision-making table, and the 
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subsequent IFOR and SFOR missions had facilitated the portrayal of Russia as a 
significant actor. The special status afforded by the NATO-Russia Founding Act had 
appeared to indicate that partnership was genuine and had a promising future. However, 
for many in Russia, Operation Allied Force, following hard on the heels of the 
enlargement of the Alliance, was proof positive that NATO was not to be trusted. It is 
little wonder then that the Russian contribution to peacekeeping in post-conflict Kosovo 
suffered something of a hangover from Operation Allied Force and got off to a less 
promising start than the mission in Bosnia. 
KFOR and Russian Participation 
One difference between the post-conflict situations in Bosnia and Kosovo was that the 
former was ended on the basis of an internationally agreed treaty, however imperfect, in 
the Dayton Accords. Peace in Kosovo, however, was reached only when, with Russian 
envoy Chernomyrdin's significant assistance, it was borne in upon Milosevic that he had 
no option but to accept NATO's terms. Those terms were essentially the same as the 
plan devised by the 08 gathering in May 1999, refined by Chernomyrdin and Ahitsaari in 
Helsinki, and subsequently by UNSCR 1244, the internationally recognised expression of 
the settlement and related peacekeeping activities. Russian acqniescence in the 
settlement for Kosovo meant that Moscow's contribution to post-conflict peacekeeping 
was premised on terms which had not been proposed in Moscow and were not to the 
liking of the Russian military authorities33• 
As in Bosnia, so now in Kosovo: an arrangement was arrived at which nominally granted 
independence of command to Russian troops in Kosovo as part ofKFOR, and Russian 
forces began arriving in Kosovo in July 199934• Once again NATO was insisting on a 
single chain of command35. Consultative arrangements with NATO at tactical and 
strategic level were agreed, and Russia once again had a unique status among the non-
NATO nations in KFOR. None of this, however, could disguise the fact that NATO had 
denied Russia its demand for its own military sector of responsibility in Kosovo, its 
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troops being dispersed among the French, German and US sectors. The short-lived 
'triumph' of the dash to Pristina36 also ended in a face-saving compromise with Russian 
troops having to be re-supplied with basic necessities by British forces at Pristina37• 
Thus, in summary, Russian participation in KFOR was undertaken to maintain Russian 
interest in portraying itself as a major player in European security decision-making, but 
the terms of its participation were, effectively, NATO's terms, thinly camouflaged by the 
shuttle diplomacy of Chemomyrdin. 
One of the consequences of Russia's dissatisfaction and perceived junior partner status 
began to emerge in a divergence of thinking between NATO and Russia regarding the 
interpretation of the terms of the settlement. The absence of a detailed peace treaty such 
as Dayton provided scope for ambiguity and interpretation, a situation of concern to 
NATO since it permitted Russia to adopt contrary views to the Alliance regarding the 
provisions ofUNSCR 1244, the Helsinki Agreements and the functioning ofKFOR38 • 
One Russian commentator noted the satisfactory nature of NATO-Russian military 
cooperation in Kosovo set against the backdrop of political disagreement39• Specifically 
he singled out the issue of the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); 
the extent to which the KLA might be permitted to participate in future security structures 
in Kosovo; the possible return of the Yugoslav Army to Kosovo; and the lack of border 
controls on the Kosovo-Albanian border, permitting the smuggling of arms into the 
province. 
The fate of the KLA was a particularly contentious issue for Russia, keen to see it 
disbanded rather than transformed into a kind of internal paramilitary security force. On 
this issue as on others there was little or no common ground with NATO or the UN'0. 
Indeed, so fraught was the relationship between Russia and the West that Russian defence 
minister Sergeyev's visit to Belgrade in December 1999 even gave rise to speculation 
that Moscow would withdraw from peacekeeping in Kosovo in protest at the perceived 
failings of KFOR41 • While withdrawal did not come about, Sergeyev's visit did generate 
closer military cooperation between Moscow and Belgrade42• 
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Having signalled its irritation, Moscow continued to participate in peacekeeping, albeit 
by continuing to question the validity of the NATO-led process at all levels. At the 
operational level, NATO's Operation Plan (OPLAN) 10413 detailed the rules of 
engagement for its peacekeeping forces. It too became the subject of correspondence 
between Moscow and Brussels at senior political level as Russia sought to create elbow-
room for its participation in Kosovo 43. This divergence of interpretation translated into 
changes in the complexion of Russian liaison at SHAPE. After September 1999 NATO 
observers noted a break in the arrangements for SFOR liaison compared to those for 
KFOR. Instead of the fOI1ller providing a model for the latter, NATO sources noted 
significant differences in the reduced decision-making authority of the KFOR Senior 
Russian representative, as well as variations in the KFOR delegation reporting line to 
Moscow. Other variations included a greater emphasis on employing liaison officers 
who did not have a professional military background, and a perceived change of 
emphasis in the focus of Russian liaison efforts from tactical level cooperation in SFOR 
to more Foreign Ministry directed policy objectives on joint decision-making in KFOR. 
The overall tenor of these changes in KFOR liaison at SHAPE suggested that Russian 
participation, while analogous to that in IFOR/SFOR, had in fact a more overtly political 
emphasis than hitherto. Russia's KFOR liaison at SHAPE was coloured by the wider 
issue of its relationship with the newly-enlarged Alliance, with whom it had believed 
itself to have a unique partnership arrangement based upon the 1997 Founding Act. 
Operation Allied Force had engendered considerable resentment in Russian circles and 
caused a great deal of soul searching regarding Russia's relationship with NAT044. It is 
not entirely surprising therefore to note a new edge to Russian representation at SHAPE, 
nor to record that peacekeeping cooperation in Kosovo, while successful at the tactical 
level, did not operate so smoothly at the political-strategic level to begin with4s. 
Resumption of Russian participation in the P JC occurred against this background and was 
thus characterised by a degree of wariness and, once again, a divergence from NATO on 
fundamental interpretations regarding the role of the PJC. Whereas NATO interpreted 
Moscow's participation as recognising the legitimacy ofthe Alliance's role in European 
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security, Moscow continued to regard the PJC as a mechanism for influencing or even 
vetoing NATO decision-making. As perceived at SHAPE46, Russian diplomacy centred 
on a variety of issues including influencing internal NATO decision-making; elevating 
the PJC's status in Europe's security architecture to convey the impression of Russian 
influence over Alliance decisions regarding Eastern Europe (Russia's perceived sphere of 
influence); promoting the role of the PJC as the mechanism for peacekeeping cooperation 
outwith NATO's ptp programme; and attempting to transform NATO-led military 
activities into 'Joint" activities, playing up the Russian contribution. 
For NATO the implications of the Russian approach to the PJC, and its colouring of 
peacekeeping cooperation in Kosovo, were several. In the aftermath of Operation Allied 
Force, the Alliance needed to take stock of its approach to the overall relationship with 
Moscow. Almost a year and a half after the end of the war in Kosovo NATO still lacked 
a strategy for progressing its relationship with Russia. Without such direction NATO 
would continue to be reactive to Russian input instead of guiding the relationship in a 
direction favourable to itself"7. Owing to the deficiencies of the PJC, NATO was limited 
in its capacity to act as the best mechanism for engaging Russia at the political level; it 
could still provide a lead in promoting Russian military reform, however. In the absence 
of a truly strategic plan for its relationship with Moscow, the best chance for genuine 
progress appeared to lie in military to military cooperation at the tactical level, based 
upon getting things right in KFOR. For NATO, therefore, peacekeeping was the primary 
means of progressing the relationship. 
In early 2000 there were a couple of hopeful signs that NATO and Russia might begin to 
overcome their post-Allied Force difficulties. In February Lord George Robertson, the 
Secretary-General to the Alliance, visited Moscow and spoke reassuringly about the 
relationship. This was followed a month later by the first meeting of the P JC since the 
launch of NATO's air campaign in Kosovo twelve months earlier. Opinion in Moscow, 
however, remained sceptical, with the Russians still keen to point out KFOR's failings 
including criticisms levelled by the UN police contingent48 and refusing to increase their 
troop contribution. As the first anniversary of the launch of Operation Allied Force 
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approached the press still carried ample evidence of the persistence of Russian 
resentment, carrying articles critical of the war and subsequent peacekeeping 
operations49• The rift over Kosovo was a grim portent for future NATO-Russian 
cooperation and Robertson attempted to redress the balance in press interviewsso. 
He also saw fit to publish a slim document outlining KFOR's progress to dateS). The 
document provides an optimistic assessment ofKFOR's mission and achievements, but is 
probably as notable for its retrospective on the background to the Kosovo crisis and its 
justification of NATO's actions. The Alliance's relationship with Russia is not 
mentioned specifically. However, Russia's major criticisms of NATO's conduct in 
launching Operation Allied Force are all addressed, including the legality ofthe action, 
the conduct of the air campaign and the (NATO-perceived) need to act out of 
humanitarian concern. References to the work of NATO in addressing issues such as 
demilitarisation of the KLA and protection of Serb minorities, also reflect a concern to 
deal with Russian-fuelled criticisms. While there is no suggestion that Robertson was 
concerned to respond directly to continued Russian anxieties regarding Kosovo, it is 
possible to read his assessment as aimed at assuaging Russian concern, as much as to 
record NATO efforts and progress to date, not least because of a lack of a similar 
document regarding IFOR/SFOR. 
This difficult period for NATO-Russian relations would never quite be fully overcome 
even though both sides had settled into an effective level of military cooperation, 
differences of political direction notwithstanding. Politically, only gradual 
rapprochement was proving possible and would become the order of the dal2• 
Throughout 2000, therefore, differences of outlook persisted over the KLA, treatment of 
attacks on Serbs, and interpretations ofUNSCR 1244. Above all of this loomed the 
unresolved issue ofKosovo's future status. Nevertheless, in late 2000 NATO and Russia 
could find some common cause for optimism in the election in Belgrade ofVojislav 
Kostunica as the successor to Milosevic. For NATO, Kostunica's election marked the 
end of the Milosevic era, while for Russia the new President's opposition to a Pax 
Americana was welcomes3• The election of Kostunica was the occasion for reassessing 
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the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, with commentators examining Russia's role there 
and drawing cautiously optimistic conclusions about Russian interests, and the 
significance of the Russian contribution in keeping the peace54• NATO too took heart 
from peacekeeping cooperation albeit Secretary General Robertson's optimism was based 
more upon the Bosnian experience than that of KOSOV055 • 
In February 2001 NATO's Office ofInformation and Press issued a facts and figures 
brief, giving details of the number and disposition of SF OR and KFOR contingents, and 
their Russian components56• Already, from the figures cited, it can be seen that the 
Alliance and Moscow regarded the situation in the Balkans as improving, so requiring 
fewer troops on the ground in each mission. SFOR numbers had been reduced from an 
original (IFOR) contingent of60,000, including 1,600 Russian airborne troops, to 
approximately 20,000, of which 1,200 were Russians. In KFOR the contingent now 
numbered 40,000 including approximately 3,000 Russian troops, down from its originally 
envisaged maximum strength of approximately 50,000 inclusive of 3,600 Russians. This 
phased and commensurate reduction in the number of troops contributed by NATO and 
Russia would become a feature of the overall peacekeeping missions over the next few 
years. 
The Office of Press and Information brief, a less personalised document than Robertson's 
earlier assessment of the situation in Kosovo, was nevertheless an openly optimistic 
account of the relationship between NATO and Russia in both peacekeeping missions. It 
portrayed an active, harmonious and successful cooperation between the parties, to the 
benefit of the populations of Bosnia and Kosovo. It highlighted the special status of 
Russian peacekeepers in terms of their unique relationship with NATO, and the 
"additional dimension" which they brought to peacekeeping, given their "linguistic, 
cultural and religious affinities". Further, the peacekeeping partnership on the ground 
would provide the Russians with an opportunity to witness NATO in action, so 
demonstrating the transparency of the Alliance and forming the basis for future military 
to military cooperation. Clearly, NATO was emphasising the furtherance of its 
relationship with Russia at the military tactical level. This would appear to be consistent 
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with downplaying expectations at the political level, as per SHAPE's recognition of its 
own limitations and lack of a strategic plan for the reiationship57. SFOR and KFOR were 
indeed proving successful at the level of military cooperation, and continued to provide at 
least some cause for optimism in the relationship. 
On the Russian side too some had been arguing for greater rapprochement in the wider 
NATO-Russian relationship based upon a mutuality of interests including peacekeeping 
efforts in the Balkans58 • Others acknowledged the "positive" experience of Russian and 
NATO military cooperation in SFOR and KFOR, but recognised that there needed to be 
caution as weIl as optimism in assessing the prospects for future rapprochement59• This 
cautious optimism for the future was based upon recognising the shortcomings of the 
main NATO-Russian consultative mechanism, the PJC. In particular, optimism had to be 
tempered because NATO and Russia differed fundamentaIly in their perceptions of the 
PJC's purpose. NATO members, regarding the Alliance as the military guarantor of 
European security, saw the PJC as of central importance in effecting its relationship with 
Russia. Moscow, on the other hand, recognising that the PJC did not give it any veto 
over NATO decision-making, regarded it as one of a number of forums, such as the . 
OSCE and the UN, within which it could articulate its views. Russia had, however, much 
greater influence in these latter bodies, hence the PJC was a subordinate and often 
unsatisfactory medium for the KremIin. Nevertheless, Balkan peacekeeping offered a 
concrete example of how the relationship could be furthered successfully at a lower level, 
informing the atmosphere of debate at the political level as to how to take NATO-Russian 
relations beyond the unsatisfactory workings of the PJC. 
Notwithstanding peacekeeping's potential as the basis for future cooperation, the wounds 
inflicted by NATO's Kosovo campaign were always going to take a long time to heal. 
The second anniversary of the launch of Operation Allied Force demonstrated that there 
remained a high level of concern in Moscow regarding NATO's actions as the potential 
harbinger of disaster for Russia itselfo. The relative successes of peacekeeping were 
held up to critical scrutiny with NATO once again accused of ethnic segregation in 
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KOSOV061 • Milosevic's extradition to the International Court of Justice at the Hague also 
gave rise to Russian criticism ofNA TO as a divisive and partisan peacekeeping force62• 
As for the functioning of the peacekeeping operations themselves, steady incremental 
successes throughout 2001 enabled the operational commander of SFOR and KFOR to 
provide a sober yet upbeat assessment of the situation by March 200263• Acknowledging 
the limitations of SF OR's and KFOR's ability to ameliorate the effects of such recent 
ethnic brutality in Bosnia and Kosovo, Admiral Greg Johnson, Commander-in-Chief of 
NATO's Southern Region, nevertheless noted a steady retum of refugees, apprehension 
of suspected war criminals, reduction in the incidence of ethnic violence and reduction in 
crime rates generally. He also stressed that NATO-led peacekeeping could not, of itself, 
effect ''nation-building'', nor was that the peacekeepers' task. Instead, he recoguised the 
need for non-NATO agencies, not least the civil population ofBosnia and Kosovo, to 
cooperate to that end. 
As for the peacekeepers themselves, there was once again a reduction in troop numbers, 
reflecting the sense among contributing nations that SFOR and KFOR were working 
sufficiently successfully, and the Balkans was settling into, if not fully restored peace, 
then an acceptable absence of open conflict. By March 2002, three years after the launch 
of Operation Allied Force, SFOR's total strength was 18,000 troops while that ofKFOR 
was 37,000. These figures reflected a commensurate reduction in the Russian contingent, 
which continued to reduce in numbers in the summer of that year and into the next64, 
.... And Moving On 
By the time of Johnson's assessment the world had witnessed the attacks of 11th 
September 2001 (9/11) in the USA, an event which had profound significance for the 
subsequent conduct of foreign policy in the US and elsewhere. Among the many 
ramifications of 9/11 was the impetus given to NATO and Russia to improve their 
relationship. While military-tactical cooperation in SFOR and KFOR was generally 
accepted as a success, at the level of political strategy Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov 
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could stilI speak critically of NATO-led operations in Kosovo in July 2001, condemning 
the province as a hotbed of terrorism and organised crime65. After 9/11, however, greater 
rapprochement became evident, and there were calls for a new partnership as each side 
began to focus more clearly on how to cultivate their strategic relationship66. 
With the immediate crises in Bosnia and Kosovo now long past, and with peacekeeping-
on the ground, if not at the level of policy - seen as generally effective, the focal point of 
NATO-Russian relations gradually became less and less Balkan-oriented. Each party had 
to consider the wider aspects of the relationship, including NATO enlargement, and 
fundamental divergence regarding the PJC, under the shadow cast by 9/11. As a result 
there was a concerted effort on the part of NATO and Russian officials to make progress 
on a new partnership based upon perceived mutuality of interests which had been given 
impetus by the shared fear of terrorism. One consequence of this was a gradual, almost 
imperceptible, turning of attention away from the 1990s Balkan wars and peacekeeping 
activities, as NATO and Russia sought to face up to what would confront them in the 
wake of9/11, and the changes in security threats and the conduct of international 
relations wrought by those attacks. 
Even prior to 9/11 there had been indications of NATO-Russian rapprochement67. Putin, 
even while espousing the standard KremIin line denying any need for NATO, conceded 
that it was here to stay and might even include Russia68 • hmnediately after 9/11 others 
argued, somewhat presciently, for the West to cultivate Russia for, inter alia, its 
peacekeeping capabilities in Kosovo should the US withdraw its forces in the event of 
commitments in the Muslim world69• Putin now began repositioning Moscow and set 
about improving Russia's cooperation with, and standing among, the NATO allies, a bold 
move given the relatively brief passage of time since the Kosovo campaign7o. US troops 
were granted access to former Soviet basing facilities, and the Russian satellite base in 
Cuba, widely understood to be used for espionage purposes, was closed down. Putin 
visited Berlin, Brussels and the US to reinforce his European security credentials and to 
press home the message of his support for Washington's war on terror. 
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On the whole, the Kremlin's new line was regarded as a positive development in the 
West71 • Putin's motives were variously attributed - economic, geopolitical Gustifying 
Russian conduct in Chechnya), fear ofthe rise ofIslam and its implications for Russia, a 
desire to improve Russia's international standing72• In any event, Russia's western 
orientation swiftly generated moves to improve its relationship with NAT073 despite 
some initial caution in Brussels 74. 
Given the swiftness of Put in's post-9/ll overtures to the West, there was an 
understandable reserve in the reaction of some commentators when assessing its 
motivation and sustainability7s. Nevertheless, NATO-Russian momentum had been 
generated and the new prevailing mood was well summed up by NATO Secretary 
General George Robertson in January 200276• Targeting a Russian audience he stressed 
the seminal nature of the changes brought about by the attacks of 11 th September, and the 
immediacy of the common threat of terrorism. The effect of the threat, according to 
Robertson, was to overshadow the differences between NATO and Russia over Bosnia 
and Kosovo - where, in his view, much had been achieved by NATO-Russian 
partnership - and to generate an urgent need for a new and deeper cooperation. 
Robertson also offered a sop to Russian sensibilities by choosing his words carefully 
when discussing Chechnya. The message was simple enough - that which divided 
NATO and Russia was of less consequence than that which united them, namely the 
threat posed by (undefined) terrorism. 
Robertson's overtures were carefully calculated, but also made clear that enlargement of 
the Alliance would proceed, though it would not pose any threat to Russia. 1bis second 
wave of NATO enlargement in only five years might have been expected to generate 
considerable official resistance from the Kremlin but Putin appears to have recognised 
the realpolitik involved77• In any event, a new post-9/11 mood of rapprochement was 
abroad, and officials worked hard on both sides throughout the spring of 2002 to enable 
the creation of the new NATO-Russian Council in May of that year, marking, perhaps 
optimistically, "a new quality" in the relationship 78. 
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Against this background of increasing political cooperation, the peacekeeping missions in 
SFOR and KFOR continued throughout 2001 and 2002. Already, prior to 11 th September 
2001, there were financial pressures on the Russian garrison, which was proving costly to 
maintain79• Reductions in troop numbers were not solely attributable to a favourable 
perception of the security situation in theatre, nor were financial constraints limited to the 
Russians, with the British also feeling the pinch8o• The theme of troop reductions 
continued throughout 2002 and 2003, reflecting a combination of financial pressures, 
improving security and waning interest in the Balkans as events elsewhere, most notably 
in Afghanistan and the Middle East, began to dominate the attention of policy makers. 
By April 2003, in a move already foreshadowed in the Russian press8!, Moscow's Chief 
of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, was announcing plans for the complete 
withdrawal of Russian forces from the Balkans. The move was justified by the General 
Staff on the basis that the Russian military had achieved all its objectives in Bosnia and in 
Kosovo, and that the operations were no longer affordable, though some questioned the 
validity of the financial arguments82• Further, the withdrawal of troops signified not just 
a military manoeuvre but a political and diplomatic relinquishing of interest in the 
Balkans on the part of Russia, a de facto recognition of its inability to compete with 
NATO, and a loss of Russian influence in the region. 
By the sununer of2003 Russia's long-standing commitment to peacekeeping in the 
Balkans throughout the 1990s had become an expensive over-investment, whose returns 
in tenus of political leverage were not worth the outlay. In July the last of the Russian 
contingent in KFOR departed from KoSOV083, signalling a demotion in the significance of 
the Balkans for the political leadership in Moscow. For the Kremlin, the Balkans had 
ceased to be a priority, and its attention was turning to the Middle East as well as 
Russia's own near abroad. Nevertheless, the military to military cooperation between 
NATO and Russian peacekeepers was recognised and applauded as the Russians 
prepared to withdraw. Itdrew generous tribute from the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, who noted that the success ofthe peacekeeping 
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missions at the tactical level, and expressed the hope that continued joint training would 
enable NATO and Russia to build upon the SFOR and KFOR experience84• 
In the post-9fll world Bosnia and Kosovo became less of a priority for the US and 
NATO also. With Iraq absorbing vast resources of manpower, equipment and money the 
US military in particular was keen to withdraw from the Balkans, albeit by late 2003 the 
number of US troops there was very small- some 1,500 in Bosnia and 2,000 in Kosovo -
compared to the height ofthe Balkan crises85• Given the political centrality of the US to 
NATO's Balkan operations, any American withdrawal would necessitate a drastic 
reduction or withdrawal on the part of NATO, in turn begging the question of an exit 
strategy for the Alliance to enable it to withdraw in good order. The EU peacekeeping 
mission in Macedonia offered an indication of European intention and capability, and in 
January 2003 the EU offered to provide the deployed HQ for SFOR in Bosnia86• At the 
time of writing NATO staffs are engaged in exploring the mechanisms by which a 
transfer of NATO peacekeeping responsibilities in Bosnia may be transferred to the EU87, 
though without any significant Russian involvement. The hour of Europe may have been 
a long time coming in the Balkans but by swmner 2004 it appeared to be getting closer as 
a US-led NATO and Russia signalled that their priorities throughout the 1990s had 
moved on. 
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Conclusion 
The Balkan wars commanded the attention of all concerned with European security in the 
1990s. From the early years of the decade when a divided West failed to deal adequately 
with the violence of Bosnia, through to the bombing of Kosovo in 1999, NATO and 
Russia found themselves increasingly involved in what was happening in South East 
Europe. Gradually, however, as peacekeeping settled into becoming the norm, and as the 
US, NATO's leading player, began to focus its attention away from the Balkans, the 
situation there receded from public view in the west and in Russia. A number of related 
questions, however, are worth considering. 
This is a NATO-centric work, and as such is concerned to assess, inter alia, what effect 
the Alliance's involvement in Bosnia and in Kosovo had upon NATO. Equally, however, 
we need to consider the effect of the Balkan wars upon Russia and the NATO-Russian 
relationship. In addressing all of these questions, it will be necessary to consider a brief 
resume of the salient points emerging from earlier chapters in order to identify key 
themes. Having drawn these strands together one may offer some tentative thoughts on 
the future. 
Retrospect - the Balkan wars and NATO 
Considering first the effect of the Balkans upon NATO it is a truism, none the less true 
for that, to observe that the NATO which first intervened in Bosnia is not the same 
organisation, politically or militarily, which has emerged from that intervention. The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia posed arguably the greatest threat to European security since 
the end of the Second World War, and so provided the Alliance with an opportunity to 
adapt, operate and demonstrate its continued relevance to European security. The 
immediate post-Cold War obituaries for NATO proved premature, though the rationale 
for its continued existence still exercised many in the West in the ensuing years, 
especially after the 9/11 attacks in the United States l . 
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Suffice it to say that the fonner Yugoslavia was the catalyst for NATO to demonstrate its 
worth in the post-Cold War period. It did this by reforming in order to operate beyond its 
traditional Article 5 borders, initially in Bosnia2• NATO's case was helped by 
contrasting it with the impotence associated with earlier UN efforts in Bosnia, and by the 
failure of west European governments to deal with the rise in violence and ethnic strife. 
Gennany's breaking ranks to recognise the emergent Slovenian and Croatian 
governments was but the most spectacular example of the EU's inability to make 
cornmon cause to deal effectively with the grave security threat knocking at its own front 
door. As an indication of a cornmon approach to security and defence matters, Bosnia 
was not hopeful. 
The situation there did, however, enable NATO to emerge as the security institution 
capable of providing, under US leadership, effective military capability and western 
political cohesion in the Balkans. In one sense, while we may speak of a major NATO 
contribution to rescuing the situation in Bosnia, we may also speak ofBosnia rescuing 
NATO. The Alliance emerged as an enhanced force, providing the forum for Allied (and 
here it is tempting to read US) military and diplomatic power to be brought to bear, 
whether in the fonn of airstrikes against Serb positions, or cajoling participants around 
the table at Dayton. The bitter violence of the early years of the war in Bosnia exposed 
the inability of Europe's leaders to submerge their differences. In turn, this made 
subsequent US leadership appear necessary and effective, the main vehicle for it being 
NATO. The Alliance also provided the means for European states to regroup, 
consolidate and re-emerge to greater effect in peacekeeping, once the war had been 
ended. If European peacemaking had been ineffective in Bosnia, peacekeeping proved 
much more successful, and restored some credibility to the notion of a European security 
and defence identity within the Alliance. 
Events in Kosovo took matters a considerable step further. Almost certainly fuelled in 
part by western public opinion's desire not to repeat the horrific experiences of Bosnia, 
NATO in effect sidelined the UN in its determination to deal with the crisis in the 
province. Retrospective UN sanctioning of NATO's actions cannot disguise the fact that 
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it was the Alliance which set the diplomatic and military pace. The ramifications of 
Operation Allied Force for international law are still being worked out, and it has been 
seen as a precedent for Western intervention in Iraq3. NATO demonstrated that it was 
now in the business of making as well as enforcing the rules, at a time and place of its 
own choosing. That said, there was not unanimity among NATO allies, especially when 
it came to the vexed issue of using ground troops, and the longer the air campaign wore 
on the greater the danger that NATO unity would evaporate. In the event, however, 
NATO cohesion held despite the misgivings of some members. Once again, Operation 
Allied Force reinforced the message that NATO was still very much indebted to US 
leadership and military capabilities. 
The cumulative effect of the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo was that NATO 
emerged from its existential soul searching as very much the pre-eminent security 
organisation on the continent of Europe, even more so than the UN, with whom its 
relationship had proven somewhat ambiguous following the Alliance's decision to launch 
Operation Allied Force in the absence of UN approval. NATO interventionism helped 
shape the Balkans, just as in turn the Balkans helped shape NATO. Crucially, NATO's 
security pre-eminence was not welcome in Moscow, where there was a clear preference 
for the OSCE as the leading pan-European security institution. 
Retrospect - the Balkan wars and Russia 
If the Balkan wars had a significant impact upon NATO, they had no less an effect in 
Moscow. The cataclysmic shock to the Russian political system caused by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union generated the most profound rethink of Moscow's place and role in 
European security. The ensuing debate gave voice to a number of schools of thought, 
and variations on the theme of Russia's place in the new world order4• On one thing, 
however, there was general agreement - despite its reduced circumstances, Russia 
remained a major power in European security. 
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A major power, confronted with the greatest test of post-Cold War security in Europe, 
could not but become involved: Russia, however reduced from its Soviet pomp, had no 
real choice but to engage with what was happening in the Balkans, and with the leading 
players in the drama. To have done otherwise would have been a public 
acknowledgement of Moscow's reduced influence in the world, and given the lie to major 
power status. Apart from that, there were strategic, historic, religious and ethnic reasons 
tending to Russian involvement in south east Europe, making the Kremlin a key player in 
its own right, even if not a fIrst team regular. 
With Andrei Kozyrev at the foreign policy helm, Moscow initially set a largely pro-
Western course in the emerging Balkan crises, though this was not universally popular at 
home. Yeltsin's government enjoyed a brief but splendid moment of diplomatic triumph 
in February 1994, when Russia prevailed upon the Serbs to withdraw from positions 
around Sarajevo, so preventing an escalation of the war involving NATO. Apart from 
that, however, Bosnia presaged an inexorable decline in Russian influence, a decline 
underlined by the process and outcome of the Dayton negotiations. At best, Russia 
achieved a junior partner status with the West, a fact ironically emphasised by the West's 
transparent efforts to play up Moscow's contribution, and by the latter's persistent 
attempts to credit anyone and everyone but NATO with achieving peace in Bosnia5• 
The survival and persistence of the NATO-Russian relationship after Dayton is 
attributable to a mutuality of interest, nourished by the success of peacekeeping 
operations. In presenting the Dayton settlement as the outcome of widespread 
. international agreement, Russian involvement was important to the NATO allies. For its 
part, Russia needed to be seen to be on the winning side after Dayton if it was to be able 
to sustain its claims of great power influence and status. Accordingly, peacekeeping 
cooperation after the Bosnian war became a test of NATO-Russian cohesion and 
goodwill, and proved on the whole a successful venture at the military operational level, 
political differences notwithstanding. For a few brief years in the mid nineteen-nineties 
there was a realistic prospect that the obvious senior-junior imbalance in NATO-Russian 
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relations could at least be evened out at the operational level, with consequent benefits 
for the relationship. Then came Operation Allied Force in 1999. 
NATO military actions in Kosovo proved a burden too heavy for Russia to sustain, and 
caused a serious rupture in relations. The outcry in Russia caused by the NATO attacks 
gave arnmunition to the government's critics who had accused the Yeltsin regime of 
being too much in thrall to the West6• The Kremlin found itselfhernmed in by the 
realities of having to deal with NATO and its untrammelled ability to act as it saw fit, as 
well as the pressure of public opinion and domestic criticism, outraged by Russia's 
demonstrable impotence. Even then, however, with a clear breach of relations having 
taken place, Yeltsin's government did not succumb to the demands of its most 
vehemently anti-Western critics. Instead, it preferred to adopt a line of formal diplomatic 
criticism while keeping open channels to the west in recognition of its own inability to 
influence events decisively. The pattern of Bosnia was repeated over Kosovo; attempts 
to establish an independent Russian line gradually evolved into grudging rapprochement 
with the West. Grudging rapprochement in turn gave way to the conduct of 
peacekeeping operations, demonstrating that at the operational level NATO and Russia 
were capable of successful cooperation. Similarities aside, it should be noted that, for the 
Kremlin, the experience of Kosovo was much more humbling than that of Bosnia. 
In sum, the Balkans wars provided a huge shock to Moscow and demonstrated the grave 
difficulties which Russia had in striving to make good its claims to being a great power. 
The relationship with NATO was seen to be unequal in the light of Dayton, and 
Operation Allied Force cast an even harsher light on it. Ultimately, however, the 
relationship survived, though at some cost to Russian pride and status, as a weakened 
Moscow accepted the need to continue to engage with a greatly strengthened NATO. 
Retrospect - NATO, Russia and the Balkans 
Turning to the effect of the Balkan wars upon the NATO-Russian relationship generally, 
it is clear that after the Cold War both parties had to move to a new, non-adversarial 
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basis. Posing the greatest immediate threat to European security, former Yugoslavia 
naturally became the forum for new relations to emerge. NATO and Russia recognised 
that, when it came to the Balkans, each had to deal with the other though for somewhat 
different reasons. As discussed, Russia needed to continue to act as a great power in the 
region, obliging it to engage with the Alliance which wanted Russian involvement but on 
NATO's terms. The Balkans helped to mould a newer, larger and stronger NATO, with 
greatly increased leverage in its dealings with Russia partly through its own new-found 
purpose as articulated by the Strategic Concept of 1999, and partly through Moscow's 
demonstrable loss of standing. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to speculate how the NATO-Russian relationship 
might have evolved in the absence of the Balkan wars, given that NATO was already 
debating its own future and Moscow was coming to terms with its loss of Soviet empire. 
Each had difficult questions to address regarding its own identity, purpose and place in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. It seems reasonable, however, to suggest that, by engaging 
the best efforts of both protagonists at one time and in one place, the Balkans provided 
each with a high degree of immediacy in addressing their own questions and doubts. The 
disintegration of Yugoslavia commanded the attention of NATO and Russia for different 
reasons, in the process focusing and forging their relationship. The immediacy of crisis 
management exposed fundamental differences in outlook between the two, whereas· 
dealing with post-crisis peacekeeping revealed an ability to cooperate at one (operational) 
level in spite of any differences at a political level. 
The picture to emerge, therefore, is a mixed one. On the one hand, there can be little 
doubt that a senior-junior partnership resulted from the course of events in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. An enlarged NATO and a reduced Moscow eventually found their level of 
cooperation, if not necessarily agreement, on modalities of operating in the Balkans. 
Superficially, NATO would appear to have ''won'' the contest to prevail over Russian 
influence in the Balkans. Nevertheless, it is not the complete picture. 
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The Alliance has enlarged as an organisation, and expanded its remit for action as 
evidenced initially in Bosnia and Kosovo, and subsequently in the US-<1ecIared war on 
terror. It would certainly appear stronger and more confident than in the inunediate 
aftermath of the end of the Cold War. However, the experience of Bosnia and of Kosovo 
demonstrated that while NATO appeared strong enough to cope with any external threat, 
it could not conceal the fact that it had internal differences. European Allies failed to 
seize the initiative in Bosnia, consequently highlighting the centrality of US leadership to 
NATO, and by extension to NATO's relations with Russia. The effectiveness of the 
European pillar of the transatlantic security alliance was called into question by events in 
Bosnia. It was further interrogated by NATO's actions in Kosovo, given the 
overwhelming reliance upon US military capability in that conflict. Indeed, NATO's 
protracted and consensual decision making processes, even in time of war in Kosovo, 
caused some US frustration, the lesson seeming to be that unilateral action or coalitions 
of the willing were preferable to relying upon NATO Allies. In itself this may be nothing 
remarkable, but it does represent a fissure in the Alliance, and the potential for a longer 
term weakening of its cohesion, an indirect result of the Kosovo action. 
The wider significance of events in the Balkans has been concisely sunnnarised by 
Aleksei Fenenko as the revival of the war factor in modern Europe, the internationalising 
of internal conflicts, and the rise of a NATO-centric European security system7• The 
revival of the war factor in modern Europe is seen as a direct result of the existence of a 
unipolar international system. In the earlier multi-polar system such a dangerous state of 
affairs would have been impossible. However, the involvement of the world's great 
powers in the ethno-nationalist mix of the Balkans, and the evolution of NATO doctrine 
to include intervention outside its traditional area of operations (initially with, but 
subsequently without UN sanction) could only cause Moscow to regard the Alliance as 
"disrupting the European balance". 
In practical terms disruption of the European balance manifested itself most significantly 
in NATO's decision to launch an attack on Kosovo. This internationalising of what had 
been an internal conflict in effect signalled the end of the concept of internal sovereignty, 
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and was replete with significance for the future conduct of international relations. Not 
least, a NATO-centric European security system in which the US held the whip hand 
could, potentially, threaten Russia itself now that there was a precedent for overriding the 
previously sacrosanct concept of internal sovereignty. As a non-NATO member Russia 
could not afford to be sanguine about NATO-driven security agendas. 
Finally, Fenenko posits the view that the reason for the emergence of NATO as the 
Balkans' and Europe's leading security player was the failure of European governments 
to establish a workable transnational approach to security. Instead, as the leading states 
failed to agree on how to handle the Balkans, the old nineteenth century 'spheres of 
influence' concept re-emerged. This diplomatic regression was compounded by the 
ineffectiveness of international organisations, primarily the UN, in bringing about peace 
and stability. NATO, dominated by Washington, became the sole arbiter of policy in 
matters of European security. 
The upshot of the above was that the Balkans had given an enlarging NATO the 
opportunity, training and experience it needed to claim primacy in all matters affecting 
security in Europe. Little wonder, then, that Moscow had cause to feel increasingly 
isolated and vulnerable to the Alliance's eastward march, Western reassurances 
notwithstanding8• After the Balkan experience the Krernlin had even greater incentive to 
engage with the West. 
Although these views were outlined prior to the attacks of 9/11 in the US, Fenenko 
reviewed his comments as having stood the test oftime, there being no fundamental 
changes to the significance of the Balkan factor brought about by 9/11. The rationale 
behind Russia's pro-Western, and particularly pro-US, diplomatic offensive after that 
date is open to debate, and many have commented9• The obligation to engage, so central 
to NATO-Russian relations in the Balkans, came to characterise Moscow's dealings in 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, Mark Smith is surely correct in identifying 
Russian cooperation with the West as stemming from Moscow's weakness as much as 
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from any strength of conviction in such a course of action, a mirror image of the 
approach in the Balkans 10. 
IfPutin hoped by cooperating to somehow stem the tide of NATO enlargement he was to 
be disappointed, the Alliance confirming its decision to admit seven new members at the 
Prague Summit in November 2002. To some extent the battle over enlargement had 
already been lost by Russia after the admission of the Visegrad Three in 1999 and their 
contribution to NATO's war efforts in Operation Allied Force. Although the Baltic states 
particularly were a source of concern for Moscow, the enlargement momentum had 
already been generated throughout the 1990s, and Russia knew it. A certain resignation 
characterised the Russian attitude to further enlargement 1 I. By the Prague Summit of 
2002 when the latest round of NATO expansion was formalised, enlargement and the 
Balkans were already on their way to being yesterday's debates, as NATO and Russia 
were increasingly tuming their attention to the Middle East and the war on terror. 
Prospect - Cooperation and Uncertainty 
As Iraq began to command greater diplomatic attention, European divisions were once 
again exposed, as over Bosnia. So too was a transatlantic divide between the USA, UK 
and their allies from 'new Europe' on the one hand, and 'old Europe' (France, Germany 
and Russia) on the otherl2• Peacekeeping in the Balkans began to assume a lesser priority 
for NATO and the US, the latter needing to bolster its troop numbers for the prosecution 
of its war on terror in Afghanistan and, subsequently, in Iraq. Over a decade later than 
first envisaged, the hour of Europe was again at hand as the EU, with responsibility for 
peacekeeping duties in Macedonia, prepared to take over security responsibilities from 
NATO in Bosnia, a task currently generating huge staff efforts in NATO and in the EUI3 • 
While Europe may now be taking greater responsibility for Balkan security - some might 
say not before time - the US has appeared to be motivated by other concerns. If it is true 
that NATO itself has changed it is no less true that its leading player has also changed 
fundamentally in its willingness to contemplate action, diplomatic and military, where it 
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perceives itself to be threatenedl4. The administration of George W Bush demonstrated 
its readiness to employ the full might of the world's only superpower when it launched 
wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. 
It has been observed that this is only the beginning of an ongoing revolution in US 
foreign policy, the consequences of which may yet be to undermine NATO, as 
Washington continues to regard its European allies as less than connnitted 15. The 
(European) Alliance's struggle to find sufficient troops and equipment to operate in 
Afghanistanl6 does little to bolster its credibility in the US. This theme of divergence 
among the transatlantic allies finds its most articulate expression in Robert Kagan's 
writing 17. Ominously for the future of NATO, Kagan argues that when it comes to 
foreign policy practice and the exercise of power, the differences between the US and 
Europe are not temporary but fundamental and longstanding. Indeed, he asserts that "it is 
time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the 
world", a sentiment which echoes over Iraq, but which also has strong resonances in the 
handling of the Bosnian and Kosovo crises. IfKagan's assertion is correct, only US 
diplomatic and military leadership - power - was capable of galvanising NATO allies 
into line in the Balkans. That experience, however, particularly after Kosovo, revealed 
the huge capability imbalance between the US and Europe and created an aversion in 
Washington to being shackled by the European preference for consensual process. To the 
US the lesson to emerge was that when American power had decided upon action, it 
could not afford to continue to shoulder the burden of supporting recalcitrant Europeans. 
The longer term consequences for NATO cohesion are, therefore, problematic. 
As NATO cedes more of its Balkan security connnitments to the EU, a welcome 
interlocutor for the Russiansl8, it is difficult to identify a significant increase in European 
defence capabilities, notwithstanding the efforts of France and the UK from the St Malo 
declaration onwards. Taken in conjunction with Washington's increasing tendency to 
favour unilateralism where it considers it necessaryl9, Europe's continued 
underperformance in the field of defence expenditure and capability creates a potential 
problem in the Balkans context. Europe may be up to the task of peacekeeping, 
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especially if Moscow is constructively engaged, so depriving partisan Serb interests of a 
potential diplomatic sponsor. However, if the security situation were to deteriorate in 
Bosnia, where the Dayton settlement is showing its age, would the EU be capable of 
handling a descent into violence? Many of the same European governments which are 
struggling to fulfil their NATO commitments in Afghanistan will be involved in 
providing forces for EU commitments in the Balkans. This may be manageable while the 
provisions of the Dayton settlement hold good. However, the long-term future of the 
settlement has been questioned2o, and any attempt to improve upon it is likely to infuriate 
the Bosnian Serbs, and possibly Belgrade as well. It is not inconceivable that, should the 
worst happen, the EU could find itself calling once more upon NATO - for which read 
US - assistance in dealing with any resurgence in violence. In such circumstances a 
cooperative and constructively engaged Russia would be a very useful diplomatic ally for 
the West. 
Meanwhile in Kosovo there remains considerable potential for serious unrest, as the iter-
ethnic rioting and killings of March 2004 demonstrated21 • The province'S final status 
remains unresolved, a situation which, the longer it persists, is likely to strain the patience 
of the Kosovar Albanians and their politicalleadership22. Any resolution of Kosovo 's 
status will necessarily involve Belgrade and possibly Tirana. The former has already set 
its face against independence for the province'S Albanian population. As a result there is 
stalemate and drift, with no apparent favourable outcome. The potential for a resumption 
of violent conflict has been noted, a conflict which would not necessarily be confined to 
Kosovo itself3. Once again, it is possible that NATO may fmd itself embroiled in a 
violent conflict in Kosovo, but at a time when the US and Russia have given clear signals 
in the form of troop withdrawals that their interests have moved on. NATO and Russia 
need to engage constructively via the NATO-Russia Council in monitoring security in 
Kosovo. In the absence of a lasting settlement there, they will at least wish to ensure no 
deterioration the security situation. 
The NA TO-Russia Council is of course concerned with wider NATO-Russian relations 
and not solely with Balkan affairs24• However, the Council does devote much of its time 
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to security issues, be they WMD, terrorism or failed states, and in terms of concrete 
achievements, a constructive contribution to lasting solutions in Bosnia and Kosovo 
would represent a major diplomatic triumph for the protagonists. Meanwhile, the 
Council continues to represent a workable forum for wider consultation and engagement 
of the parties. 
Most recently, opening a NATO-Russia Council conference on the role of the military in 
combating terrorism25, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed 
Russian offers of assistance to NATO in its ISAF mission in Afghanistan26• He made 
much of the Alliance's common cause with Russia in the war on terror, reminding all 
parties that "terrorism threatens all of us". His words echo the views of Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov, who identified the two key turning points in international relations 
since the end of the Cold War as, first, NATO attacking Kosovo and, second, the war on 
terror27• Ivanov saw scope for US-Russian cooperation in a spirit of multipolarity, by 
which he meant multilateral cooperation within an internationally legitimised (ie UN) 
framework. Clearly this is a difficult balance to achieve where one of the parties' key 
members has a predilection for unilateral action. While a unilateral instinct can pose a 
problem for the long term health of the NATO-Russia Council, it also creates an 
incentive to make the forum work effectively, as a demonstrably successful 
countervailing factor. 
As NATO has enlarged, potentially diluting the cohesion of its membership, and as US 
disenchantment with its allies' inability or unwillingness to take decisive action increases, 
the cracks in the transatlantic structure may become more visible. Paradoxically, 
however, this potential for US go-it-alone disharmony in NATO can also work in the 
Alliance's favour. America's predisposition to act unilaterally could in fact redound to 
NATO's benefit by making the Alliance, as opposed to the US, a more attractive partner 
to Russia in terms of engaging Washington and the West via NATO. For its part, Russia 
can recognise the value of continuing to engage with the West, albeit from its relatively 
weak position. It should be noted, however, that the balance is not entirely unfavourable 
to Moscow, which does have some cards of its own to play. 
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If we consider the most pressing security challenges which the Alliance seeks to address, 
they include terrorism, arms proliferation, regional instability, and trafficking in drugs 
and people. Russia's geography, history, intelligence capabilities and regional influence 
make it an essential partner for NATO in those undertakings28. This opens up 
opportunities for further cooperation, even to the point of perhaps basing NATO military 
personnel in the Russian Federation as part of joint NATO-Russian structures designed to 
further common goals in combating terrorism and arms proliferation29. Such an idea 
might be considered fanciful or overly optimistic, but it is the case that NATO-Russian 
relations have travelled a long, if occasionally very bumpy, road since 1991. There is no 
inherently good reason why the relationship might not yet take such a significant step, a 
truly new quality in NATO-Russian relations, contingent upon the continued 
rapprochement of Russia and the West in the post-9fll world. The details would take 
considerable work, but the Balkan peacekeeping experience shows that both parties are 
capable of a high degree of successful cooperation at the appropriate level. 
Of course it is possible that a great deal could yet disrupt the slow progress wrought by 
the NATO-Russia Council. Russia remains engaged in the Council, claiming parity with 
all other participants, and promoting the line that there are no pre-cooked positions, only 
open discussion. That could change should Moscow fmd its initiatives stalled 
sufficiently often to throw aside the veil of 'at 27'. Dependent upon how US forces 
conduct themselves in the Caucasus, Moscow might also come to regard the American 
presence there as inimical to its own national interests. NATO cohesion may yet come 
unstuck as US patience with some of its European allies wears thin. Alternatively, a 
bloated NATO may succumb to organisational inertia as it attempts to integrate its 
newest members. Caught between the pressures of NATO's out-of-area commitments 
and Europe's fledgling autonomous commitments, the European allies may overreach 
themselves. Finally, the absence of final and lasting settlements in Bosnia and Kosovo 
may well give rise to renewed violence and war. 
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Nevertheless, with the NATO-Russia Council espousing common cause, NATO 
determined to continue to demonstrate its post-9fll relevance, and Russia keen to remain 
engaged (albeit through the necessity of mitigating its own weakness), there is surely 
scope for a more fruitful partnership. As well as calls for setting up joint NATO-Russian 
military establishments on Russian soil there are also voices recognising the wider 
common interest of NATO and Russia, and advocating an even deeper partnership in 
terms of cooperative structures to tackle terrorism and organised crime in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus30• It is noteworthy that those advocating this kind of cooperation cite 
the successful experience of NATO-Russian cooperation in Bosnia and Kosovo as the 
basis for believing that such bold moves can work. The Balkan wars of the 1990s 
demonstrated that NATO and Russia had, have and most likely will continue to have 
their significant differences, but that they can remain engaged and have a proven ability 
to cooperate even under the most difficult of circumstances. In uncertain times, as 
NATO and Russia focus their attention on a wide thematic and geographic agenda well 
beyond south east Europe, that at least provides some cause for optimism. 
144 
I For just a flavour of the post-9/11 debate see Anthony Forster and WilIiam Wallace, What is NATO for? 
Survival Vol43 No 4 Winter 2001-2002 pp 107-122: Judy Dempsey, "An Alliance in search of a role" 
Financial Times 10" April 2002: Alan L Isenberg, Last Chance: A roadmap for NATO revitalization Orbis 
Fall 2002 pp 641-659: Rebecca Johnson and Micah Zenko, All dressed up and no place to go Parameters 
Winter 2002-2003 pp 48-63: Michael Ruhle, NATO after Prague: learning the lessons of91/ / Parameters / 
Summer 2003 pp 89-97: Paul Cornish, NATO: the practice and politics of transformation Intemational 
Affairs Vol80 No I pp 63-74. 
2 A more detailed assessment of how Bosnia has affected the Alliance is provided by George Schulte, 
"Bringing peace to Bosnia and change to the Alliance" NATO Review Vol45 No. 2 March 1997 pp 22-
25. 
J See John H Cume "NATO's Humanitarian Intervention In Kosovo: Making or Breaking International 
Law?" Atlantic Council of Canada Paper (2/99). Neil Clark "How the battle lines were drawn: WMDs 
haven't turned up; in /999 there was no genocide in Kosovo" The Spectator 14th June 2003; also, Kate 
Hudson "A pattern of aggression. Iraq was not theftrst illegal US-led attack on a sovereign state in recent 
times. The precedent was set in /999 in Yugoslavia" The Guardian 14th August 2003, all op cit chapter 
three. 
• A review of Russian thinking and debate in the post-Soviet field of international relations is contained in 
Alexander Sergunin, Discussions o/international relations in post-Communism Russia Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies Vol37 No 1 March 2004 pp 19-35. 
5 Chapter four, notes 5 and 7. 
, Chapter three, note 43, details official and public reaction in Russia. 
7 Aleksei Fenenko, Balkanski factor ivoenno-politicheskaya bezopasnost' Evropi Mezhdunarodnava Zhizn ' 
No 2 I" February 2002 pp 51-66. 
s Ian Black, "US says Russia need notfear bigger NATO" The Guardian 3'" April 2004. 
9 For a survey of Russian attitudes to the US-Russian relationship see Mark A Smith, The Russia-USA 
Relationship Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 04/12 (Russian Series>. May 2004. See also, inter 
alia, Robert E Hunter, NATO-Russia Relations after / / September, in Shireen Hunter (ed) Strategic 
Developments in Eurasia after II September, esp pp 40-41; also, chapter four, notes 88 and 91. 
10 Mark A Smith, The Russia-USA relationship op cit 
11 Sergei Yastrzhembsky, "Ne nado boyatsa 'Bolshevo NATO': rasshirenie alliansa sozdaet slozhnosti v 
pervuyu ochered emy samomy" Nezavisimava Gazeta 13th January 2003; Andrei Kelin, Spokoinoi 
negativnoe otnoshenie k rasshireniyu NATO" Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' No 1231" December 2003 pp 
10-22. 
12 The phraseology is that of US Secretary of State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, in 2003. 
IJ Author's meetings with NATO international staffs in Naples, May 2004 and with British EU staffs in 
Brussels, July 2004. 
I. This is not, as might be supposed, an exclusively post-91l1 phenomenon, as a unilateralist/militarist 
tendency in George W Bush's administration had already been discerned. See WilIiam Pfaff, Bush team's 
military focus is skewing US foreign policy International Herald Tribune 20th June 2001. 
IS Irwin Stelzer, "Wake up! America is dreaming ofa new order" The Times 19th July 2004. 
16 BBC Radio 4, Today programme, 91h August 2004. 
17 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the new world order London 2004 (revised 
edition). . 
18 For a detailed discussion of Moscow's attitude, and attraction, towards the EU see Mark A Smith, Russia 
and the EU under Putin Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 04120 (Russian Series) July 2004. 
19 Stelzer op cit. Also Simon Tisdall, "Diplomacy sidelined as US targets Iran ", The Guardian I Oth August 
2004. 
20 Alexander Ivanko, Day ton brought peace. It's timefor justice Bosnia Report, Series 37-38 January-
March 2004: David Harland, What has not happened in Bosnia Bosnia Report Series 37-38 January-March 
2004. For a very different realpolitik rationale as to why Dayton should be revisited see WilIiam Pfaff, 
"Time to concede defeat in Bosnia-Herzegovina" International Herald Tribune lOth October 2002. 
21 An analysis of the significance of the March 2004 disturbances is provided by James Pettifer, Kosovo, 
March 2004: the endgame begins Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 04/04 <Balkan Series) April 
2004. 
145 
22 Helena Smith, "Angry Kosovars call on 'colonial' UN occupyingforce to leave" Observer 19th October 
2003. 
23 Misha Glenny, "Analysis: Theforgotten land" The Guardian 22" June 2004. 
24 See Oksana Antonenko, The NATO-Russia Council: Challenges and Opportunities, Paper presented at 
Tallinn to a conference on dual enlargement and the Baltic States, 11-13 February 2004, 
2S The military's role in the fight against terrorism is a theme which predates the establishment of the 
NATO-Russia Council. Then Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson opened the first conference on 
the subject at the NATO Defence College in Rome, 3-4 February 2002. Ironically, in view of the Russian 
military's reported opposition to Putin's pro-western rapprochement - see The reaction of the military 
establishment to President Vladimir Putin 's new foreign and security policy Oxford Analytica 24ili June 
2002 - the military's role in combating terrorism has since become a staple of the NATO-Russia Council. 
26 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's keynote address to the NATO-Russian Council conference on the role of the 
military in combating terrorism, Norfolk, Virginia, USA, 5th April 2004. Available at 
www.nato.intldocu/speechl2004/s040405a.htm 
27 Cited in Mark A Smith,lgor lvanov onJraq and the Struggle for a New World Order, Conflict Studies 
Research Centre Occasional Brief No 102 3'" February 2004. 
28 Paul Fritch, Building hope on experience NATO Review Autumn 2003. 
29 A thoughtful, if optimistic (or ahead of its time?), proposal for just such a venture is outlined in Peter 
Zwack, A NATO-Russia Contingency Command Parameters Spring 2004 pp 89-103. 
30 Ian Bremmer and Nikolas Gvosdev, "Why not really make Russia a partner?" International Herald 
Tribune 22" June 2004. 
146 
Bibliography 
Websites 
www.nato.int (NATO official homepage) 
www.bosnia.org.uk (Bosnian Institute website, for Bosnia Report) 
www.rferl.org (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Reports and Daily 
Newsbriefs) 
www.osce.org (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe official homepage) 
www.state.gov (US State Department official statements) 
www.globalpolicy.org. 
www.cdi.orglrussialjohnson (Johnson's Russia List, news bulletins, comment and 
analysis on Russia) 
www.fco.gov.uk (British Foreign Office official website) 
www.fas.harvard.eduJ-ponars (Program On New Approaches to Russian Security 
[PONARS] memos) 
www.un.org(UnitedNationshomepage) 
http://online.eastview.com (Russian-based sources, in Russian or English, including 
official Russian government statements) 
Books 
Bacevich, A. and Cohen, E. (eds) War Over Kosovo: Politics And Strategy in a Global 
Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) 
Baranovsky, V. (ed) Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) 
Bildt, C. Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1998) 
Bowker, M and Ross, (eds) Russia After the Cold War (London: Longman, 2000) 
Croft, S., Redmond, J., Wynn Rees, G. and Webber, M. (eds) The Enlargement of Europe 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999) 
Fukuyama, F. The End of History and The Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) 
Goldgeiger, J., Not Whether but When: the US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1999) 
Gow, J. Triurnph of the Lack ofWi11: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War 
(London: Hurst 1997) 
Holbrooke, R. To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998) 
Hunter, S. (ed) Strategic Developments in Eurasia After 11 September (London: Frank 
Cass, 2004) 
Hyde-Price, A. Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000) 
Judah, T. The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven and 
London:Yale University Press, 2000) 
Kagan, R. Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2004) 
Magas, B. and Zanic, I. (eds) The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001) 
Malcolm, N., Pravda, A., Allison, R., Light M. (eds) Internal Factors in Russian Foreign 
Policy (Oxford and London: RIIA, 1996) 
Owen, D. Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995) 
Pond, E. The Rebirth of Europe (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999) 
Ripley, T. Air War Bosnia: UN and NATO Airpower (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 
1996) 
Saunders D., Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881 (London: Longman, 
1992) 
Simms, B.Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin, 2001) 
Snyder, G. Alliance Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997) 
Stankovic, M. Trusted Mole: A Soldier's Journey Into Bosnia's Heart of Darkness 
London: HarperCollins, 2000) 
Tunander, 0., Baev, P., and Einagel, V. eds. Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe (Oslo: 
Sage, 1997) 
Webber, M., The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996) 
Webber, M. (ed) Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? (Basingstoke: MacMilIan, 
2000) 
Yost, D. NATO Transfonned: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security 
(Washington D.e.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998) 
Journals l 
Adomeit, H. 'Russia as a "Great Power" in World Affairs: Images and Reality' 
International Affairs Vol. 71(1), 1995, pp. 35-68. 
Aguera, M. 'Air Power Paradox: NATO's Misuse of Military Force in Kosovo, and its 
Consequences' Small Wars and Insurgencies Vo1.12(3), 2001, pp. 115-128. 
Ali, T. 'Springtime for NATO' New Left Review No. 234 May 1999, pp. 62-72. 
Ambrosio, T. 'Russia's Quest for Multipolarity: A Response to US Foreign Policy in the 
Post-Cold War Era' European Security Vo1.10, 2001, pp 45-67. 
Anderson, S. 'EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's 
New Security Architecture' European Security Vol. 4, Summer 1995, pp 23-41. 
Antonenko, A. 'Putin's Gamble' Survival Vol. 43 (4), 2001-02, pp. 49-60. 
Baev, P. 'Putin's Western Choice: Too Good to be True?' European SecurityVo1.12, 
Spring 2003, pp. 1-16. 
Bansahel, N. 'Separable but not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined 
Joint Task Force' European Security Vol.8, Summer 1999, pp. 52-72. 
Bell, C. 'Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia' Journal of Strategic Studies 
Vo1.17(8), 1994, pp 27-41. 
Botyanovskii A.S. 'The Bosnian Knot' International Affairs (Moscow) January 1996 
(electronic edition, http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/article). 
I (i) Due to changes over time in the frequency of publication, the designation of identifying NATO 
Review issues varies slightly. (ii) Where page numbers are not shown, the article has been accessed online 
(see websites). (iii) International Affairs is not to be confused with International Affairs (Moscow); the 
latter is a Russian·based English language journal. 
Brandenburg, U. 'NATO and Russia: A Natural Partnership' NATO Review Vol. 45(4), 
1997, pp. 17-21. 
Butkevicius, A. 'The Baltic Region in Post-Cold War Europe' NATO Review Vol. 41(1), 
1993 pp. 7-11. 
Carr, F. and Flenley, P. 'NATO and the Russian Federation in the New Europe: The 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations' Journal ofComrnunist Studies and Transition Politics 
VoI15(2), 1999, pp. 70-88. 
Cimoszewicz, W. 'Building Poland's Security: Membership of NATO a Key Objective' 
NATO Review Vol.44(3), 1996, pp. 3-7. 
Cornish, P. 'NATO: the Practice and Politics of Transformation' International Affairs 
VoI.80{l), 2004, pp. 63-74. 
Daalder, I.H. and O'Hanlon, M.E. 'Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo' Foreign Policy, 
Fall 1999 pp. 128-139. 
Dale Waiton, C. 'The Decline of the Third Rome: Russia's Prospects as a Great Power' 
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies VoI.I2(1), 1999 pp. 51-63. 
Edmunds, T. 'NATO and its New Members' Survival VoI45(3), 2003 pp. 145-166. 
Fenenko, A. 'Balkanski Faktor Ivoenno-Politicheskaya Bezopasnost' Evropi' 
Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' No 2, February 2002, pp.51-66. 
Forster, A. and Wallace, W. 'What is NATO for?' Survival VoI43(4), 2001-2002, 
pp. 107-122. 
Fritch, P. 'Building Hope on Experience' NATO Review VoI.51(3), 2003 (electronic 
edition, http://www.nato.intldocuJreview). 
Frye, A. 'The New NATO and Relations with Russia' Journal of Strategic Studies 
VoI.23(3), 2000, pp.305-327. 
Gazzini, T. 'NATO Coercive Military Activities in the Yugoslav Crisis (1992-1999), 
European Journal ofInternational Law VoI12(3), 2001, pp.391-435. 
Glennon M.J. 'The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law' 
Foreign Affairs May-June 1999 pp. 2-7 
Gobarev, V. 'Russian-NATO Relations after Kosovo: Strategic Implications' The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies Vo1.12(3), 1999, pp.1-17 
Godzimirski, J.M. 'Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative 
Analysis' European Security Vol9 Winter 2000 pp.73-91. 
Golob, 1. 'Preparing for Membership: Slovenia's Expanding Ties to NATO' NATO 
Review VoI.44(6), 1996 pp.24-25. 
Gowan, P. 'The NATO Powers and the Balkan Tragedy' New Left Review No 234, May 
1999, pp.83-105. 
Guicherd, C. 'International Law and the War in Kosovo' Survival VoI.4l(2), 1999, 
pp. 19-34. 
Huysmans, J. 'Shape-shifting NATO; Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee 
Crisis' Review ofIntemational Studies VoI.28(4), 2002 pp.599-6l8. 
Isakova,1. 'The Kosovo Air Campaign's Impact on Russian Military Thinking' RUSI 
Journal August 2000, pp.53-57. 
Isenberg, AL. 'Last Chance: A Roadrnap for NATO Revitalization' Orbis Fall 2002, 
pp.641-659. 
Ivanov, I. 'The Formation of New Russian Foreign Policy Completed' International 
Affairs (Moscow) July 2001, (electronic edition, 
http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/ article). 
Ivashov,1. 'On NATO's Eastward Expansion' Military Thought (Moscow) September 
1996, (electronic edition, http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/article ). 
Johnson, G. 'The Balkans: Prospects and Challenges One Year Later' NATO's Nations 
and Partners for Peace 112002 pp.11 0-114. 
Johnson, R. and Zenko, M. 'All Dressed Up And No Place To Go' Parameters Winter 
2002-2003. pp.48-63. 
Kamp, K.H. 'The NATO-Russia Founding Act: Trojan Horse or Milestone of 
Reconciliation?' Aussenpolitik No 4, 1997, pp 250-266. 
Karasev, A 'Russia in Yugoslavia: Mission Accomplished' International Affairs 
(Moscow) January 2001, (electronic edition, http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/article). 
Kazantsev, B. 'Obvious Bias to the Use of Force' International Affairs (Moscow) July 
1999 (electronic edition, http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/article). 
Kelin, A 'Spokoinoi Negativnoe Otnoshenie k Rasshireniyu NATO' Mezhdunarodnaya 
Zhizn' No 12, December 2003, pp.10-22. 
Klaiber, KP. 'The NATO-Russia Relationship a Year After Paris' NATO Review Vol 
VoI.46(3), 1998 pp.16-19. 
Kolodziejczyk, P. 'Poland- a Future NATO ally' NATO Review VoI.42(5), 1994, 
pp.7-1O. 
Kovac, M. 'Slovakia and the Partnership for Peace' NATO Review VoI.42(1), 1994, 
pp.15-IS. 
Kozin, V. 'The Krernlin and NATO: Prospects for Interaction' International Affairs· 
(Moscow) May 2000 (electronic edition, http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/article). 
Kozyrev, A. 'The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance' NATO Review VoI41(1), 1993 
pp.3-6. 
Kozyrev, A. 'Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe' NATO 
Review VoI.42(4), 1994, pp.3-6. 
Kritsiotis, D. 'The Kosovo Crisis and NATO's Application of Force Against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia' International and Comparative Law Ouarterly VoI.49(2), 2000, 
pp.330-359. 
Levitin, O. 'Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle' Survival Vol. 42(1), 2000, pp.130-140. 
Light, M., White, S. and Lowenhardt J. 'A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow and 
Kiev' International Affairs VoI.76(1), 2000, pp.77-SS. 
Lukin, V. 'Chechnya, Corruption, Kosovo, NATO, and Other Problems' International 
Affairs (Moscow), November 1999 (electronic edition, 
http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sourceslarticle). 
Mandelbaum, M. 'A Perfect Failure; NATO's War Against Yugoslavia' Foreign Affairs 
VoI7S(5), 1999, pp.2-S. 
Matser, W. 'Towards a New Strategic Partnership' NATO Review VoI.49(4), 2001 
(electronic edition, http://www.nato.intldoculreview). 
Melescanu, T. 'Security in Central Europe: A Positive-Sum Game' NATO Review 
VoI.41(5), 1993, pp.l2-18. 
McGwire, M. NATO Expansion and European Security Brassey's Defence Yearbook 
1997, pp.6-21. 
Mihalisko, M. 'European-Russian Security and NATO's Partnership for Peace' RFEIRL 
Research RejJort VoI3(33) 1994. 
Noev, B. 'More Optimism for the Balkans' NATO Review VoI.41(2),1993, pp.10-14. 
Novotny, J. 'The Czech Republic: An Active Partner with NATO' NATO Review 
VoI.42(3), 1994, pp.12-15. 
O'Connell, M.E. 'The UN, NATO and International Law after Kosovo' Human Rights 
OuarterlyVol22, 2000, pp.57-89. 
Orend, B. 'Crisis in Kosovo: A Just Use of Force?' Politics VoI19(3), 1999, pp. 125-130. 
Papasotiriou, H. 'The Kosovo War: Kosovar Insurrection, Serbian Retribution and 
NATO Intervention' Journal of Strategic Studies VoI.25(1), 2002, pp.39-62. 
Pick, O. 'Reassuring Eastern Europe' NATO Review VoI.40(2), 1992, pp.27-31. 
Piontkovsky, A. and Tsygichko, V. 'Russia and NATO after Paris and Madrid: A 
Perspective from Moscow' Contemporary Security Policy VoI.19(2),1998, pp.121-125. 
Rich, R. 'Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union' 
European Journal ofInternational Law VoI.4(1),1993, pp.36-66. 
Robertson, G. 'A New Quality in the NATO-Russia Relationship' International Affairs 
(Moscow), January 2002 (electronic edition, http://www.ebiblioteka.ru!sources/article). 
Riihle, M. 'NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11 ' Parameters Summer 2003, 
pp. 89-97. 
Schulte, G. 'Bringing Peace to Bosnia and Change to the Alliance' NATO Review 
VoI.45(2), 1997, pp. 22-25. 
Schuite, G. 'The Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO' Survival VoI39(1),1997, 
pp.19-42. 
Sergeyev,1. 'We Are Not Adversaries, We Are Partners' NATO Review Vol. 46(1), 
1998, pp.15-18. 
Sergunin, A. 'Discussions ofInternational Relations in Post-Communist Russia' 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies VoI.37(1), 2004, pp.19-35. 
Shevtsov, 1. 'Russian-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for the Future?' 
NATO Review VoI.45(2), 1997, pp.17-21. 
Simrna, B. 'NATO, The UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects' European Journal of 
International Law Vol.l 0(1), 1999. pp. 1-22. 
Smith, M.A. 'A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination: NATO-Russian Relations 
1991-2002' European Security Vol 11(1),2002, pp. 54-75. 
Sobell, V. 'NATO, Russia and the Yugoslav War' The World Today VoI51(11), 1995, 
pp.210-215. 
Solana, J. 'NATO-Russia Relations: On Track' NATO Review VoI.45(6), 1997 p. 3. 
Stigler, A.L. 'A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo' 
International Security Vo1.27(3), 2002-03, pp.124-157. 
Suchocka, H. 'Poland's European Perspective' NATO Review Vo1.41(3), 1993, pp.3-6. 
Trenin, D. 'Avoiding a New Confrontation with NATO' NATO Review VoI.44(3), 1996, 
pp.17-20. 
Trenin, D. 'Russia-NATO relations: Time to Pick Up the Pieces' NATO Review 
Vo1.48(1), 2000 (electronic edition, http://www.nato.intldocu/review). 
Trenin, D. 'Silence of the Bear' NATO Review VoI.50(1), 2002 (electronic edition, 
http://www.nato.intldocu/review). 
Tsygankov, A.P. 'The Final Triumph of the Pax Americana? Western Intervention in 
Yugoslavia and Russia's Debate on the Post-Cold War Order' Communist and Post 
Communist Studies, Vo1.34(2), 2001, pp.133-156. 
Valki, 1. 'Russia and the Security of East-Central Europe' European Security Vo1.5, 
Autumn 1996, pp.448-469. 
Wallander, C. 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War' 
International Organization VoI.54(4), 2000, pp.705-735. 
Waltz, K. 'Structural Realism after the Cold War' International SecurityVoI.25(1), 2000. 
pp. 5-41. 
Webber, M. 'A Tale of A Decade: European Security Governance and Russia' European 
Security Vo1.9, Summer 2000, pp.31-60. 
Weller, M. 'The RambouiIIet Conference on Kosovo' International Affairs Vol. 7 5(2), 
1999 pp. 211-251. 
Warner, M. 'The Atlantic Alliance in the New Era' NATO Review VoI.39(1), 1991, 
pp.3-8. 
Zagorski, A. 'Great Expectations' NATO Review VoI.49(1), 2001, pp.24-27. 
Zwack, P. 'A NATO-Russia Contingency Command' Parameters Spring 2004, pp.89-
103. 
Reports and Occasional Papers 
Amroliwala, F.F. 'Open Fire or Under Fire? The Validity of Augustinian Principles of 
War in the Twenty First Century' Seaford House Papers 2001. 
Antonenko, O. 'The NATO-Russia Council: Challenges and Opportunities', paper 
presented at the Conference on Dual Enlargement and the Baltic States: Security Policy 
Implications Tallinn 11-13 February 2004. 
Arbatov, AG. 'The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post-Cold War Era', paper for the 
Atlantic Council of the United States March 2000. 
Cross, S. 'Russia and NATO Toward the Twenty First Century: Conflicts and 
Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo' NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship 
Report August 2001. 
Currie, J. 'NATO's Humanitarian Intervention In Kosovo: Making or Breaking 
International Law?' Atlantic Council of Canada Paper No.2, 1999. 
Pettifer, J. 'Kosovo, March 2004: The Endgame Begins' Conflict Studies Research 
Centre Paper 04/04 (Balkan Series) April 2004. 
Smith, M.A. 'Russia and the West' Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper F78 July 
2002. 
Smith, M.A 'Igor Ivanov on Iraq and the Struggle for a New World Order' Conflict 
Studies Research Centre Occasional Brief No 102 February 2004. 
Smith, M.A 'Russia and the EU under Putin' Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 
04/20 (Russian Series) July 2004. 
Smith, M.A. 'The Russia-USA Relationship' Conflict Studies Research Centre Paper 
04/12 (Russian Series) May 2004 
Webber, M. 'Third Party Inclusion in ESDP: Form and Substance - a Case Study of 
Russia' , paper presented to the International Conference of the European Community 
Studies Association Madison, Wisconsin June 2001. 
Press and Periodicals 
Air Force Magazine 
Bosnia Report 
Daily Telegraph 
Diplomaticheskii Vestnik 
Economist 
Financial Times 
Guardian 
Independent 
International Herald Tribune 
ITAR-TASS World Service 
Izvestiya 
Jane's Defence Weekly 
Jane's Intelligence Digest 
Johnson's Russia List 
Kommersant Daily 
Krasnaya Zvezda 
Kuranty 
Moskovskie Novosti 
Newsweek 
New Times 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta DipKur'er 
Nezavisimoye Voyennoe Obozreniye 
Observer 
Oxford Analytica 
RFEIRL Newsbriefs 
Rossiska ya Gazeta 
Segodnya 
Sovetskaya Rossiya 
Spectator 
Times 
Transition 
Vestnik Voennoi Informatsii 
Washington Times 
Zavtra 

